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ABSTRACT
The rules of the international economic order have traditionally sought to reduce
trade barriers between national markets; domestic policy autonomy has been viewed
as an inviolable sovereign freedom. The 1994 WTO Government Procurement
Agreement requires Member States to introduce a series of administrative procedures
for their tendering processes, as well as institutional avenues through which
individual suppliers can invoke indirect "rights" they gain from these "common
rules"; its positive disciplines represent a departure from the traditional, negative
GAIT regulatory "methodology". This thesis involves a study of what these
institutional changes have to say about economic policy-making and enforcement
processes in an interdependent world.
Part I presents an institutional history of the GPA and an analysis of how it works.
Part II examines the kind of domestic intervention associated with the Agreement,
concluding that the most significant interference with sovereigns' autonomy is neither
strictly legislative nor administrative. The GPA's enforcement mechanism - in
conjunction with the individual "rights" arising from its procedural obligations -
"constitutionalises" the rights to national treatment it engenders. This implies a US-
style relationship between property and the state. Executive and legislative powers
are separated and both are limited by law. Judicial-like entities, in turn, fulfill an
arbitrator's role, charged with determining whether a government entity has acted in a
manner consistent with its legally-delimited powers.
3The final section presents reasons why GPA Member States may have been willing to
accept the "intervention" that is implicit in the Agreement, developing an argument
that the GPA is a "means" to Members' "shared end" of facilitating the integration of
markets and, most importantly, ensuring their subsequent integrity. States, in
implementing the "common rules", act as agents on behalf of the economic order
because, in a globalising world, cooperation is consistent with citizens' welfare. The
way in which this cooperation is structured allows for heterogeneous political
interests to be accommodated. To the extent that the GPA protects individual rights
for "collective ends", it is not inconsistent with unitary state notions of sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
GATT's Domestic Policy Dilemma
The rules of the international economic order have traditionally sought to reduce
trade barriers between national markets and ensure that Member States' trade policies
do not harm the interests of their trading partners; domestic policy autonomy has
been viewed as an inviolable "sovereign freedom". Since the outset of the GATT in
1947, it has, however, been formally recognised that domestic policies could be
employed to undermine the tariff and trade policy concessions that Member States
had exchanged under the accord. Article HI of this Agreement seeks to ensure that
imported goods receive the same treatment as goods of local origin with respect to
policy matters under government control, reading in part: "The contracting parties
recognise that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and
requirements... should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production".' Like all Part II GATT duties, or rules embodied
in the latter's "Code of Conduct", however, this obligation - under the Protocol of
Provisional Application through which it was initially applied - was only binding to
the extent that it was not inconsistent with Contracting Parties' (hereafter CPs)
existing national legislation. Furthermore, as will be seen, it was vague. Because of
the way in which it was specified, the "national treatment" obligation represented a
"political aspiration", more than a "legal commitment". Through the early 1960s,
despite the fact that a few factious disputes relating to Article ifi arose, multilateral
liberalisation focused almost exclusively on the reduction of tariff barriers. It was
GATT. "The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade". Geneva: July 1986,
p.6.
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not until the Tokyo Round Codes were agreed in 1979 that this started to change in
an institutionally significant way.
This thesis involves a study of the evolution of one of these "codes", known today as
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (hereafter GPA). This Agreement's
plurilateral - or something less than multilateral but more than bi-lateral - disciplines
govern the administrative processes associated with government procurement, or
public purchasing. One of four agreements separate from, and annexed to the WTO
Charter, it remains outside of the latter's broad institutional parameters, or what is
known colloquially as the Charter's "umbrella". This thesis is a study of the question
of why. Its focus, accordingly, is largely historical. For this reason, the GATT 1947
- the treaty that established the postwar international order - will be the broader
institutional measure against which most of the discussion takes place.2
Public purchasing, an activity that accounts for roughly 10 - 15% of most countries'
GNPs, is one of the most important tools that governments wield for the promotion
of political objectives. It is, in a sense, the "carrot" that goes with the "stick" of
It should be mentioned that, as from 1994, the GAIT 1947 technically ceased to exist;
its substantive provisions were formally incorporated into a "new GAIT 1994", and its
institutional concepts and procedures were enveloped by the WTO Charter.
As regards the historical orientation of the thesis, an Early Review of the GPA is currently
underway in Geneva, as well as procurement-related negotiations in two other WTO fora, a
newly created Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement and the Council for
Trade in Services Working Party on GATS Rules. Despite the many interesting, institutionally-
oriented questions surrounding these ongoing activities - eg. the possible "multilateralisation" of
the GPA and/or the introduction of a simpler "Transparency Agreement" - this thesis is premised
on an assumption that, prior to considering them, it is important to understand why the GPA
emerged in the "institutionally unorthodox" way in which it did, and what its "methodology"
necessarily implies.
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taxation. For this reason, it is hardly surprising that government procurement was
specifically excluded from the national treatment obligations of Article III of the
GATT. Paragraph 8(a) of the latter stated categorically: "The provisions of this
Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental
purposes..." 3
 Although the possibility of bringing procurement under multilateral
supervision was raised during the Kennedy Round (1963 - 67), formal disciplines for
procurement only emerged in the context of the Tokyo Round (1973 - 1979), more
than 10 years later.4
 They came in the form of a self-standing, conditionally-
reciprocal "Government Procurement Code". Like the 5 other "codes" negotiated at
this time, it was generally procedural in nature, restricted in application - both in
terms of coverage and Member State participation - and designed to be self-
enforcing. Along with its fellow Codes, too, it came to be recognised as the source
of ineffective, or asymmetrically-credible disciplines. Not reconciled by the intra-
Member re-negotiation of the accord that was completed in 1986, this problem
became an important issue in yet another "round" of re-negotiations that commenced
in 1987, especially after a national treatment-related dispute arose between the US
and Norway in 1991. This thesis will study the Agreement that resulted from the
most recent negotiations, focusing on the "institutionally innovative" way in which it
op. cit., GA1'T, "The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", p. 7.
Under Article XXIII, paragraph I of this Agreement, defense-related
procurement is still generally excluded from its market disciplines; Member States' scheduled
commitments specify positive listings of any military entity's procurement that is to be covered
by the accord, eg. motor vehicles and foodstuffs for the Ministry of Defense. The thesis' Part I
discussion of the way in which concessions with respect to GPA coverage were negotiated will
consider this issue in more detail. See below, pp. 83 - 86.
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addressed the issue of enforcement and asking what its reinforced domestic
disciplines necessarily imply as regards relations amongst its Member States.5
The regulatory "dilemma" that is reconciled in the GPA originates, in very general
terms, from the fact that every national economic system reflects the
institutionalisation of different social values, or conceptions of the "political good".
These values, as John Rawls has explained, determine how the advantages of social
cooperation are distributed; practically speaking, they usually operate by constraining
the objectives of policy - either formally or informally. 6
 In so doing, they define the
legitimate functions of government. They also, as will be seen, dictate the nature of
the relationship between the state and the individual. The manner in which all of this
transpires is largely a question of how political authority is structured in a given
society. For example, in a federal state wherein political authority is based on
popular sovereignty and allocated on the basis of a written constitution, the elected
representatives of the sovereign people may have chosen to use public procurement
to facilitate affirmative action. To achieve this value-related objective, legislators
have enacted substantive law - eg. legislating that specified margins of preference be
granted to qualifying minority suppliers - and designated formal, detailed legal
In an unpublished speech given to employees of the WTO Secretariat on 11 June 1996,
John Jackson used the term "practice resolutions" when describing the GPA and other WTO
Plurilateral Agreements, underscoring their "quasi-legal" nature. Whilst this is a critically
important distinction for any legal analysis of these international agreements, it is not one that
necessarily precludes this thesis' analysis of the political theory that is implicit in the OPA.
Considerably more will be said regarding this subject in the second section of this thesis wherein
the kind of political intervention that the Agreement entails will be analysed. See below, pp. 208
- 257.
°	 Rawis, J., A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971, p. 7.
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procedures, dictating the role that the executive's administrative officials are to play
in implementing the law and thereby facilitating the objective. The purpose of the
procedures is to clarify the substantive objective and define the limits of executive
discretion. They operate by creating corresponding individual rights to affirmative
action; rights which may be invoked before the judicial branch of government by the
individuals who possess them if there is some question as regards whether they have
been respected. In political contexts of this nature, law is used as a tool to
implement, albeit indirectly, the "sovereign will". 7
 It is also employed as a
mechanism for the distribution of political authority and a "check" on its exercise.
Even amongst democratic governments, there is a variety of different ways in which
the exercise of political authority may be structured. Since the French Revolution,
however, there have been two roughly competing approaches amongst such entities:
that, on the one hand, of the Anglo-American, or common law countries which tends
to privilege the rights of the individual over those of society, versus the Continental,
or civil law approach which favours the equal rights of man as a citizen and thus
generally tends to advantage the interests of the collective relative to the individual.8
In an article entitled, "Binding sovereigns: authorities, structures, and geopolitics in
Philadelphian systems", Daniel Deudney described this approach to the organisation of political
authority as that of "recessed" authority. "The sovereign of a polity," he said, "is recessed when
the exercise of authority has been delegated to some other body or bodies." This is as opposed to
the "engaged sovereign", or one who actually wields authority directly. See State Sovereignty as
Social Construct, edited by T. Biersteker and C. Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
This distinction is described more fully in George Sabine's "The Two Democratic
Traditions". The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXI. No. 4, October 1952, pp. 451 - 474.
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Michael Sandel has explained these differences on the basis of the relationship
between liberty and self-government:
"On the liberal view, liberty is defined in opposition to democracy, as a constraint on
government. I am free insofar as I am a bearer of rights that guarantee my immunity
from certain majority decisions. On the republican view, liberty is understood as a
consequence of self-government. I am free insofar as I am a member of a political
community that controls its own fate, and a participant in the decisions that govern its
affairs" .
In practice, the political theory that constrains the exercise of authority in any given
sovereign jurisdiction is likely to represent a combination of the two traditions,
especially given the economic, political and legal integration that has occurred since
the end of the Second World War.'° "Equality," as George Sabine put it, "does
depend on liberty and liberty on equality, because each expresses a phase of the kind
of human relationship that democracy hopes measurably to realise.tt Nevertheless,
he concludes, "...(T)he simple device of rejecting one is not a live option. Ideals that
have been imbedded for centuries in a culture are not discarded with impunity..."
The contrasting democratic traditions, in other words, lie at the heart of the
intellectual foundations on which the institutions of Western society have been
structured.
Sandel, M. Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 25 - 26.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann describes this process as a movement from the "international
law of co-existence" to an "international law of co-operation". See the discussion on pp. 49 - 53
of his paper, "Constitutional Functions of Public International Economic Law" in Restructuring
the International Economic Order: The Role of Law and Lawyers, edited by P. van Dijk, F. van
Hoof, A. Koers and K. Mortelmans. Deventer: Kiuwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1987.
op. cit., Sabine, p. 474.
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As will be seen in Part I of the thesis, the evolution of the GPA is fundamentally a
story about an evolving international understanding of the concept of discrimination,
or problems of individual inequality before the law. Because of the way in which
diverging national perspectives with respect to the "political good" and the
contrasting democratic traditions and cultures with which they are associated
ultimately affect the realities of day-to-day politics, this concept - which might also
be described as "non-national treatment" - is institutionally contingent; each
participant in the international economic order has a unique perspective on what
constitutes "discrimination". The task of the GPA negotiators who were sitting at the
juncture of potentially more than 100 different economic systems - as well as that of
the GATT and OECD delegates who had proceeded them - was, accordingly, to
specify a common "domestic policy denominator". One that was credible and, above
all, did not substantially undermine any of the local values represented in the
economic systems that were to be amalgamated under the accord, or, less
theoretically, one that was politically palatable irrespective of the relationship
between values and domestic policies within any given national jurisdiction. The
specific issues that this thesis will investigate surround the question of what was
finally going to constitute discriminatory behaviour in government procurement and
how assessments with respect to this behaviour were going to be made and enforced.
Because of the potential relationship between the administrative activities to be
"regulated" and any given nation state's normative underpinings, negotiators'
"solution set" was constrained by the need to accommodate what have been referred
to as "inviolable sovereign freedoms". Any negotiated domestic disciplines could
not, that is, threaten state autonomy, or the equal liberty of sovereign entities to
16
assess and pursue their citizens' interests) 2
 Better known as the principle of non-
intervention, this constraint necessarily implied that any Agreement would effectively
delimit the boundaries of the GATT's "inviolable sovereign freedoms", at least in
they existed in this particular policy context.
Through a study the institutional evolution of the GPA, and an examination of how
its domestic disciplines, or "practices" work and differ from the traditional GATT
regulatory methodology, this thesis seeks a better understanding of the boundaries of
"sovereign freedom" within the international economic order. This objective will be
pursued through an analysis of three different lines of questioning, each relating, as
will be seen, to a different aspect of "sovereign freedom", namely: 1) the institutional
history and innovations of the GPA; 2) the nature of the intervention, or interference
with sovereign entities' autonomy that is implicit in the Agreement; and 3) its
political economic context and implications as regards relations between its Member
States.
The Institutional Evolution of the GPA
- The GPA requires that its Member States introduce a series of administrative
procedures for their tendering processes, as well as institutional mechanisms through
which individual suppliers can invoke indirect "rights" that they gain from the
common procedures; these positive policy obligations represent a departure from the
negative disciplines, or policy proscriptions that have traditionally characterised the
12	 These definitions are taken from Charles Beitz' discussion of the principle of non-
intervention in Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979, PP. 71 -83.
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rules of the multilateral trading system. The first series of questions looks at the way
in which the GPA's policy "practices" differ from the GA1'T's conventional
"regulatory methodology" and why. Proceeding from a general review of the
modified liberal theory on which the international order was structured, explaining
the origins of the GATT's traditional disciplinary methodology, the analysis draws
heavily on "regulatory learning experiences" offered by economic integration in a
European context.
Political Implications: Issues of Intervention
- The second line of questioning is more theoretical; it focuses on the issue of
intervention, taking a closer look at how "sovereign freedom" is constrained by the
Agreement. At first glance, the kind of intervention that is entailed in the GPA
would appear to be relatively straightforward. The Agreement's positive policy
disciplines, or "transparency procedures" impinge upon Member States' legislative
authority to the extent that the latter are committed to implement national
procurement rules that are in conformity with them. Similarly, Member States'
administrative authority is affected to the extent that they must ensure that domestic
"court-like" review entities have been designated and given the necessary authority to
act as agents of enforcement for the "common rules". In that all of these
requirements are voluntary and can be seen as "means" to otherwise unobtainable
sovereign "ends", however, neither of these two kinds of intervention, per Se,
constitute serious infringements of "sovereign freedom". Nevertheless, the overall
"solution" to the problem of discrimination that is embodied in the GPA is generally
consistent with a particular way of thinking about the "political good". One that, in
18
keeping with its intellectual roots in the doctrine of natural rights, seeks to enable
individuals to choose and pursue their own ends, or political "goods". In this sense,
the way in which the legislative and administrative intervention that the GPA entails
are combined are particularly significant. This section analyses the specific form of
political organisation that GPA Member States must introduce for the conduct of
administrative activities covered by the accord, determining that the Agreement
establishes a US-style institutional relationship between individual property owners
and the state. In using law to structure and limit the exercise of political power, the
GPA effectively "constitutionalises" certain "property rights" of potential suppliers.
Boundaries between and amongst institutions of government are established, and the
rights of individuals are privileged relative to those of the collective.
The Context of the Agreement
- The final series of questions is contextual. It asks why GPA Member States may
have been willing to accept the kind of "quasi-legal" domestic discipline that is
embodied in the Agreement, particularly given their long-standing reticence to
entertain even the most limited of "political" domestic policy constraints. An
argument is developed that the GPA is a "means" to the "shared end" of facilitating
the integration of markets and, most importantly ensuring their on-going integrity.
Member States, in implementing the "common rules", effectively act as agents on
behalf of the economic order because, in a globalising world, cooperation is not only
consistent with citizens' welfare, but may be absolutely required if a sovereign is to
fulfill certain of its duties.
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Normative implications of the American approach to the ordering of political
authority that is implicit in the GPA will also be considered in this section. An
argument will be developed that the Agreement's common "practices" should be
viewed as means to independent, albeit shared, sovereign ends. Economic
interdependence is necessitating a greater degree of precision as regards the
definition of the principles of international law, and, more specifically, how they
interface with domestic legal structures. Although the GPA's "regulatory
methodology" is unquestionably interventionary, the voluntary character of all its
obligations - combined with the way in which reciprocity has facilitated the factoring
of local values and preferences into the exchange of market access concessions under
the Agreement and the cultural homogeneity on which competing political
philosophies are premised - suggest that it may provide the only politically viable
institutional avenue for further liberalisation. In addition, given the "mortal diseases
under which popular governments have everywhere perished," capitalism may not be
a sustainable process if a GPA-style separation of political powers is not adopted and
the process of globalisation continues apace.'3
A Gambol Through the Theory
The relationship between values and economic policies, including those governing
public procurement, has been introduced and briefly considered. This section will
develop some of the thinking behind this linkage a bit further. Its focus, however,
will be on theoretical aspects of the broader, corresponding relationship between
13 The reference here is to James Madison's famous description of the "problem of
factions", a "problem" that will be discussed at length in chapter 2.3, pp. 226 - 250.
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values and the functions of government. More particularly, the section highlights the
awkward international interface between economics and politics that results from the
fact that every sovereign entity has a different value-related perspective regarding the
legitimate ends of collective endeavour. The international economic order currently
sits at an "institutional intersection" between 131 independent entities; its purpose,
from this theoretical perspective, is to politically defuse policy externalities arising,
ultimately, from competing conceptions of the "political good" reflected, as will be
seen, in the positive policies of negative, or liberal states. This section surveys what
political theory has to say regarding the way in which this system is structured
relative to this "end". Because of broad parallels between the economic philosophy
on which the order is premised and that underlying the liberal nation state, it is
organised around the three fundamental duties that Adam Smith specified for a
liberal nation state, namely defending the realm, protecting civil rights - including
those of property - and providing public, or collective goods. Particular attention is
given to the problems that are inherent in applying this theory extranationally. The
chapter concludes with a review of existing academic work in this area and a
discussion of the thesis' relationship to these prior enquiries.
The Social Function of Economic Systems
Earlier sections of this chapter cited Rawls' comments concerning the social function
of economic systems. He referred to such institutions, it will be recalled, as social
21
arrangements that "distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the
division of advantages from social cooperation".' 4
 More specifically, they govern:
"what things are produced and by what means, who receives them and in return for
which contributions, and how large a fraction of social resources is devoted to saving
and to the provision of public goods".'5
The political connotations of an economic system arise from the fact that, in all
nation states, it is a major factor in determining a citizen's life prospects, or, as Rawls
put it, "what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do".' 6 Each society
must decide how these opportunities are to be distributed amongst its members; it
must have, that is, standards of equity against which determinations of this nature can
be assessed. "(A)ny economic system," as Joan Robinson has explained, "requires a
set of rules, an ideology to justify them, and a conscience in the individual which
makes him strive to carry them out".' 7
 Social values, in this sense, lie at the heart of
every economic system.
The international economic order, as has been mentioned, sits at an institutional
juncture between more than 100 different national economic systems. On a Rawisian
view, each one is an "outgrowth of different notions of society against the
background of opposing views of the natural necessities and opportunities of human
'	 op. cit., J. Rawls, p. 7.
'	 ibid., p. 266.
16	 ibid., p. 7.
'	 Robinson, J. Economic Philosophy. Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1962, p. 18. As
quoted by J. Mayall in "The Liberal Economy", op. cit., p. 96.
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life") 8
 At this "higher level" of social order, how do questions pertaining ultimately
to equity, or economic justice get resolved? The answer, on one theoretical view, at
least, is that they are not supposed to arise in the first place. This theory, that of
economic liberalism, provides the conceptual foundations for the postwar trading
system; for this reason, a rough sketch of its outlines follows.
Economic Liberalism
A liberal economic system is governed by a set of economic rules that are, according
to the theory, impersonal, politically neutral and universal. These rules facilitate the
creation of a self-regulating market economy, one in which a society's distributional
dilemmas are largely resolved by the price mechanism. As Karl Polanyi has
explained:
"A market economy is an economic system controlled, regulated and directed by
markets alone; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this
self-regulating mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation
that human beings behave in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. It
assumes markets in which the supply of goods available at a definite price will equal
the demand at that price. It assumes the presence of money, which functions as
purchasing power in the hands of its owners. Production will then be controlled by
prices; for the profits of those who direct production will depend on them; the
distribution of the goods also will depend upon prices, for prices form incomes, and
it is with the help of these incomes that the goods produced are distributed amongst
the members of society. Under these assumptions order in the production and
distribution of goods is ensured by prices alone."9
The political neutrality of a self-regulating market economy emanates from the
longer-term harmony of interests on which it is premised. A self-regulating market,
18	 op. cit., Rawis, p. 9.
19 Polyani, K. The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time.
Beacon Hill: Beacon Press, 1957, p. 68.
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distributionally speaking, portends that "...everyone will gain in accordance with his
or her contribution to the whole". 2° Because individual abilities differ, however, the
benefits of such a system are not distributed uniformly; nevertheless, a longer term
harmony of interests is maintained because the economic growth that the market
facilitates eventually benefits all. As Robert Gilpin put it:
"Individual pursuit of self-interest in the market increases social well-being because
it leads to the maximization of efficiency, and the resulting economic growth benefits
all "21
The public, on this view, is better off with what Andrew Wyatt-Walter recently
termed "overtly self-interested behaviour than with (a sovereign's) superficial public
minded virtue".22
The duties of a liberal, negative or laissez-faire state, as have been mentioned, are
limited to the protection of civil interests from both internal and external "invasion",
and the provision of public, or collective goods. 23
 Sidney Fine described such
entities as merely "passive police(men)... protecting property and administering
justice, but not interfering with the affairs of... citizens". 24
 To the extent that
20	 op. cit., Gilpin, p. 30.
21	 Gilpin, R. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987, p. 30.
22	 Wyatt-Walter, A. "Adam Smith and the liberal tradition in international relations".
Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1996, p. 9.
23 A liberal state, as will be seen, is not necessarily the same as a nation state that adheres
dogmatically to the principles of laissez-faire. The major reasons why will be explored at length
in this thesis. For the purposes of this introduction, in any case, what is important is the idea on
which such entities are premised, namely that of limited government.
24 Fine, S. Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American
(continued...)
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competition regulates economic affairs and governments refrain from interfering with
the commercial activities of their citizens, the intersection between national
economic systems and the international economic order, is thus a seamless one.
Competing interests, if they arise, are transitory. The market - "led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of its intention" - reconciles private
interests with the various market-defined "public goods". 25
 Earlier sections of this
chapter, however, have described this thesis as a study of the GPA as an institutional
"methodology" for the reconciliation of competing economic philosophies reflected,
ultimately, in diverging domestic policies and practices; from this practical
perspective, it is clear that distribution-related problems have arisen within the
international economic order, and, furthermore, that they have proven exceedingly
difficult to resolve. To explain why, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
conceptual issues at play, starting with the particular economic philosophy on which
the international trading system is based.
Defusing the "Political Fallout" from the Positive Policies of Negative States:
The Problems of Liberal International Order
The very existence of the postwar trading system provides evidence of problems in
the operationalisation of the philosophy of economic liberalism. If, that is, an
international "harmony of interests" truly prevailed, there would be no need for an
institution whose purpose is to ensure the peaceful operation of a worldwide
(...continued)
Thought, 1865- 1901. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956, p. 9.
Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations: an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations. London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1914, p. 400.
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commercial community. The following offers a brief overview of these problems; it
then surveys theoretical issues relating to the way in which they have been
accommodated in the GAIT. The balance of the thesis, to reiterate, will be devoted
to a study of the WTO OPA as a practical example of how those problems relating
specifically to Member States' diverging civil laws and practices might be reconciled.
Since the early 1900s, the Western liberal economies have struggled to resolve two
inter-related, social dilemmas arising from their economic philosophies: 1) the fact
that a self-regulating market has never been cleanly excised from the society of
which it is a product, giving rise, ultimately, to various security-related, positive
duties for the otherwise negative liberal nation state and; 2) the international mis-
alignment of economic and political boundaries. These enduring political
conundrums have dictated the parameters of the 'job specification" of the
international economic order. They have necessitated what J.M. Keynes called
institutions to "save liberalism from itself'.26
The duties that Adam Smith outlined for the liberal sovereign were duties for a
liberal nation state; indeed, they were premised on the priority of the defense of that
realm.27
 Each one of them, nevertheless, is reflected in the structure of the
26	 See the discussion in James Mayall's "The Liberal Economy", op. cit., p. 100.
27	 More precisely, in describing the duties of a liberal state, Smith, said:
"... the sovereign has only three duties to attend to... first, the duty of protecting society from the
violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of
it... and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick institutions, which it can
(continued..
26
international economic order. To understand why and how, it is helpful to think
about the organisation and operation of social order in Hayekian terms. Order, that
is, as "stratified structure", existing within and amongst over-lapping layers of social
aggregation. Nation states, on this view, are an important locus of order, but they
exist alongside of other entities like municipalities, regional bodies and groups of
sovereign nation states. As Hayek explained:
"Societies differ from simpler complex structures by the fact that their elements are
themselves complex structures whose chance to persist depends on (or at least is
improved by) their being part of the more comprehensive structure. We have to deal
here with integration on at least two different levels, with, on the one hand, the more
comprehensive order assisting the preservation of ordered structures on the lower
level, and, on the other, the kind of order which on the lower level determines the
regularities of individual conduct assisting the prospect of the survival of the
individual only through its effect on the overall order of the society".28
So as to emphasise areas in which there have been major difficulties in applying
liberal theory at a "higher level" of social aggregation - or across over-lapping
national domains of order - this thesis' discussion of the political theory of the
international trading system will be structured around Smith's description of the 3
duties of the liberal state. The first section, relating to the obligation of national
defense, introduces the fundamental political problem of liberal international order,
namely differing security-related, positive policies of otherwise negative states. It
(...continued)
never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain".
As quoted by Wyatt-Walter, op. cit., p. 10.
28 Hayek, F.A. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1967, P. 76. As quoted by J. Tumlir in "Strong and Weak Elements in the Concept
of European Integration" in Reflections on a Troubled World Economy: Essays in Honour of
Herbert Giersch, edited by F. Macblup, G. Fels and H. MuIIer-Groeling. London: Macmillan,
1983, pp. 32 -33.
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develops an associated vision of the purpose of order that highlights parallels
between the way in which domestic law has gradually "freed" the individual within
national liberal society, and how the GATT norm of non-discrimination, combined
with the negative disciplines of its Part II Code secure "sovereign freedom" within
the international community of states. The next section reviews the "civil law
functions" of the trading system. Incorporating a brief discussion of the context of
Adam Smith's political economic theory that focuses on the relationship between
capitalism and the replacement of the absolute sovereign with the "state according to
law", and the "rationalised" view of the public interest vis-à-vis the economy that
began to emerge at this time, it surveys legislative and enforcement-related problems
stemming from the fact that there is no transnational sovereign. A final section
considers sovereign duties relating to the provision of public goods; it focuses on the
allocation of the costs associated with the "collective good" that is represented by
economic order. Parts II and ifi of the thesis, in turn, will use the institutional
example that is provided by the GPA to illustrate one way in which the political
problems that are inherent in liberal international order might be resolved in a world
wherein nation states remain the central locus of social cooperation.
Defending the Realm: Positive Duties for the Negative State
The post-WWII multilateral trading system was founded on a modified liberal vision.
The reasons why are tied to the "defense-related duties of Smith's liberal state; they
have allowed politics to "crash" the otherwise harmonious international economic
"party". The functions of a liberal government have traditionally been defined in
negative tenus. Individuals - either as autonomous entities, or in their capacities as
28
members of the national collective - are central to this doctrine. The job of the state,
more precisely, is defined relative to them - and in particular, either their liberties, or,
to employ a more modern vernacular, state-guaranteed "rights". As Smith said, the
duties of the liberal sovereign extend little further than the protection of these
"personal freedoms" from threats posed by either "the violence and invasion of other
independent societies", or the "injustice or oppression of other members of the
national society". 29
 Liberties - or what Isaiah Berlin described as things individual
citizens should be "able to do or be... without interference by other persons" - play
this central role in the liberal state because individual human purposes and activities
do not automatically harinonise with one another. 3° If individuals are to be "free",
accordingly, they must be prepared to sacrifice a measure of the personal power that
they would enjoy outside of the bounds of organised society. 3 ' This sacrifice enables
a frontier to be drawn between, respectively, areas of private life and those subject to
public authority. Liberties, in this sense, define the job of government by specifying
what it exists to protect, namely rights as "ends" in themselves, or "means" to the
common "ends" of the collective; the rule of law, as later sections of this chapter will
explain, governs this process.
29	 op. cit., as quoted by Wyatt-Walter, p. 10.
30 Berlin, I. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 124.
31 Whether this surrender is a conscious one, or merely a matter of convention has
important implications as regards the nature of a sovereign's authority. This issue - and, in
particular, the implications of political authority premised on a "social contract" - will be the
focus of the concluding analysis in chapter 2.3. See below, especially pp. 245 - 250.
29
Defense-related obligations are "theoretically problematic" in liberal states because
they engender, on the other hand, positive duties for governments that are inherently
difficult to circumscribe. Unity is a first requirement in the face of threat, but it is
also the antithesis of limited government; any effort to contain a sovereign's defense-
related powers potentially constitutes a threat to the realm in its own right. A
sovereign, in acting to ensure the security of the state, inevitably interferes with the
otherwise market-governed economic activities of its citizens; individuals' economic
liberties are thus conditioned upon their government's judgment of the security needs
of the collective. National security, in this very fundamental sense, "sullies" the
"politically pure" operating principles of laissez-faire government.
The market disruption and uncertainty engendered by a sovereign's obligation to
defend the nation, in turn, are intensified in an extranational setting; just as with the
values that underlie its economic philosophy, each sovereign has its own perspective
regarding what constitutes a threat to the realm, including dangers that may come
from social unrest within its own borders. 32 For this reason, although the multilateral
trading system was structured around the principles of economic liberalism, to the
extent that its participating governments intervened in their domestic markets for
defense-related reasons, politics could not be kept out of the wider system. If
markets had been either more perfectly self-regulating, or political and economic
boundaries coincident, the situation might have been different. The international
economic order would not be necessary to ensure peaceful commercial relations
32 The fact that threats may be either externally or internally-generated bears emphasis. As
will be seen, many of the social welfare-related positive duties that have been assumed by states
since WWI are motivated by governments' desire to stem domestic political unrest.
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between nation states, in other words, if the individual freedoms - and those
pertaining to property in particular - that otherwise limit a state's authority and enable
the market to function as a social decision procedure had not been conditioned on
sovereign perceptions relating to the security of a realm, or, alternatively, perceptions
of the latter nature had been aligned in a more "melodious manner" with market
boundaries.
In order to appreciate the profusion of political problems potentially associated with
this situation and the way in which the GA1'T sought to palliate them, it is helpful to
have a general understanding of the historical context from which the postwar
economic order emerged. Contracting Parties' prior experiences with 19th century
liberal international economic order and their perceptions of the role that economics
had played in outbreak of the Second World War, in this sense, are particularly
significant: The first World War destroyed what had been a generally stable, liberal
international economic order. 33
 It also contributed to the formation of new ideas
concerning the proper economic role of the nation state. Jan Tumlir, in describing
this period, observed:
B	 Many interesting issues surround the "disharmony of interests" that ultimately resulted in
the implosion of this 100 year old institution, eg. the role played by Germany and the US, the
"emerging economies" of the day, in undermining British hegemony. For the general purposes of
this theoretical review, however, it is sufficient to note that "market justice" during the 19th
century was Darwinian in its rawest form. Robert Gilpin, in describing it, said:
"The goals of economic policy were modest in this prewelfare state era... This, it should be
remembered, was still an age when society's demands on government were few, and the ruling
elites preferred the dangers of tight money and deflation to those of cheap money and inflation.
Both the poorer nations and the poorer classes within societies frequently paid the price of
adjustment through higher rates of unemployment and decreased welfare".
See the discussion in R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 126.
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(After the war, governments) governed with far less assurance than before 1914...
(A)s the nationalist fever subsided and people began to ask what it had all been for,
all the belligerent European governments, whether winners or losers felt
weakened".
He concluded, quoting E.M.H. Lloyd:
"For the first time in history the world began to have a vision of what human
association, raised to its highest degree might accomplish... Men who have breathed
the larger air of common sacrifice are reluctant to return to the stuffy air of self-
seeking" .
A world wide depression and another war intervened before these ideas were of
much practical influence. Both of these events, however, proved to be major factors
in the development of a general consensus amongst Western political economists that
a broader, re-distributive economic role for the state might be appropriate. In
surveying the policy environment from which the GATT emerged, Tumlir stated:
"During the Second World War, the view gained almost universal acceptance that the
inter-war economic disaster was due to laissez-faire, and in particular to the
premature dismantling of government controls in the 1920s in the midst of economic
dislocations so severe that private markets could not cope with them. This view was
particularly influential in Britain but also in the underground movements of the
occupied European countries, and strongly influenced their post-war governments".36
John Keynes demand management theories were of particular influence in the
"theoretical compromise" that was finally realised in the postwar trading system.
Tumlir, J. "Evolution of the concept of international economic order 1914 - 80", in
Changing Perceptions of Economic Policy: Essays in honour of the seventieth birthday of Sir
Alec Cairncross, edited by F. Cairncross. London: Methuen, 1982. p. 154.
ibid., p. 155.
36	 op. cit., Tumlir, p. 172.
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Developing an argument that a self-regulating market could not facilitate a stable
process of economic growth, they tied full employment and domestic stability to the
issue of national security, the one area in which economic liberalism endorsed
positive duties for the otherwise negative state. 37
 James Mayafl has motivated
Keynes' ideas in the following manner:
"Keynes... was convinced that, in the absence of effective international machinery,
national governments had to take unilateral action to overcome the problem of mass
unemployment and to lay to rest the spectre of communist revolution to which it had
given rise throughout the capitalist world".38
Keynesian theory caused a major difference of opinion between the UK and the US,
the initiators of the postwar negotiations for an "international trade organisation";
nonetheless, it found direct reflection in the objectives of the provisional Agreement
that established the GA1'T in 1947:
"...Relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment (emphasis added), and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange
of goods".39
The Anglo-American controversy surrounded the issue of employment, and,
specifically, what the state's responsibilities should be as regards its availability. It is
of particular importance here because, fundamentally, the disagreement involved the
The thesis' discussion of Keynesian political economy draws heavily on chapter 6 of 3.
Caporaso and D. Levine's Theories of Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992, pp. 100 - 125.
38 MayaIl, 3. Nationalism and international society. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 88.
op. cit., GATT, "The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", p. 1.
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proper economic role of the state. Keynes had called for government intervention in
domestic markets to stimulate demand and, thereby, ensure optimal levels of
employment and investment. Such intervention, however, like the other defense-
related obligations of the sovereign, involved more positive duties for the negative
sovereign. The UK and the US were not the only GATT Contracting Parties that
failed to share common perspectives regarding the extent of the state's employment-
related responsibilities - to say nothing of how they should be realised. The
following section explains how Keynes' ideas were factored into the postwar order,
illustrating why, from the very outset of the postwar order, the institutional
floodgates were wide open for further "political adulteration" of international
economic relations.
Technical aspects of the "theoretical compromise"
Practically speaking, the GATT's "theoretical compromise" was reflected in the
myriad of exceptions that were built into its Part II commercial policy disciplines, as
well as the provisional way in which these "policy restraints" were applied nationally
up until the creation of the World Trade Organisation. Crafted to facilitate the
exchange of tariff concessions on a reciprocal basis during a period in which the US
Congress was debating approval of the International Trade Organisation, the GATT,
itself, represented a compromise; it was not designed to fulfil the institutional role
that it eventually assumed when the US Congress failed to approve the ITO. The
Agreement's "code of conduct", in any case, sought only to ensure that the
commercial value of a tariff concession negotiated under its "organisational aegis"
was not undermined by the subsequent introduction of a non-tariff barrier to trade.
34
In keeping with the liberal theory on which the ITO had been premised, the
"regulatory logic" of the GAIT's commercial disciplines was negative in nature; they
sought to limit Contracting Parties' ability to interfere with the flow of trade to the
use of protective tariffs, forbidding, inter alia, quantitative restrictions, currency de-
valuations designed to frustrate trade, discriminatory administration of trade policies
and preferential customs arrangements not designed to lead to integration.40
 The
theoretical idea implicit in such restraint involved the creation of autonomous,
domestic policy realms with which other sovereigns could not legitimately interfere.
That is, in much the same way that the clarification of individual rights vis-à-vis a
sovereign "frees" them within a national society, the specification of things that
GA1'T governments could not do was aimed at the "freeing" of sovereigns within a
liberal international society. This "institutional logic", as Part II of the thesis will
explain in some detail, was consistent with the way in which political authority was
disciplined under the unwritten British Constitution; anything that the sovereign was
not specifically forbidden to do was within its legitimate powers.
One further duty, also traditionally understood in negative terms, was specified for
the economically "autonomous national entities" differentiated by the GATT, that of
non-discrimination; embodied in norms of most favoured nation (hereafter MFN) and
national treatment, it operated to ensure that a Contracting Party's exported goods
were not the objects of discrimination by a foreign government. This thesis, as was
mentioned in the Preface, is basically a story about an evolving understanding of the
4° GAIT rules regarding customs arrangements are not included in Part II of the
Agreement; nevertheless, they are mentioned here because their negative "disciplinary
methodology" is consistent with that of the "code" that is under discussion.
35
implications of this commitment, specifically as it relates to the norm of national
treatment. For the purposes of this theoretical introduction, however, it is sufficient
to note the fundamental objectives of the mutually-reinforcing GATT norms of non-
discrimination: The MEN obligation functioned at the border, governing the
application of customs measures, including tariffs. Its purpose has been described by
John Jackson as that of ensuring that Contracting Parties "treat(ed) activities of a
particular country or its citizens at least as favourably as... the activities of any other
country".4 ' Interpreted in unconditional terms, this duty, more precisely, obliged
Contracting Parties to extend policy-related advantages offered to one Contracting
Party to all others, regardless of whether any given third party was prepared to offer
equivalent privileges. Obligations of national treatment, on the other hand, arose
once imported goods cleared customs and became subject to domestic laws, or
regulations governing local commerce; their aim was to preclude the use of internal
policy mechanisms as surreptitious systems of protection. Jointly, the duties of MEN
and national treatment defined a sovereign "right" to equality before the law. This
"right", in turn, along with the one to non-intervention emanating from the various
negative policy duties contained in Part H of the GATT, specified the parameters of
the "sovereign freedoms" resulting from the Agreement.42
'" Jackson, J. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992, P. 136.
42 The indirect nature of these "rights", as well as the role that individual GATT member
sovereigns have always been required to play in their application bears emphasis. The rights that
are engendered by the GPA generally arise from the implementing legislation through which its
individual Member States comply with its obligations; the Agreement is not, as the lawyers
would say, directly effective. This issue, as will be seen, is tied to the lack of supranational
representative and executive institutions. See below, pp. 193 - 207.
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The theoretical compromise embodied in the GATT, as has been mentioned, was
achieved via the introduction of a series of exceptions to each of the Agreement's
Part II policy proscriptions. The purpose of these exceptions was to allow sovereigns
maximum flexibility for the implementation of positive domestic policies designed to
facilitate national stability and security. Practically speaking, it is not an
exaggeration to say that they had the effect of seriously undermining the liberal logic
of the Agreement's disciplines.43
 In outlining the exceptions, Victoria and Gerard
Curzon-Price said:
"Although the vital m.f.n. (most favoured nation) rule... was most forcefully
formulated, it was followed by a blanket exception for all preferential agreements
which existed prior to GATT's establishment. Another exception... permitted
countries to form customs unions and free trade areas. In addition, while quantitative
restrictions were firmly prohibited in Article XI (with the exception of the loophole
for agricultural products..), they were immediately reintroduced in Article XII as
suitable measures for safeguarding the balance of payments... (Similarly, if) a
domestic producer were threatened with injury due to import competition, in turn due
to past tariff concessions, a contracting party could take emergency action according
to Article XIX... Finally, a general escape clause was to be found in Article XXV,
which permitted the 'waiver' of any GATT obligation 'in exceptional circumstances
not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement".
The basic problem created by the exceptions was that they left the trading system
with the responsibility of reconciling the irreconcilable. A liberal economic order,
regardless of the level of social aggregation by which it is bound, is premised on a
harmony of interests. A cacophony of competing national perspectives regarding
On this point, Victoria and Gerard Curzon-Price quote Michael Heilperin as having
described the GATT as "one of the most hypocritical state documents of modern times". See
Heilperin's "How the US lost the ITO conference", Fortune, September 1949, p. 80, as quoted in
"The Multilateral Trading System of the I 960s", in A. Shonfields International Economic
Relations of the Western World 1959-1971. London: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 152.
"	 ibid.,p.152.
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these interests had now been introduced into this extranational "de-politicised policy
environment". Worse still, there were no agreed methodologies for resolving
differences of opinion arising from the diverging perspectives. An institutional
dilemma relating to the fact that economic boundaries were not necessarily aligned
with political ones had been built into the Agreement. 45
 As Ebba Dohlman has
explained:
"Although the basic principles of the GATT acknowledged the necessity for
governments to maintain full employment, the Agreement contained no substantive
proposals to cope with any potential problems of structural adjustments or the
provision of welfare. While the Keynesian revolution had led to acceptance on the
national level that free play of market forces was not automatically redistributive and
that some form of government intervention was therefore required... (there had been)
no attempt to accommodate the enlarged role of the state in providing security for its
citizens within the international trade order..."46
An international harmony of interests is, furthermore, a harmony of individual
interests. The individual, as has been explained, is the basis of a liberal society and
the negative, or liberal state is one in which the job of government is dictated by a
concern for such interests. The postwar order, despite this fact, did not, for all
practical purposes, even acknowledge individual interests. 47
 Nation states were the
John Ruggie, in describing the implications of this incongruency said, "The relationship
between economic regimes and international transaction flows is inherently problematical,
because the domain of international regimes consists of the behavior of states, vis-à-vis one
another and vis-à-vis the market-place, not the market-place itself. See 'International regimes,
transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order". International
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 383.
46 Dohlman, E. National Welfare and Economic Interdependence: The Case of Sweden's
Foreign Trade Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 26 and p. 212.
Article X, paragraph 3(b) of the GATT 1947, however, obligates Contracting Parties to
create court-like entities for the review of "administrative action relating to customs matters".
The rights that individuals gain indirectly via this obligation are, however, different from those
flowing from the new GPA in important ways. This issue will be the focus of the discussion in
Part ifi of the thesis. See below, especially pp. 258 - 263.
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subjects and respondents of the rights and duties arising in this institutional setting;
they were to be "freed" by the GA1'T in international society, not their individual
citizens. John Jackson, in describing the implications of this situation, said:
"When individuals have a complaint against some foreign nation, the traditional
approach requires those individuals to get their own governments to bring up the
matter in international diplomatic processes or tribunals... If the nation refuses to
proceed, the individual usually has no recourse under international law.48
The "Civil Law Function" of Order
In one sense, the way in which the GATT addressed the inevitable law-making,
application and enforcement-related problems flowing from the lack of an
international sovereign was simply no to deal with theni; through the first 15 years
that the Agreement was in effect, it did little more than provide an institutional forum
in which sovereign entities could negotiate reciprocal tariff concessions, and offer
informal, "political judgements" concerning the way in which the latter were
subsequently applied. The interpretation of the Agreement's fundamental negative
disciplines remained, for all practical purposes, little more than a discretionary matter
for the executives of its individual Contracting Parties. Whilst a GAIT Working
Party, or Panel might rule that a particular trade policy was inconsistent with a Party's
obligations under the treaty - or had the equivalent effect - it could call on nothing
stronger than moral suasion to enforce compliance with its ruling; the only available
remedy consisted of withdrawal of whatever benefits had been granted in exchange
for the concession that was at the heart of the dispute, and/or one equivalent to it. As
regards the question of rule-making in this extranational policy environment, the
48 Jackson, J. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, p. 42 and p. 103.
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principle of sovereignty made it difficult to envisage "representation in the GATT"
on anything other than the basis of one country, one vote. This approach, however,
left economically powerful Contracting Parties convinced that their interests were
being consistently under-represented, and, as will be seen, increasingly unwilling to
be bound by any rules agreed under the system.
Part of the reason for this situation, no doubt, was the interim nature of the GATT;
although its "code of conduct" was essentially a replica of the iTO's commercial
policy sections, the Agreement did not include any of the latter's carefully specified
domestic policy disciplines, including those dealing with private restrictions on
competition. 49
 Nor were anything like the ITO's relatively "legalised" dispute
settlement procedures grafted onto the GATT; interpretation of the sovereign
"freedoms" arising from the Agreement's negative disciplines was, as has been
mentioned, to be political rather than judicial, and remedies were limited. At the
same time, a more structured approach was adopted in the Agreement's provisions
governing administrative actions relating to the implementation of customs policies,
or, more specifically, those:
"pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or
to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions
on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale,
The purpose of the latter disciplines, according to a recently produced WTO Secretariat
document, was specifically "to prevent, on the part of private or commercial public enterprises,
business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to
markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the
expansion of production or trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the other
objectives of the Charter". WTO Secretariat. "Competition-related provisions in existing WTO
Agreements". 17 June 1997, p. 2.
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distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhibition,
processing, mixing or other use".5°
Article X, Paragraph 3, in particular, obliged Contracting Parties to:
"... administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings... (and) maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the
prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters".5'
Individual importers, furthermore, were to be given legal standing to invoke such
review. Nevertheless, for reasons that will be the focus of the analysis in Part II of
the thesis, no standards were specified to guide the review processes concerned; the
matter of what was to constitute discrimination in the administration of customs
matters was left to the discretion of individual contracting entities. If, in turn, a
Contracting Party's administrative entities made an error that impinged upon an
importer's civil interests - as opposed to those that the national collective generally
had in "fair" administrative processes - the Agreement made no provision for the
payment of compensatory damages; the purpose of the Article X procedures was
solely to facilitate the correction of administrative errors. Finally, the review
provisions of Article X did not cover the domestic application of the "internally-
oriented" Part II norm of non-discrimination; there were no institutional avenues of
appeal for importers who felt that domestic laws or regulations had been
administered in a manner that impinged upon trade, or, in other words, that a state
had failed to respect its duty of national treatment.
° GATT. The Text of the GeneralAgreement on Tarffs and Trade. Geneva: July 1986,
pp. 16-17.
'	 ibid., pp. 16-17.
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This section proceeded from an observation that the GA1'T addressed the law-related
problems of extra-national order largely by not dealing with them. In another sense,
it might be said that the postwar trading system confronted these institutional
challenges as would have most unitary, Parliamentary sovereigns. The GA1'T, that
is, was structured in a way that was constitutionally consistent with the organisation
of political authority in a nation state in which the power of the government was
centralised, based on some variation of majority rule and administered by a strong
executive. Virtually the same kind of national government, in fact, that Adam Smith
had been involved in "re-engineering" at the end of the 18th century. Part II of this
thesis will examine differences between sovereigns of this nature and those that
embrace its prime democratic alternative, consensual or popular sovereignty. These
differences are significant herein because, as was suggested in the Preface, they affect
the way in which states organise themselves to conduct the business of government,
including the regulation of economic activities; in this sense, it is not a coincidence
that popular sovereignty was an "institutional innovation" that emerged during
Smith's time. The remainder of this "civil law" section, in any case, serves as a brief
historical introduction to the more detailed discussions that will follow by outlining
main features of the political context in which Smith and the early "oeconomists"
were operating. Its purpose is to illustrate how the rise of capitalism necessarily
affected the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state, and, in
turn, contributed to the "rationalised" vision of the economy that developed at this
time. The chapter then concludes with a survey of problems relating to the provision
of public goods in an extranational political context - the third area in which a
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negative state must act - and, finally, a review of existing academic work relating to
the broader issues to be addressed by the thesis.
Contextual parameters of a new economic philosophy
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was published in 1776. It provided what Robert
Heilbroner has described as a "philosophy" for the social revolution then underway
throughout Europe.52
 The revolution was that of an emerging capitalism;
authoritarian and traditional approaches to the management of man's "economic
problem" - namely, that of survival - were being replaced by those of the market.
Owing, at least in part, to its natural advantages in the production of wool, the
process was particularly advanced in England. The political implications of this
social transformation were fundamentally associated with the fact that it necessitated
a modification of the relationship between the individual and the state, as well as
different ways of thinking with respect to the nature of the public interest relative to
the economy. Two aspects of the shift to market society, according to the theory
developed the classical "oeconomists", are of particular relevance for the regulatory
issues under consideration in this thesis: 1) the recognition that property rights had to
be tradable if the market was to function, and; 2) the role that political stability
played in the operation of this new social decision procedure. To facilitate market
exchange, sovereigns were obliged to enact civil rules that would enable the
accumulation of private property. They were also compelled to show a minimum of
respect for these canons themselves. This, in itself, was intellectually revolutionary;
52 Heilbroner, R. The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great
Economic Thinkers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, p. 24.
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prior to this time, the king's power - at least vis-à-vis subjects who were not members
of the nobility - had been formally absolute. 53
 Law, enacted by representative
assemblies, became the instrument of these changes; it facilitated a limitation and re-
organisation of state powers, including those relating to property. 54 It also enabled a
distinction to be made between constituent and constituted power. By the beginning
of the 19th Century, throughout Europe, the modern "state according to law" was
rapidly replacing absolute government.
Up until this time, then-prevailing mercantilistic theory had viewed the economy as
little more than the "personal war chest" of the sovereign. Adam Smith, however,
suggested that the pursuit of private interests in this sphere could also be consistent
with the public interest. The economy, he said, should be viewed as a realm apart,
flawed by man's "slothful nature" but governed - in rough parallel with the physical
world - by a "natural order". This was his famous "harmony of interests" doctrine;
the idea, that is, that by selfishly directing his industry so that "its produce may be of
the greatest value.., every individual (also) necessarily labours to render the annual
revenue of the society as great as he can". 55
 The de-militarised or "rationalised" view
of the economy that it engendered, in turn, would have had even more radical
Its exercise was, in some instances, however, disciplined by the existence of consultative
parliaments, and traditions of respect for the principles of natural law, eg. as embodied in the
British Magna Carta. More will be said about the political role of the former entities - as well as
how it subsequently evolved - in Part II. See below, pp. 226 - 229.
The thesis' discussion of the evolution of the modern state's submission to the rule of law
draws heavily on part I of Allan Brewer-Cat-las' Judicial Review in Comparative Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and chapter 3 of Jan-Erik Lane's Constitutions
and political theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London:
J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1914, p. 400.
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implications for government at that time except for the fact that Smith's liberalism
was qualified by the provision that complete freedom of activity within the private, or
"civic realm" - even within one state - was Utopian. The introduction of positive law
to enable the recognition and exchange of private property did not, in his view, entail
a corresponding emancipation of the individual within civil society. Rather, as
earlier sections of this chapter have explained, it was simply associated with a
fundamental change in the regulatory role of the state; the "negative state", in other
words, had begun to evolve.
During the next century, the English state came to represent a fairly close
institutional approximation of classical "oeconomic" theory. Long before this
happened, however, the British executive's subjugation to the Rule of Law, following
the English Revolution in 1688, had had great influence on the re-organisation of
political authority in other "modemising" European states. Part II of the thesis will
take up this issue in greater detail, particularly as it relates to the way in which
political authority is implicitly organised under the WTO GPA. For the purposes of
this "historical digression", in any case, it is sufficient to note that the modem British
state was, more expressly, constituted by a limited parliamentary government,
operating under the rule of the law. Under its unwritten Constitution, anything that
the sovereign "Queen-in-Parliament" was not legally forbidden to do, it was allowed
to do; this included changing the laws under which the sovereign, as well as all of its
organs and each one of its subjects was governed. The principles of natural justice -
or customary standards of fairness that required authorities to act in an unbiased
manner, after having given those affected by a decision a chance to put their case - in
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turn, regulated the administration of the common law. To the extent that delegated
authority was exercised within whatever limits happened to be attached to a given
piece of legislation, however, administrative discretion knew no further significant
legal bounds.56
This chapter had been in the process of outlining major difficulties associated with
applying Smith's "economic philosophy" extranationally. Before returning to that
broader discussion, however, a few words must be said regarding the one exception
to Smith's "minimalist" perspective, namely, national security. This issue is tied to
the political stability that was cited as the second area of major contextual change
connected with the rise of capitalism, It is also responsible for what James Mayall
has termed an "unresolved tension between collectivism and individualism" that lies
at the heart of economic liberalism.57
The economic ramifications of a sovereign's security-related obligations are
associated with the fact that individuals' "rational planning" with respect to the
exercise of their property rights cannot take place in the face of "irrational
belligerency" within, between, and/or amongst sovereigns. This is particularly true in
the context of transactions that may require the passage of time in order to come to
fruition. Liberal states, accordingly, are charged with defense-related responsibilities
of avoiding unnecessary military entanglements and, somewhat paradoxically,
56 This approach to "administrative law" will be explained in greater detail and contrasted
with that of the popular sovereign in Part II. See below, pp. 251 - 257.
Mayall, J. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 75.
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providing an adequate national defence. Standing armies are warranted because
states need to be able to respond to the "irrational" behaviours of other sovereigns.
Maintaining market security and stability under these conditions is inevitably a
politicised task in that that which must be defended is typically significantly more
than just a functioning market. As viewed by the classical economists, in any case, a
market was a reflection of civil society. Civil societies were the products of unique
cultural and natural circumstances; indeed, their variation across political boundaries
was associated with the advantages of trade. Because of differences of this nature, a
measure of political cooperation between sovereigns has always been required in
order for the benefits of international commerce to be achieved. Markets engender a
"harmony of interests", but they cannot co-exist on an extranational plane without
governments' prior agreement to respect the sovereign freedoms and domestic
obligations of their institutional peers. Institutional ambiguities are inevitably
associated with this situation because both the national and international orders are
otherwise generally organised to facilitate the realisation of individual ends. Defense
of the realm, in other words, is an obligation that might be described as inevitably
and "discordantly" collective.
Public Goods, Hegemonic Theory and the "Costs of Adjustment"
The balance of this chapter has been devoted to a review of the difficulties of
applying classical liberal economic thought extra-nationally. Two of the three duties
that Adam Smith identified for the liberal sovereign have been considered, namely
those of ensuring national defense, and providing and enforcing civil law. The third
and final traditional obligation of the negative state involves the rectification of
47
market failures relating to the provision of common goods, or the "duty of erecting
and maintaining certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest of
any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain". 58 This section
surveys the way in which goods of this nature have been provided within the social
order engendered by the GATT; it proceeds from Mancur Olson's idea of the
international economic order, itself, as a public good, and is predominantly a review
of hegemonic stability theory.59
 The purpose of this review is to present a theoretical
framework for subsequent discussions concerning how dramatically the institutional
"cost allocation strategy" embodied in the WTO GPA differs from that prevailing in
the GATT during the heyday of US hegemony, as well as throughout the subsequent
"Codes-approach"-era that commenced with the signing of the 1967 Anti-dumping
Code.
Extranational problems relating to public goods start with the fact that the latter are
outside of the normal "cost structures" of a liberal economy; neither the costs nor the
benefits of collective goods can be evaluated on the basis of a "harmony of interests"
calculus. "Consumption of .... (goods of this nature)", as Charles Kindleberger
explained, "does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers".6°
58	 op. cit., as quoted by Andrew Wyatt-Walter, p. 10.
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. As quoted by Robert Gilpin in The Political
Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 74.
60 Kindleberger, C. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy:
Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Rides". International Studies Quarterly, 25, 1983. As
quoted by R. Gilpin in The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987, p. 74.
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They can thus be consumed without the assumption of financial responsibility for the
benefits enjoyed. This opportunity to "free-ride" means that such goods are typically
underprovided unless someone is prepared to carry a disproportionate burden of the
costs of their provision, or has the power to make others shoulder their fair shares.
For these reasons, the state is typically left to oversee both their production and
distribution.
Hegemonic theory developed in response to the absence of an international sovereign
authority to underwrite and oversee the provision of collective goods whose
consumption could not be disciplined within national borders. In its original form, it
proceeded from the argument that an open international economy and a stable
international currency were, in themselves, "collective goods". 6 ' in securing these
goods, the hegemon, or what Charles Kindleberger termed, "leader" assumed the
"provisory role" normally performed by the state in a national setting; in this role, it
"establishes and enforces the rules of a liberal market regime and suppresses the
ever-present tendencies toward economic nationalism". 62
 Earlier sections of this
thesis have referred to the international economic order as a "policy party"; hegemons
are like "parents", chaperoning this "party". Not necessarily benevolent, they are
there to ensure that participants do not act impetuously and forget about their liberal
principles.
61 Subsequent variations on the theory, according to Robert Gilpin, have argued that
international security is also a "collective good". See the discussion in Gilpin, op. cit., p. 74.
62	 op. cit., Gilpin, p. 75.
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A hegemon's provisory duties, like those of the sovereign state, also entail "the
prevent(ion of) cheating and free riding... (and the) encourage(ment of) others to
share the costs of maintaining the system". 63
 The hegemon, in fulfilling this
responsibility, however, does not enjoy the same disciplinary authority as his national
counterpart; "free-riding", or failure to assume financial responsibility for the benefits
one enjoys from the public goods, as well as the exploitation of national market
advantages that undermine the system are common. This, as the following paragraph
will explain, has created particular problems in the context of the GATT.
The liberal order that the hegemon strives to maintain functions on the basis of a
systemic logic different than its own. If economic boundaries were aligned with
political ones, this would not necessarily be problematic. As it is, however, the
operation of the international market ultimately engenders a re-distribution of
economic power, or, at the very least, a dilution of the power retained by the
hegemon. In time, the political environment from which the hegemon emerged is
transformed. The hegemon is led to re-calculate the benefits of order; at some point,
the conclusion that its interests do not extend to underwriting it is probable. As
Robert Gilpin explained:
"...(T)he market produces profound shifts in the location of economic activities and
affects the international redistribution of economic and industrial power. The
unleashing of market forces transforms the political framework itself, undermines the
hegemonic power, and creates a new political environment to which the world must
eventually adjust... Capitalism and the market system thus tend to destroy the
political foundations on which they must ultimately depend.&$
63	 ibid., p. 75.
op. cit., Gilpin, pp. 77-78.
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As long as the institutional "business" of the GATT was largely confined to the
negotiation of tariff reductions, the costs of maintaining economic order were low for
the US, the postwar hegemon. James Mayall, on this subject, said, "Every country
operated a tariff and all could agree that, subject to certain safeguards, it was
desirable that the overall level should be reduced'. 65
 The fact that these cooperative
concessions were exchanged on the basis of reciprocity, in addition, made them easy
for the hegemon to "sell" and subsequently maintain; each tariff reduction could be
clearly associated with the gain of a market access opportunity, and access to the
latter could "policed" on the basis of the former. "Free-riding", in this institutional
context, was not a serious problem.
The "balance of benefits" flowing from this system to the US started to change once
the process of post-war reconstruction had been substantially completed.
Nevertheless, as long as the GATT continued to be a "rich man's club" and US
economic growth proceeded at unprecedented rates, any additional "costs" associated
with underwriting the institution were not difficult for it to overlook, particularly
when security concerns relating to the Cold War were weighed in to the "hegemonic
equation". During the 1960s, however, the political environment surrounding the
GA1'T changed dramatically: First, the institutional agenda of the trading system
shifted. NTBs became the "principle form of protectionism". Subsequently, a
number of political economic developments came to fruition: As John Jackson has
explained,
65	 op. cit., Mayall, p. 102.
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"International economic interdependence, the quadrupling of GATT membership to
include countries with greatly divergent stages and systems of economic
organization, and the crises of energy costs and unemployment.., all buffeted the
GATT".
The 1967 Anti-Dumping Code (hereafter, AD Code) was a first attempt to re-
distribute some of the additional costs that all of these changes effectively
represented for the hegemon. The "allocational approach" that it embodied, as will
be discussed in Part II, was subsequently replicated in 5 more "self-balancing" codes
- designed to discipline various NTBs - that were agreed during the 1973-79 Tokyo
Round. By the beginning of Uruguay Round in 1986, the GAIT's institutional
infirmity had been diagnosed by John Jackson as a conflict between "rule vs. power
diplomacy".67
 The US, increasingly, was behaving Jike a hegemon on the decline.
even though its economic power, in absolute terms, had never been more substantial.
Politics, ever at the gates of the international economic "party", was threatening to
over-run it completely. Now, 10 years and a protracted Round later, many of the
political problems associated with developing multilateral disciplines to regulate
non-tariff barriers to trade are still outstanding. This, despite the fact that the end of
the Cold War has rejuvenated liberalism as an "economic philosophy" and
contributed to a rash of WTO membership applications.
Existing Work: The Thesis' Contribution
The proceeding section surveyed problems associated with the costs of maintaining
international order. Many of these costs are associated with the fact that multilateral
Jackson, J.H. "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal", in
Law & Policy in International Business, Vol. 12, No. 21, 1980, p. 30.
67	 ibid., p. 40.
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cooperation has usually been viewed as an inherent threat to sovereign authority,
irrespective of the local conventions in any given participating entity regarding the
allocation of political power. Jan Tumlir, on this subject, said:
"The commitments which states accept, as participants in the international order, are
generally thought of as constraints on economic sovereignty - more or less painful
concessions of national interest made for the sake of international comity".68
In this sense, any policy "concession" a Member State makes is potentially at odds
with the national values and local preferences and traditions that its existing policies
and practices reflect, and, therefore, costly. Such costs are difficult for governments
to justify politically if they cannot be associated with clearcut benefits that flow
concurrently from participation in the international regime, eg. if they engender
benefits that are disseminated. Furthermore, they can be difficult to quantify,
particularly when they do not involve tariffs. The GATT approach to the discipline
of domestic policies - or, heretofore, effective lack thereof - is a particularly vivid
reflection of this institutional "cost structure". For reasons relating to the divergent,
positive social welfare-related responsibilities liberal governments' have assumed, the
postwar international economic order has sought only to reduce trade barriers
between markets, leaving Contracting Parties' generally free to conduct their
domestic policies as they see fit. This institutional lacuna, as explained in the
previous section, represents a departure from certain tenets of liberal theory. It also
stands at the academic portals of an area in which there has been relatively little
recent, practical, politically-oriented work.
Tumlir, J. "Strong and Weak Elements in the Concept of European Integration" in
Reflections on a Trouble World Economy: Essays in Honour of Herbert Giersch, edited by F.
Machiup, G. Fels and H. MulIer-Gröeling. London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1983, p. 32.
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Despite its theoretically-flawed pedigree, the GATT adheres to a "regulatory
methodology" that is decidedly liberal. GAIT disciplines, apart from the duty of
non-discrimination, have taken the general form of precise policy restraints,
discouraging all protectionist trade policies other than tariffs. During the early
1980s, a substantial literature concerning the way in which these negative disciplines
operate to structure the exercise of political authority within GATT Contracting
Parties was developed. Its theme was that the multilateral trading system, in
providing "rules for the making of trade policy rules", served what Jan Tumlir,
Frieder Roessler and others termed a "constitutional function". 69 The following, after
a brief introduction to the political rationale behind constitutions, reviews this body
of work and describes the way in which the thesis will contribute to it.
When the "state according to law" was first emerging, an important distinction was
made early on between laws that government makes and those that make
government. Although, as will be seen, this distinction was and still is relatively
more important in states with written constitutions than those with unwritten ones, it
is, nonetheless, of key importance for understanding negative political entities, or
ones premised on notions of individual liberty. Charles Mcflwain, a noted American
constitutional scholar, had this to say on the subject:
"There is and there must be, in every free state, a marked difference between those
laws which a government makes and may therefore change, and the ones which make
the Government itself. The Government... is free of the law... but only of the
69 See, for example, Tumlir's "Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem", published as
the Harold Wincott Memorial Lecture, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1984 and
National Constitutions and International Economic Law, edited by M. Hilf and W. Petersmann
Deventer: Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993.
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ordinary laws with the government itself has made or may make... The supreme
authority established and defined by a fundamental law is bound absolutely by that
law, though he is free of all other laws".7°
Corwin Edwards, another American constitutional scholar has explained this
distinction on the basis of differences between constitutional and civil liberty:
"(L)iberty signifies the absence of restraints imposed by other persons upon our own
freedom of choice and action... (W)e enjoy civil liberty because of the restraints
which government imposes upon our neighbors in our behalf and constitutional
liberty because of the constitutional restraints under which government itself operates
when it seeks to impose restraints upon us".7'
In countries with written constitutions, restraints of the former nature are generally
inflexible, allowing amendment only after approval by what Arendt Lijphart has
termed "special majorities" or "popular referendums" 72 . Their purpose, in any case, is
to provide an institutional framework for the exercise of political power;
constitutions govern the making and implementation of a society's collective
decisions, including those relating to the economy. John Rawis, in discussing their
function, suggested that the political process be viewed as a machine which "makes
social decisions when views of their representatives and their constituents are fed
into it".73
 A constitution, he said, controls the operation of this machine. It specifies
how a society will assess the justice of laws and policies, its output. In the case of
70 Mcllwain, C. Constitutionalism and the Changing World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1939, p. 73. As quoted in A. Brewer-Carifas' Judicial Review in Comparative
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, P. 27.
71 Edwards, E.S. Liberty Against Government: The Rise, Flowering and Decline of a
Famous Juridical Concept. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948, p. 7.
72 Lijphart, A. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-one Countries. London: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 189.
See the discussion on pp. 195-196 of A Theory of Justice, op. cit.
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differences of opinion with respect to these measures, it stipulates procedures for the
reconciliation of conflicting views. Finally, because of the inherent imperfectibility
of human institutions, it also dictates when the enactments of the majority are to be
complied with - assuming the society in question is a democratic one - and when they
can be rejected as no longer binding.74
From the point of view of international order, it is particularly significant that
constitutions 1) operate to structure the way in which law is made and applied, and;
2) privilege certain individual, or specific interests relative to those of the collective,
namely those whose interests the law is supposed reflect. The latter function
involves the specification of "constitutional rights". Such rights are subject to what
Joseph Raz termed, "special institutional treatment" in that they are not governed by
the ordinary legislative and administrative processes specified in the constitution of
which they are a part; the judicial branch of government is typically allocated
responsibility for their oversight. Constitutional rights reflect a society's values. The
fact that some of them are also means to the end of the institutional protection of
collective goods, as will be seen, is of particular relevance for international order. As
Joseph Raz explained:
"At least some constitutional rights are primarily means of formal or informal
institutional protection of collective goods. They protect these collective goods
inasmuch as damage to them is caused by the harming of the interests of identifiable
individuals... Where harming an individual seriously jeopardises the maintenance of
a public good that harm is also a cause of a harm to the community. Therefore, there
The discussion that follows assumes that the political environments under consideration
are liberal democracies. Part ifi of the thesis provides further insights concerning why such an
assumption is appropriate. See below, especially pp. 212 - 224.
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is in such cases an adequate instrumental justification for holding others to be subject
to duties to refrain from such harm.75
The political literature concerning the "constitutional function' of the multilateral
trading system deals almost exclusively with the structuring of the economic policy
process, and, more specifically, trade policy processes. Much of it is premised on Jan
Tumlir's ideas of order as a means through which "political process failures",
reflected in protectionist trade policies, can be corrected. The following offers a brief
review of Tumlir's thinking, highlighting areas in which it offers insights for the
domestic policy issues under discussion. Parts H and ifi of the thesis will apply these
ideas to an analysis of the way in which the GATTs "vague" duty of non-
discrimination has been legally clarified under the WTO GPA, so as to effectively
create indirect individual rights to national treatment and non-discrimination; they
argue that this Agreement embodies an extension of the trading system's
"constitutional disciplines" to domestic rule-making and implementation processes.
Whereas Tumlir and most previous work in this area has generally focused on the
GATT's "constitutional discipline" of trade policy-making processes, that is, this
thesis will consider the institution's constitutional role in disciplining domestic
policy-making and implementation.
Tumlir's ideas about international order proceeded from the premise that all
economic policy is inherently redistributive. In describing democratic governments'
"preoccupation with redistribution", he said:
'	 Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 258.
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"Contemporary states are best understood as complex and costly redistributive
systems. Price controls, licensing, other forms of regulation, protection, and
subsidisation, public enforcement of private cartel agreements, and many other
policies of this kind are presented in public discussion as means to objectives
politically more appealing than redistribution..."76
Protectionist trade policies, in his view, thus were a manifestation of government or
"constitutional failures" comparable to the market failures associated with public
goods; both result from the fact that "adequate information is not, or cannot be,
brought to bear on decisions".77
 As Uli Petersmann put it:
"(T)he term 'government failure' is used to denote badly functioning policy
institutions and distorted democratic decision-making processes which fail to lead to
political decisions and legal rules that maximise the equal rights and social welfare of
domestic citizens".78
The institutional "remedy" that Dr. Tumlir was in the process of developing at the
time of his death was premised on the observation that the political failures in
question arose from the "absence or tolerated disregard for rules and institutions for
structuring and informing political decision-making". 79
 The fundamental problem, as
he saw it, was that protectionist trade policies were typically made under the
discretionary foreign policy powers of the executive, and, therefore, excused from
most meaningful domestic constitutional constraints:
76 Tumlir, J. Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies. Washington: American
Enterprise Institute, 1975, pp. 13-16.
Banks, G. and J. Tumlir. "The Political Problem of Adjustment' in The World
Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1986, p. 146.
78 Petersmann, E. Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International
Economic Law. Fribourg: University Press, 1991, p. 205.
Banks, G. and J. Tumlir. "The Political Problem of Adjustment", The World Econo,ny,
Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1986, p. 146.
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"The constitutional jurists' avoidance of... matters of foreign policy was well founded
throughout the centuries of virtually unbridled competition among nation states for
territory and power... Today, however, with respect to foreign policy towards other
democratic states, this traditional stance... has become anachronistic. Democratic
countries.., have no claims against and good knowledge of each other; they face
common dangers and know that such prosperity as they may enjoy can only be
enjoyed in common. The foreign policy issues among them have become largely
economic and economic issues demand regulation by law".8°
Following through on this line of reasoning, Frieder Roessler, shortly after Tumlir's
death, described the purpose of the GATT as that of providing a constitutional
framework for trade policy-making process through the regulation of policy
instruments. 8 ' Multilateral trade policy disciplines, he explained, do not prevent
sovereigns from pursuing specific economic policy goals, but, rather, discourage the
use of policies with market distorting effects and/or negative international
externalities.
Tumlir's theory also considered how the GATT would need to change in order to
fulfill this "constitutional role" more completely. His institutional "prescription"
would have involved many of the political and legal innovations reflected in
European economic institutions, including the adoption of common domestic laws
based on free market principles, rigid legal commitment to the principles of non-
discrimination, private rights and review-like mechanisms to safeguard them, and, in
addition, participation on the basis of something other than complete sovereign
80 Tumlir, J. "Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem". The Wincott Memorial
Lecture. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1984, P. 80.
SI	 Roessler, F. "The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order" in National
Constitutions and International Economic Law, edited by M. Hilf and E. Petersmann. Deventer:
Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p. 54.
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equality, eg. the idea of a "GATT-PIus type of agreement between the major trading
powers". 82
 Each of these ideas, as will be seen, is reflected in the GPA.
82 Hudec, R.E. "The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade
Policies", in National Constitutions and International Economic Law, op. cit., pp. 507 - 508.
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PART I - The WTO Government Procurement Agreement
The "story" that this thesis is going to tell involves a policy area that was originally left
essentially outside of the postwar trading system, government procurement. Today, nearly
50 years after that system was created, procurement is still not subject to the standard
market disciplines of the international economic order; it is governed by one of 4 WTO
Plurilateral Agreements, separate from, and appended to, the WTO Charter. The
proceeding section introduced the liberal vision that is reflected in the multilateral trading
system, along with its associated "negative" regulatory methodology. It also endeavoured
to illustrate the difficulties that are associated with implementing this theory across over-
lapping national realms of social order. The purpose of this section is to describe the
institutional evolution and context of the WTO disciplines to which procurement is subject,
and explain how they differ from mainstream WTO policy constraints. The discussion
includes a review of the legislative and administrative intervention that the GPA's positive,
procedural disciplines entail; it concludes that although they represent a dramatic change
vis-à-vis the situation in this policy context circa 1948, they are not, per Se, seriously
interventionary. Rather, as with the common rules and compliance measures of the EU's
procurement regime, it is more appropriate to view them as an institutional development
that is complementary to the trading system's existing regulatory methodology. The most
significant institutional "irregularities" embodied in the GPA, in this sense, include its:
previously-mentioned limited membership; positive rather than negative policy disciplines;
reciprocity-based discrimination in the exchange of its market access benefits; judicial
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review-like enforcement mechanism, provisions for "correction of the breach of the
Agreement or compensation for the loss or damages suffered" and; lack of an escape clause.
The chapter 1.3 discussion relating to the institutionally unorthodox way in which the
GPA is structured - or, as will be seen, the way in which its positive disciplines serve to
reinforce the negative commitments that Member States have undertaken not to
discriminate in the application of their domestic policies and procedures - draws heavily
on institutional learning experiences derived in the context of European economic
integration, both in an EU and an EFTA setting. Lessons relating, specifically, that is,
to the role of common rules and regulatory "flexibility" in disciplining national legislative
processes, on the one hand, and stringent procedures to facilitate the uniform executive
application of these rules, on the other.
Subsequent sections of the thesis will examine the issue of intervention from a broader,
political perspective and consider the implications of the kind of legal cooperation that
is implicit in the GPA.
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Chapter 1-The Institutional Evolution of the Government Procurement Agreement
What is Government Procurement?
Article ifi, paragraph 8 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade generally exempts
government entities' procurement-related activities from the national treatment obligations
to which GATT Contracting Parties are obligated:
"The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations, or requirements
governing the procurement by government agencies of products purchased for governmental
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production
of goods for commercial sale."83
In so doing, it provides what two WTO Secretariat employees, Annet Blank and Gabrielle
Marceau, have recently described as a commonly accepted GATT/WTO definition of
government, or public procurement; neither the Tokyo Round Code, nor the re-negotiated
Government Procurement Agreements of 1988, or 1994 contain formal definitions of
this concept. In the institutional setting that has grown up around the GATT, a working
definition of government procurement thus is, or at least, has been:
"procurement by government agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes
and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods
for commercial sale."
According to the aforementioned WTO authors, the 1992 Sonar Mapping System Panel
Report addressed this definitional lacuna. It concluded that while there was no formal
definition in the Agreement, the following characteristics could be used to provide guidance
83 GATT. The Text of the General Agreement. Geneva: July 1986, p. 7.
84 Blank, A. and G. Marceau. "History of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since
1945". Paper presented at WTO Conference on 'Multilateral Rules for Government
Procurement: Design, Implementation and Enforcement", 2-3 December 1995, P. 39.
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as to whether a particular transaction should be considered an instance of government
procurement: "payment by government, governmental use of or benefit from the product,
government possession and government control over the obtaining of the product".85
For its part, Blank and Marceau's paper proceeded from the following definition:
"Government procurement involves the government or its agent acting as consumer,
procuring for its own consumption and not for re-sale."86
This thesis will adopt these authors' definition, albeit with one major modification. As
the purpose of this thesis is to examine the political imçlications of the multilateral rules
embodied in the GAiT!WTO procurement regime, insights from a more politically-oriented
definition recently offered by Friedi Weiss will be grafted onto Blank and Marceaus
definition. In a recent book about the EU's procurement regime, Weiss described
procurement as:
an activity which is designed to fulfill the economic functions and powers attributed
to the state and to some of its bodies and is carried out within the scope of the legal powers
conferred upon them."87
85 Herein, these authors' mention of the definitional approach adopted by the 1976 "OECD
Draft Instrument on Government Purchasing Policies Procedures and Practices" is also, arguably,
of interest. This instrument, they say, proposed that countries agree on a list of definitions,
much like the positive listing of situations in which single tendering was to be permitted, and the
indicative lists of entities to be covered by the Instrument/subsequent GATT Agreements.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the implications of this listing approach
in detail, it might have interesting things to say about the process of positive policy coordination.
86	 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 5.
Weiss, J.F. Public Procurement in European Conmuniry Law. London: The Athlone
Press, 1993, p. 6.
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So as to emphasise the fact that public procurement is an activity conducted in relation
to a state's exercise of its political powers, the thesis' operating definition will be:
"Government procurement is an activity which is designed to fulfill the economic functions
and powers legally attributed to the state, involving the government or its agent acting
as consumer, procuring for its own consumption and not for re-sale."
Blank and Marceau's paper argued that it is also important to distinguish between
procurement and state trading. In state trading, they said, "the government or its agent
is involved in buying, selling, and sometimes in manufacturing operations for re-sales... "88
The state is, in other words, a commercial actor much like any other firm. Such activities,
as has been described, are considered to be outside the realm of public procurement, at
least as it been understood in a GATT environment. To the extent that a particular state-
trading entity is not a commercial actor with what the US has recently termed a
"commercial function", however, its activities are of potential relevance to this discussion.
In a 1989 paper submitted to the GATF Committee on Government Procurement's Informal
Working Group on Negotiations (hereafter IWG), the US delegation made a distinction
between procurement/trading activities with "government functions" and those with
"commercial functions". 89
 The former involve the performance of duties which "only
governments can do", such as making laws, or "which governments reserve for themselves
the right to do, eg. national defense, (or the) monopoly provision of services which are
necessary to existence as a nation", whereas the latter entail the "performance of duties
left entirely to the private sector, where there are no substantial controls exercised by
88	 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 5.
89 United States Government. "Broadening: Submission by the United States". GATT
Government Procurement Agreement Informal Working Group on Negotiations, Meeting of 13
June 1989.
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governments on them... other than generally applicable laws such as tax laws". Government
procurement is characterised by purchases of products for "government functions", wherein
the behaviour in question is that of the Contracting Parties or Signatory, as distinguished
from the behaviour of the firms or agencies themselves, or on their own. Such a distinction
is of importance because of the process of privatisation that is underway in many countries.
The disciplines embodied in the Government Procurement Agreement are designed to
govern the activities of an entity procuring goods or services for government purposes,
wherein these purposes dictate either the kind of competitive environment in which such
entities operate, or the extent to which the profit motive is a factor in the entity's
management decisions.
The ITO Negotiations - Exemption from MFN and National Treatment
The introductory section described the postwar trading system's regulatory methodology
as being fundamentally negative in nature; anything Contracting Parties were not
specifically forbidden to do remained within their legitimate sovereign prerogatives. The
trade policy proscriptions contained in the Agreement's Part II "code of commercial
behaviour" were designed to discourage all but tariff barriers to trade. They were
accompanied by a duty of non-discrimination, also traditionally interpreted in negative
terms. Embodied in the norms of most favoured nation and national treatment, the general
idea of this concept has been described by J.F. Weiss as involving "formal equality before
the law... (manifested in the) attribution of status, or the definition of common rules, or
entitlements".9° According to Petros Mavroidis and Bernard Hoekman, its norms have
been understood in a GATT context to involve: "... a legal prohibition to discriminate
op. cit., Weiss, pp. 19-20.
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between foreign products... (or,in the context of national treatment) a legal prohibition
to discriminate between foreign and domestic sources".9'
Article ifi, paragraph 8 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, as was mentioned
at the outset of this chapter, generally exempted government entities' procurement-related
activities from the national treatment obligations to which GATT Contracting Parties
were obligated. Most legal commentators have interpreted this exemption as excusing
such purchasing entities from general GATT MFN obligations as well. Paragraph I of
Article I requires that Contracting Parties extend MFN treatment with respect to "all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article ifi". As mentioned previously, however, Article
ifi specifically exempts government entities from the duties of national treatment that
it confers. Thus, it is argued, government procurement markets are not subject to either
of the GAiTs two fundamental disciplines, namely the duties of national treatment and
non-discrimination on a most-favoured nation basis.92
Article XVII, paragraph 2 of the GAiT similarly exempts state-owned trading enterprises'
purchases of "products for immediate or ultimate consumption in government use and
not otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale" from the non-
discriminatory disciplines to which such trading entities are otherwise subject, whilst
91 Hoekman, B. and P. Mavroidis. "The WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement:
Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?" CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1112, January
l995,pp.4-5.
92 Herein, John Jackson, for example, refers to Edmund McGovern's argument that Article
I's reference to the obligations of Article III implicitly makes government procurement activities
exempt from MFN rules. See The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International
Economic Relations, p. 199.
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Article Xffl, paragraph 1 of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter
GATS) exempts government agencies from the duties of most favoured nation and national
treatment outlined in Articles H, XVI and XVII. In addition, GATT Article XXI(b)(ii)
and GATS Article XXI:(b)(ii) contain broadly drafted "national security exemptions"
for all measures considered:
"necessary for the protection of essential security interests.., relating to the traffic in arms,
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as
is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment".93
The complete exclusion of public procurement markets from multilateral policy disciplines
was not, per Se, an objective of the participants in the immediate post-war International
Trade Organisation (hereafter, ITO) negotiations. On the contrary, according to the
previously cited WTO authors' paper on the history of the GATF/WTO Agreement, "The
first US draft for an ITO envisaged explicitly that the non-discrimination principles,
reflected in the MFN and National Treatment obligations, were to apply to government
purchases for governmental use... and to the awarding of contracts by governments for
public works." Nevertheless, the majority of the other 22 nation states participating
in these negotiations held less liberal positions on this issue, a legacy - at least in part -
It should be mentioned that Article XVII, paragraph 2 requires that state trading entities
"shall accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment". John
Jackson has described this as an "MFN-like requirement", but it has never been questioned or
raised as an object of complaint amongst CPs. See Jackson's World Trade and the Law of the
GAIT, op. cit., p. 360.
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 4.
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of what Gary Hufbauer and others have termed the "protective orgy" that had proceeded
the Great Depression.95
Blank and Marceau's paper provides an overview of the course of the iTO negotiations.
From the outset, they say, discussions were plagued by definitional problems. What
activities of which government entities were to be subject to any potentially-agreed
multilateral disciplines?
	 During the first round of preparatory meetings (for the
negotiation of an iTO Charter) that took place in London in 1946, the delegates' debate
focused on the issue of coverage. A fundamental problem with which participants had
to contend involved the issue of what these authors term, "constitutional diffeiences".
Because of the variety of ways in which participating states organised themselves to
discharge the duties associated with governing, it was difficult to come up with a set of
disciplines that would engender consistent obligations across national jurisdictions. For
example, John Evans, in a book about the Kennedy Round (1963-67), discussed problems
associated with the separation of executive from legislative authority in the US. This
has meant, he said, "that the details of... government procurement practices... have had
to be committed to statute, while in most countries the government officials concerned
exercise much wider discretion. In addition, the constitutional rights of individual states
Hufbauer's comments were made in the context of a description of the "rise of the
GATT... out of the ashes of the Havana Conference". Although they did not deal specifically
with the negotiation of government procurement-related issues, they did reflect the broader
policy concerns with which all ITO negotiators were contending, i.e. MFN and non-
discrimination. See "The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle"
by G. Hufbauer, J. Erb and H. Starr. Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 12, 1980.
This article also refers to R. Gardner's Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, arguably the classic text
concerning the political objectives of the ITO/GATT negotiators (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980).
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, pp. 2 - 18.
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in... (the US has) created a twilight zone of jurisdiction within which some states have
adopted laws or regulations that conflict with the policy and even with the international
commitments of the federal government."97
 The negotiating dilemmas faced by the iTO
negotiators were thus compounded by the fact that in order to implement many of the
proposed non-discriminatory disciplines, some participating states would have had to
alter significant portions of their national legislation.
The end result of the iTO discussions, according to Ken Dam, was that the US proposal
to extend the duties of MEN and national treatment to the non-defense-related, public
procurement activities of ITO signatories was dropped because "an attempt to reach
agreement on such a commitment would... (have led) to exceptions almost as broad as
the commitment itself'.98
Evans, J.W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GA7T?
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
98 Dam, K. The GA 77': Law and International Economic Organiarion. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 200.
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The OEEC/OECD Dialogue (1960 - 1976)
In 1962, Belgium and, later, the United Kingdom brought formal complaints within the
newly formed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter, OECD)
against the US' Buy American Act. This, as described by Morton Pomerantz, an Office
of the US Trade Representative (hereafter, USTR) negotiator during the Tokyo Round,
was in response to the increased national procurement preference that had been enacted
by the Department of Defense for balance of payment reasons in July of 1962Y It
ultimately lead to the OECD's being given a mandate to investigate the general issue of
preferences in its Member States' government procurement.
In early 1963, according to Blank and Marceau, it was decided, as a first step, to "gather
information on procedures for government purchasing of supplies by central
governments")°° Before the results of this survey had even been fully compiled and
published, it was clear that practically all OECD states had some kind of preferred treatment
or preference schemes favouring national suppliers, whether formal price preference or
informal discrimination against foreign suppliers or products.'°'
A Working Party on Government Procurement was accordingly created in the Trade
Committee in early 1964. The objective of this initiative, according to an OECD document
Pomerantz, M. "Toward a New International Order in Government Procurement". Law
and Policy in International Business, Vol. Il, 1980.
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 18.
tO! The results of the survey were published in 1966 by the OECD Secretariat. Known
colloquially as the "pink book", this report was officially titled, "Government Purchasing in
Europe, North America and Japan: Regulations and Procedures'. Paris: OECD, 1966.
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cited by Ken Dam, was to "...explore the possibility of elaborating guidelines which would
ensure maximum fairness in the field of government procurement through limiting
discrimination against the suppliers of foreign products". 102 By 1967, the group had
developed and published draft guidelines for its Member States' public procurement.
The Americans were highly critical of the new guidelines. As Pomerantz put it, the draft
would have required "the elimination of specifically stated preferences, such as those in
the US system to domestic suppliers, and would not... (have adequately ensured) open
bidding and award procedures by other countries".' 03 By way of rejoinder, the US
Delegation offered an alternative set of guidelines, calling for liberalisation premised on
the principle of sectoral reciprocity. Their proposal called for the Working Party to
continue its efforts by focusing on the heavy electrical equipment sector because of its
"considerable trade importance... susceptibility to statistical study and its relevance to
OECD members as (both) producers and consumers".'°'
Before 1969 had ended, the American proposal had proven impracticable; discrepancies
in the degree of government ownership in the power generation field made it impossible
to achieve meaningful reciprocity as regards the potential policy concessions of states
participating in the negotiations. Nevertheless, according to Blank and Marceau, the US
proposal did provide a useful platform from which subsequent OECD work proceeded;
102 op. cit., Dam, p. 206.
103 op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1273.
'° ibid., p. 1275, which quotes the OECD Secretariat's "Working Party of the Trade
Committee: Government Procurement (Note by the US Delegation)", OECD Document
TFD/TD/521, dated 19 February 1969.
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it offered norms that were "more binding than those that had been envisaged", whilst
signalling that the US might be prepared to take a more active role in the OECD dialogue)05
The Working Party's studies continued, virtually uninterrupted, through 1975. Some of
the most difficult questions yet to be addressed involved what Pomerantz termed, "finding
a common terminology for the different kinds of procurement processes used by the
negotiating countries") 06
 Blank and Marceau have described this terminological quest
as a debate over the "concept of discriminationhl)m The fundamental issue, they say, was
what the Japanese delegate at the time termed, the "dual nature" of discrimination in public
procurement markets. It involved the question of how countries' nationally-biased public
procurement policies were implemented, namely via "formal" discrimination, in accordance
with statute, or "informally", through the exercise of administrative, or procedural
discretion. Incarnated in the dispute over whether public tenders should be made the "rule"
under any potential Code, and selective tendering procedures an exception, having to be
justified, this debate was significant from a policy point of view in that each of the
competing approaches to discrimination dictated a contrasting approach to multilateral
regulation. The fact that "formal" discrimination necessitated multilateral disciplines
that involved legislative changes at the national level, as will be seen, compounded the
difficulty of finding "commonalities" on which a code could be based.
105 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 20.
l06 op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1277.
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 23.
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By 1970, the fundamental problem that had de-railed the ITO negotiations on public
procurement was once again squarely facing OECD negotiators: "Constitutional
differences", reflected in contrasting regulatory methodologies, were making it difficult
to come up with a set of multilateral disciplines that would engender consistent obligations
across national jurisdictions. The following chapter will examine environmental factors
that may have been associated with changed incentives for multilateral cooperation and
compromise in detail. As the objective of this chapter is solely to outline the institutional
history of the WTO Agreement, suffice it for now to say that the OECD discussions, as
Pomerantz put it, were "not proceeding in isolation".'° 8
 During the early 1970s, a "sea
change" in the context of the discussions was underway. There was, as Dam has described
it, growing recognition amongst the participants that "getting rid of discrimination in these
markets wasn't going to be simply a question of bargaining over formal restrictions".'°
Once this consensus had been achieved and a restrictive listing of circumstances under
which Members would be allowed to use single tendering procedures had been agreed,
particular controversy continued to surround the issues of publicity in the context of both
the tenders and awards procedures, and derogations from the Agreement's disciplines.
According to Matthew Marks and Harald Malmgren, two American commentators on
the process, bidders rights to secrecy were viewed by many participants as a vital element
in the functioning of government-industry relations, beyond the appropriate jurisdiction
of a set of international ground rules concerning procurement practices, whilst derogations
108	 op.cit.,p. 1273.
109 op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 209.
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for development purposes, and in connection with national industrial policies, were also
highly
Complete consensus on either of these issues was never reached amongst participants
in the negotiations. On the one hand, the US continued to hold out for ex post, or post-
award publication of the winning bid in a given tender, whereas the Europeans, in the
words of Blank and Marceau, feared that this would "endanger subsequent competition,
result in collusion on the part of suppliers, invite identical bids in new contracts... and
lead to an excessive number of disputes1.hI Similarly, although there was broad agreement
on the US' proposal for three main types of derogations, it was not possible to address
this issue effectively in a forum in which the "beneficiaries" of many of these derogations -
namely, the developing countries - had no formal standing."2
As 1975 came to a close, three main issues, according to Blank and Marceau, still needed
to be addressed:
"1)	 the scope of the agreement, i.e. the list of national entities to which
the code was to apply...
2)	 the minimum dollar-value which would trigger the application of
the guidelines;
"° op. cit., Marks and Malmgren, p. 402.
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 27.
112 ibid., p. 29. Blank and Marceau identify the following "types" of derogations: "1) for
developing countries; 2) for reasons similar to those contained in Article XX and XXI of the
GATT and in the Treaty of Rome; and 3) for economic reasons which consisted of cyclical
difficulties, balance of payment reasons, implementation of regional or sectoral development
policies."
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3)	 the procedure for the settlement of disputes, including the
content of ex post publicity."3
It was decided to suspend the negotiations to "let capitals reflect on the main outstanding
issues". By this time, the negotiators had effectively succeeded in operationalising the
principles of national treatment and non-discrimination as they might be applied to Member
States' public procurement practices. Most notably, innovative "transparency procedures"
for Members' tendering and award practices designed to counter exclusionary practices
had been identified, and there was general agreement that a conditional MFN obligation
was going to govern the implementation of any eventual agreement."4
In the autumn of 1975, according to an OECD document cited by Blank and Marceau,
the EC countries had "officially proposed the (re)opening of the necessary negotiations
but then Canada, in particular and also the United States were already resolved to include
government purchasing in the GATF MTN". By October of 1976, the EC and the other
European Member States had agreed, "though somewhat reluctantly", to the establishment
of a Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereafter, MTN) Sub-Group on Government
Procurement.
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, pp. 3 1-32. Herein, the authors cite questions surrounding
the "use of subsidies to support national industries" as a possible fourth, yet-to-be-resolved issue.
These issues, they say, were subsequently to be addressed in negotiations for the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code.
114 The term "transparency procedures" was first employed by Patrick Messerlin in an article
about the 1994 Procurement Agreement. See "Agreement on Government Procurement", in The
New World Trading System: Readings. Paris: OECD, 1994. As regards the accomplishments of
the OECD negotiators, both of the technical "innovations" mentioned are addressed by Blank
and Marceau as significant accomplishments of the OECD negotiators. See, op. cit, p. 27 and p.
32.
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Shortly thereafter, on 8 December 1976, OECD guidelines for Member States' public
procurement policies, now known officially as the "OECD Draft Instrument on Government
Purchasing Policies, Procedures and Practices" were transmitted to the GAT1' Secretariat.
A principle reason for the movement of the discussions to the broader GAIT forum was,
according to Pomerantz, so that the "developing countries could participate and better
evaluate the desirability of adhering to an eventual agreement".TM5
Negotiation of the Tokyo Round Code and the 1988 Protocol (1976 - 1988)
Not long after the OECD public procurement dialogue was initiated, the issue of
government procurement had been raised again in a GATT setting, during the early days
of the Kennedy Round (1962-1967). In October 1963, in response to an invitation issued
by the executive secretary of the GATT, the UK, Japan, the US and Sweden had submitted
lists of non-tariff barriers to trade (hereafter, NTBs) they considered should be the subject
of GATT negotiations. TM6
 Government purchasing practices were included in the summary
of these lists that the Secretariat subsequently prepared. A similar exercise was initiated
shortly thereafter amongst all of the Round's participants. The UK, the EC and Japan
formally complained about the US' "Buy American" law, whilst the US called for "more
open procedures by government procurement agencies of other countries in advertising
115 op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1279.
116 op. cit., Evans, p. 257. Herein, it might also bear mention that, subsequent to a 23
March 1965 decision by the Contracting Parties, the title of the head of the GATT Secretariat
was changed from 'Executive Secretary" to "Director General". See BISD 13S/19, Geneva: July
1965.
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and awarding contracts"." 7
 A multilateral negotiating group on government procurement
was accordingly established."8
Given what Evans and others have described as the general failure of the Kennedy Round
to achieve much in terms of the reduction of NTBs, it is hardly surprising that the
negotiating group on government procurement failed to accomplish anything. Chapter
2.2 of this thesis will consider why the OECD might have been a more appropriate forum
for discussions on discrimination in public procurement markets at this time, and how
both this policy-making environment and the multilateral one were changing in the years
prior to the Tokyo Round (1973 - 79). For the purposes of this institutional overview,
it is sufficient to note that, at least through the 1 960s, the political will necessary to develop
effective multilateral disciplines for trade in public procurement markets in a GAiT-setting
did not exist.
Following on from the GATI' Secretariat's earlier, preliminary efforts to survey the various
NTBs employed by its Contracting Parties, a 1975 note by the GAiT Secretariat set out
the following as factors inhibiting foreign participation in public procurement markets:
"a)	 the giving of preferences for products of local origin is
widespread;
b) these preferences basically divide into two types - price
preferences and non-price preferences, with most countries
using a combination of both;
"	 ibid., p. 257.
118 op. cit., Dam, p. 205.
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c) the system of preferences for domestic products has
sometimes been placed on a statutory basis of a generally
mandatory character;
d) the preferential treatment applied in the field of government
procurement to domestic products appears in many cases
to be based on administrative discretion, practice and habit;
and
e) the use of government procurement as an instrument of
government policy is common to both the developed and
developing countries...""9
This document also summarised the necessary "elements" for negotiators' consideration
in a potential GATT Code on government procurement, describing, in some detail, the
work on issues of this nature that had previously been conducted in an OECD setting.
The properties that it identified for a potential multilateral Code included:
(1) Objectives and principles
(2) Definitions
(3) Procurement entities
(4) Elimination of existing discrimination
(5) Exceptions
(6) Purchasing procedures
(7) Publication of government procurement regulations
(8) Reporting, review, complaint and confrontation procedures'2°
As has been mentioned, this institutional reconnaissance was soon followed by the creation
ofaMTN Negotiating Sub-Group on Government Procurement and the Secretariat's receipt
"9 GATT Document MTNINTMIW/I 6, "Government Procurement: Note by the
Secretariat". Geneva: 5 August 1975, pp. 6 - 7. This document described the activities of
Working Group I, an entity charged with examining possibilities for concrete action on NTMs in
the government procurement area identified in the "GATT Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures".
(The "inventory" had evolved from the preliminary survey of NTBs that took place in October
1963; it turned into a decade-long project that, according to John Jackson, ultimately involved a
catalogue of over 800 NTBs, listed by country. See The World Trading System: Law and Policy
of International Economic Relations, op. cit., p. 130.)
120	 ibid.,p. 1.
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of the OECD "Draft Instrument". The task the GATT negotiators were now facing, as
described by Blank and Marceau, remained essentially the same as that previously
confronted by their OECD counterparts: the issues of a potential Code's coverage,
thresholds and dispute settlement procedures still needed to be addressed. Nor had
controversies surrounding the issue of ex post information been resolved)2'
The major new issue on the Sub-Group's agenda, as has also been suggested, involved
the matter of "special and differential treatment" for the developing countries. Indeed,
Pomerantz has described Article ifi of the eventual Tokyo Round Code - or that addressing
the "development, financial and trade needs of the developing countries" - as "the only
part of the Agreement that did not have an antecedent text at the OECD negotiations")22
These negotiations, as he put it, were subsequently governed by the idea that a "smaller
entry fee" would be required for such countries' participation in the Code; they were, that
is, not required to subject as great a percentage of their procurement entities to the
disciplines of the Code as were its developed country signatories. In this sense, the Article
ifi negotiations arguably fell under the broader umbrella of discussions concerning the
Agreement's coverage that were underway. Provisions for technical assistance for the
least developed countries also formed an important part of the provisions for special and
differential treatment that were eventually agreed.
GAll' negotiations with respect to the minimum value of the purchases to which a potential
Code would apply and its coverage were conducted jointly; they were respectively governed
121 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, pp. 4 1-45.
122 op. cii, Pomerantz, p. 1279.
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by notions of administrative efficiency and a quest for balance of commitments. The task,
as it eventually evolved, has been described by Gilbert Winham as being:
"similar to an item-by-item tariff negotiation... where the participants placed items on
or withdrew them from the bargaining table in an effort to wangle an attractive offer from
the other partners. The positions nations took... (bearing) some relationship to the rules
that were negotiated ... such as the threshold value of the contracts to which the code would
apply".123
According to Blank and Marceau, one of the most important "reinforcements" of the
elementary procurement regime that had been negotiated in the OECD came from the
procedures for consultation and dispute settlement that were agreed by GATT negotiators
in Geneva. As in other policy areas governed by Tokyo Round Codes, a Committee on
Government Procurement was established "to oversee" the implementation of these
measures. What Pomerantz has termed the "self-policing" nature of the OECD Draft was
maintained, but new dispute settlement mechanisms were crafted in accordance with GATE'
practices, and provisions that were being developed in the context of the negotiation of
the other Codes.'24 It was assumed that the vast majority of disputes would be resolved
during the procurement process, or following bi-lateral consultations. Those disputes
that could not be resolved in this manner were to be referred to the Committee for
examination. If, after three months, the Committee had failed to bring about
accommodation between the parties, either of the aggrieved parties were given the right
to request the establishment of an impartial panel of 3 - 5 members.
123 Winham, G.R. International Trade and the Tokyo Round. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, p. 190.
124 op. cit., Pomerantz, pp. 1286 - 1287.
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It was widely recognised that procurement markets constituted the most significant
opportunity for trade liberalisation that was opened up by the Tokyo Round. Prior to the
Round, the GATF Secretariat estimated that such markets potentially offered market access
opportunities worth roughly ?, excluding defense-related trade. The Code that eventually
entered into force on 1 January 1981, however, covered only some $33.2 billion worth
of opportunities.' It was, in the words of Gilbert Winham, clearly "just a beginning".'26
Re-Negotiations (The 1988 Protocol)
Article IX, paragraph 6(b) of the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code states:
"Not later than the end of the third year from the entry into force of this Agreement and
periodically thereafter, the Parties thereto shall undertake further negotiations, with a view
to broadening and improving this Agreement on the basis of mutual reciprocity... In this
connexion, the Committee shall, at an early stage, explore the possibilities of expanding
the coverage of this Agreement to include service contracts."27
On 1 January 1988, a series of amendments to the Code, representing the first phase of
re-negotiations under this Article and designed to improve the functioning of the
Agreement, broaden its coverage and start working towards the inclusion of service
contracts came into force. Changes to the rules contained in the Agreement included:
a lowering of the threshold value for procurement contracts to be covered by the Code
from SDR 150,000 to SDR 130,000, extension of the Code to leasing, rental and hire
purchase contracts, prohibition of discrimination against locally established firms on the
125 US Government estimate, excluding the offers of Austria and the developing countries.
See D. V. Anthony and C.K. Hagerty's "Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign Government
Procurement", in Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. II, 1979, P. 1341.
I Th
-	 op. cit., Winham, p. 232.
127 GA1'T. The Texts of the Tokyo RoundAgree,nents. Geneva: 1986, pp. 47-48.
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basis of their degree of foreign affiliation, provisions for language assistance to developing
country suppliers, and tightened restrictions on tendering procedures and qualification
of potential suppliers, preparation of technical specifications, and publication of contract
awards.' 28
 Progress in extending the terms of the Code, including coverage of service
contracts, was much less substantial; it was effectively limited to the parties' agreement
to set out work programmes for further consideration.
The 1994 Agreement
Further re-negotiation of the Agreement effectively commenced in 1987, during the early
stages of the Uruguay Round; it was motivated by consensus that still more of the trade
conducted in this context should be brought under GA1'T disciplines and that the
opportunity that the Round presented to do this shouldn't be missed.'29
Three separate issue areas were explicitly recognised for further work in the forequoted
Article IX, paragraph 6(b) of the Tokyo Round Agreement. Blank and Marceau have
summarised them in terms of the following: "broadening", or extension of the Agreement's
coverage, "expansion", involving the inclusion of service contracts, and "improvement",
dealing with amelioration of its text.' 3° The 1988 Protocol of Amendments, as has been
128 International Chamber of Commerce. Policy and Programme Department, Document
No. 103-4/26, November, 1985.
129 Technically, these negotiations were not part of the Uruguay Round, although they
represented an important element in the Rounds broad market access concept. See A. Otten's
"Improving the Playing Field for Exports: The Agreements on Intellectual Property, Investment
Measures and Government Procurement", in GAiT - Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, edited by T.
Cottier. Bern: Stampfli and Cie AG, 1995. The idea that the Round presented a negotiating
"opportunity not to be missed" is suggested by Weiss in his forequoted book, Public
Procurement in European Community Law, p. 150.
130 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 51.
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suggested, had stipulated that Parties to the Agreement were, in future, to adopt
workprogrammes on "broadening" and "expansion". In October of 1987, before the
Protocol had even officially entered into effect, the Committee on Government
Procurement's Informal Working Group on Negotiations (hereafter, IWG) had reached
consensus on the required workprogrammes.
"Broadening" or Coverage
The 1WG's programme on "broadening" proved to be particularly significant for the
negotiations that followed. As described by the forequoted WTO authors, it involved
two distinct "stages": the first sought participants' written input on potential "spheres of
application" for any future Agreement, and the second involved the derivation of
negotiation "criteria" from the submissions received. By May of 1988, the Working Group
had completed both phases of the plan. The "criteria" that were identified in the latter
stage proved important factors in the remainder of the negotiations in that they established
a "basic structure" for the bargaining processes that followed.
According to two EU delegates who were involved in the 1WG activities, Gerard de Graaf
and Matthew King, three "categories" of entities whose procurement activities might
potentially be subject to an Agreement, A, B and C, were identified: "Category A"
consisted of central government organisations, "Category B" included sub-central entities
and "Category C" was made up of utilities and other miscellaneous organisations) 3 ' It
131 De Graaf, G. and M. King. "Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market:
The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the
Uruguay Round". The International Lcmyer, Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 441. The GPA
"categories" have subsequently come to be known colloquially as entity "annexes".
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was decided that entities in the first two categories would be the prime subjects of the
negotiations, whilst those in the third group could be covered, but it would depend on
whether the benefits associated with coverage of a particular entity justified the additional
costs it would be likely to engender for the Signatory whose entities were in question.
Thereafter, a quest for 'balanced coverage" governed a "request-and-offer' negotiations
process that essentially involved a hi-lateral exchange of market access concessions. As
outlined by Annet Blank, the WTO Secretariat official responsible for the servicing of
the Procurement Agreement, the term 'balanced coverage" reflected a "measure of the
market access opportunities offered by a given Party to the Agreement".' 32 Reciprocal
exchanges of such offers were made amongst the Parties on the basis of their relative value,
expressed as a percentage of a participant's national GDP; the absolute value of an offer
was not a factor in such transactions. The basis for the exchanges, in turn, was either
the level of government involved in a particular purchasing activity - that is, "Category
A", "B" or "C" - or a specific industrial sector, eg. the construction-related procurement
of large Japanese cities.
Gerard de Graaf and Matthew King, the previously-cited members of the EU's WTO
Delegation, have recently argued that the negotiations with respect to coverage, and, indeed,
the latest "round" of re-negotiations in general cannot be understood without an
appreciation of the specific negotiating objectives of the EU and the US:
132 Conversation with Annet Blank, employee of the Policy Affairs Division of the GATT
Secretariat. Geneva, 27 July 1994.
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"The United States' main negotiating target was to achieve unrestricted access to the
strategically important electrical and telecommunications procurement sectors of the
European Union... The European Union, on the other hand, (sought) .. .unfettered access
to state and major city level procurement entities in the US... the removal of "buy
American" restrictions attached to federal funding (grants and loans) provided to states
and localities.., and comparable access for its suppliers to the US electrical and
telecommunications markets..."33
Because of difficulties in resolving differences of opinion between these two Parties over
the value of the market concessions each was prepared to offer, a deadlock arose between
them in early 1992. It continued even after a bi-lateral Memorandum of Understanding
was reached between them on 22 April 1993; it effectively reduced the remainder of the
negotiations over the Agreement's coverage to a bi-lateral market access debate.
A 1994 study of the respective values of public procurement opportunities in the EU and
the US that was jointly commissioned by these two parties and conducted by the
consultancy firm, DeLoitte and Touche, played an important role in the resolution of this
debate. It presented what de GraM and King have called, "reliable estimates, indicative
of the scale of procurement opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic", confirming "rough
balance" between the two at the Category A level, a US$82 billion "credit" in the EU
account at the Category B level (US$100 billion opportunity in the EU vs. US$18 billion
offered by the US), and a US$37 billion "deficit" in the US account at the Category C
level (US$40 billion of benefits in the EU vs. US$3 billion in the US).'34
op. cit., de Graaf and King, pp. 442-443.
'	 ibid., p. 448.
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This report was released on 22 March 1994, well after the 15 December 1993 deadline
for the completion of all Uruguay Round negotiations. Negotiators thus had less than
a month to resolve their bi-lateral differences, and "multilateralise the market access results"
if they wanted their new Plurilateral Agreement to be signed in Marrakech along with
the rest of the Uruguay Round accords; for this reason, the 1994 Agreement does not adhere
to the "intra-Agreement GATT norm of MFN" that was established during the Tokyo
Round.' 35
 The market access concessions that were ultimately exchanged under the
Agreement, in other words, were exchanged on the basis of a strictly conditional variation
on the norm of MFN. During the month before the ministerial meeting in Marrakech,
the US and EU, in any case, managed to resolve their major differences of opinion
surrounding the value of each other's respective offer, and began to focus on "opening
up access to the markets of the Quad Countries", namely the US, EU, Canada and Japan.'
De Graaf and King have summarised the final results of the new Plurilateral Agreement's
coverage in the following value terms:
Category A
	 US$ 50-5 5 billion in opportunities
Category B
	 US$ 25 billion
Category C
Ports	 US$ 1 billion
Utilities	 US$ 30 billion'37
'	 Because of this derogation from the GATT MFN norm, Hong Kong, according to Annet
Blank, refused to sign the Agreement. 0p. cit., interview of 27 July 1994.
136 Hill, A. "US, EU in procurement talks". Financial Times, 11 January 1994.




The Government Procurement Code was designed to be largely self-policing. Article
VI, paragraph 5 of 1988 Agreement requires that:
"There shall also be procedures for the hearing and reviewing of complaints arising in
connexion with any phase of the procurement process, so as to ensure that, to the greatest
extent possible, disputes under this Agreement will be equitably and expeditiously resolved
between the suppliers and the entities concerned."38
Under the terms of this Agreement, however, no criteria were provided for the
establishment and operation of such review procedures; Parties to the Agreement were
simply obligated to establish some kind of administrative review.
During some of the early meetings of the IWG in late 1988/early 1989, many of the
participating delegations were of the opinion that the dispute settlement provisions of
the 1988 Agreement, and, in particular, its review provisions, were problematic. A paper
submitted by the Canadian delegation to the Committee in mid-June of 1989 touched
on several of the arguments that were offered at the time regarding reasons why this issue
should be on the agenda of its work programme on Surveillance, Monitoring and Control:
"This gap... (makes) it difficult for suppliers to be aware of the recourse available to them
when they do, or seek to do, business with procuring entities in the other Parties' territories.
More importantly, it leaves open the possibility that suppliers will be treated differently
from one jurisdiction to the other, and potentially within the same jurisdiction..."39
GATT. "The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements". Geneva: August 1986, p. 41.
139 Canadian Government. "Canadian Submission on Bid Protest Mechanism", GATT
Government Procurement Agreement Informal Working Group on Negotiations, Meeting of 13-
15 June 1989.
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As has been mentioned, the re-negotiation of the Agreement that paralleled the Uruguay
Round was motivated by its Parties' recognition that more of the trade conducted in this
context should be brought under GATT disciplines. In what was to prove a key agenda-
setting move for the surveillance, monitoring and control discussions, the European
Community submitted a "non-paper" on 15 June 1989 that argued that a satisfactory
broadening of the Agreement had to be achieved in such a way that it would be
accompanied by a high degree of "credibility". To this end, it proposed guidelines for
a non-discriminatory and independent national system of review, designed to ensure
"mutual confidence between parties and potential suppliers and purchasers". The proposed
review system was based on public purchasing review procedures contained in the EC's
1992 Remedies Directive; its fundamental objectives were to ensure that the Agreement's
principles of non-discrimination were respected in an efficient and timely manner; that
administrative errors in implementing these principles could be corrected when identified;
and, that if such mistakes could not be amended, commercially satisfactory remedies would
be available to the injured party. The following rules formed the basis of the EC proposal:
"Review procedures should be made available, under non-discriminatory procedural
conditions, to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular
award procedure in the field of public supplies and who has been or risks being
harmed by an alleged infringement;
Such review procedures would concern any aspect of the procurement
procedure, including the decision to award the contract;
Before starting an official review procedure, a supplier would be
encouraged to seek a solution to his complaint with the awarding entity;
Impartial and independent review bodies with no interest in the outcome
of the procurement would have responsibility for receiving complaints
and for taking decisions.
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The review bodies, after receiving a complaint, would investigate the case
and determine the appropriate remedy, which could include:
a. temporary suspension of the proposed award
procedure;
b. setting aside illegal decisions including the
removal of discriminatory technical,
economic or financial specifications in the
invitation to tender, the contract documents
or in any other document relating to the
contract award procedures;
c. repeating the procedure for the award of
the tender concerned;
d. awarding damages." 140
The key objective of the Community's proposed review system was improved efficiency
in the resolution of supplier complaints. The EC defined efficiency in this context in terms
of the extent to which suppliers have an opportunity to resolve their complaints informally
with the relevant purchasing entity, that is, before formal international dispute settlement
mechanisms are set in operation. Such an approach could be described as consistent with
the aims of the negotiators of the original Code who'd endeavoured to institutionalise
procedures for the resolution of government purchasing-related disputes during the
procurement process. It is also reflected in the structure of the Tokyo Round Code, and
all succeeding versions of the Agreement. Supplier-initiated information and review
provisions are contained in Article VI of the 1981 and the 1988 Agreements, and Articles
XVffl - XX of the 1994 Agreement. Formal state-to-state dispute settlement procedures,
on the other hand, are defined in Article VII of the Code and 1988 Agreements, and Article
European Community. "Non-Paper of the European Community", submitted to the
Government Procurement IWG Negotiating Group, 15 June 1989.
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XXII of the 1994 Agreement, combined with the relevant provisions of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.'4'
Damages
Although the new bid challenge mechanism did not represent a departure from the
established, "phased approach" to the resolution of government procurement disputes,
it did introduce an important additional consideration to this process: damages, or measures
to compensate individuals harmed by the illegal behaviour of institutions of the state.
GPA Members, however, could limit their liability to the amount of loss a potential supplier
had incurred in "tender preparation or protest". Article XX, paragraph 7 of the Agreement
states:
"Challenge procedures shall provide for...
(c) correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensation
for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to
costs for tender preparation or protest."42
Miscellaneous Issues
Other issues addressed in at least a preliminary fashion during the negotiations concerning
improvement, according to Blank and Marceau, included: offsets, privatisation and "self
'	 This basic "phased" approach to the resolution of differences of opinion with respect to
the interpretation and application of the rules of the Government Procurement Agreement
parallels that in the GATT, at least as the latter relates to "customs matters". Article X,
paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement defines a series of review procedures relating to customs
matters that Contracting Parties are obliged to maintain, while formal dispute settlement
procedures are outlined in Articles XXII and XXIII (and, post-WTO Charter, in the Uruguay
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes). See
"The Text of the General Agreement", op. cit., pp. 16-17 and 39-40.
op. cit., "The Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 26.
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denial", or non-interference in the procurement decisions of entities not subject to the
Agreement whose activities are, nonetheless, commercial in character and subject to
government control regulation and/or influence)43
d)	 Further Re-negotiations
Article XXIV, paragraph 7(b) of the Agreement that was signed in Marrakech on 14 April
1994, included yet another provision for further re-negotiation:
"Not later than the end of the third year from the entry into force of this Agreement and
periodically thereafter, the Parties thereto shall undertake further negotiations, with a view
to improving the Agreement and achieving the greatest possible extension of its coverage
among all Parties on the basis of mutual reciprocity, having regard to the provisions of
Article V relating to developing countries."
In addition, the sub-paragraph that followed committed the Parties to avoid:
"...introducing or prolonging discriminatory measures and practices which distort open
procurement and shall, in the context of negotiations under sub-paragraph (b), seek to
eliminate those which remain on the entry into force of the Agreement."
The 1994 Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1996. Its signatories included: the
EU, the US, Japan, Canada, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Israel and
Korea.
Whereas the Tokyo Round Agreement covered procurement estimated to be worth
approximately US$ 33 billion p.a., estimates for the volume of trade covered by the new
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 62 and p. 73.
op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 30.
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agreement are in the neighbourhood of some US$ 350 billion p.a)45 The total size of
public procurement markets internationally is estimated to be well over US$ 1,000 billion
p.a.
The figure for the Tokyo Round Code is taken from A. Otten's "Improving the Playing
Field for Exports...", op. cit., p. 69. Estimates for the volume of trade covered by the 1994
Agreement and the size of procurement markets in general come from de Graaf and King's
"Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market...", op. cit., pp. 435 - 436.
93
1.2 - The Context of the GPA
The proceeding chapter outlined the dramatic changes that have taken place during the
past fifty years in the multilateral regulation of public procurement markets. Inter-
governmental processes that culminated in the 1994 WTO public procurement agreement
were portrayed as a quest to determine: 1) How discrimination in these markets was going
to be defined; 2) What the multilateral rules governing these markets were going to be
and who was going to make them; 3) Which public entities they were going to cover, and;
4) How they were going to be enforced. This chapter takes a closer look at the interface
between the new rules, and existing national and regional regulatory regimes and rule-
making processes. It does so in an effort to trace the development of the political will
that ultimately led to the polylateral Agreements. Its objective, more specifically, is to
identify significant events that contributed to the dramatic institutional change that is
reflected in the 1994 Agreement. Part ifi of the thesis will return to these issues, after
having taken a closer look at how the GPA works and, in particular, the kind of domestic
intervention that it entails; the final section analyses the question of what GPA Member
States' willingness to accept the Agreement necessarily implies as regards their thinking
about national interests.
Setting the Stage
One political commentator, Gilbert Winham, has described the process of the negotiation
of the Tokyo Round codes in general, including the Government Procurement Code, in
terms of an analogy with "the lawmaking process of a modern parliament". International
diplomacy, he said, is becoming a "means for conducting policy at a broader level than
146 op. cit., Winham, p. 306.
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the nation state". As he observed and in keeping with what earlier sections of the thesis
have suggested, however, the "legislative processes" that the Tokyo Round entailed were
complicated by the fact that each participant possessed national and, sometimes, sub-
national rule-making institutions of its own. Furthermore, in most of the policy areas
then under discussion, including government procurement, fundamental inconsistences
between the existing national regimes of all of the sovereign entities participating in the
negotiations needed to be reconciled before new, extranational "laws" could be agreed.
The central problem with which delegates to both the iTO negotiations and the subsequent
OECD government procurement discussions had to contend, as has been described,
involved the "concept of discrimination"; it arose from inconsistencies in the way in which
national governments discriminated against foreign entities in their public purchasing-
related activities. Delegates to the OECD discussions were ultimately faced with a decision
regarding whether a potential set of multilateral rules should seek to constrain either
legislatively-administered discrimination, or "exclusionary practices", emanating from
the exercise of administrative discretion.' 47
 Resolution of this problem was complicated
by the fact that it emanated from constitutional differences. These differences, in turn,
147 The term "exclusionary practices" is employed by Anthony and Hagerty in their
discussion of the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Code. See their 'Cautious Optimism as a
Guide to Foreign Government Procurement", op. cit., p. 1304.
Herein it is also important to underscore the fact that, at the time of the ITO negotiations, the
regulatory "problem" in question was more loosely diagnosed as one emanating from
"constitutional differences". As was outlined in the preceding chapter, an important achievement
of the OECD discussions was improved understanding of Member Countries' public procurement
regulations, procedures and practices and how they interacted. This understanding enabled more
precise definition of the problem with which delegates were contending.
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implied that, in some national jurisdictions, any multilateral solution was necessarily going
to involve changes to existing national legislation.
This situation posed a "chicken and egg" dilemma for the countries participating in the
OECD rule-making exercise, pitting the US - with its politically-deviant form of
presidentialism - against what have subsequently come to be known as its fellow "Quad
countries", Japan, the states of the EU, and Canada.'48 Multilateral cooperation was
contingent upon institutional change at the national level, or alterations to existing
legislation and/or administrative practices. Such change, however, inevitably entailed
"costs"; generally, though not exclusively, of a short-term political nature. Difficulties
arose from discrepancies in the way in which these costs were allocated relative to the
liming of potential benefits in different national jurisdictions. Delegates to the OECD
discussions were, it might be said, involved in a balancing exercise, assessing the benefits
of cooperation against its costs, given the constraints of their particular national jurisdiction.
As has been mentioned before, however, this process "was not proceeding in isolation".
During the early 1970s a "sea change" in the overall tenor of the political economic
environment in which the discussions were taking place was underway. The remainder
of this chapter looks at major national "constitutional constraints" with which delegates
were having to contend, and then seeks to outline key features of the changing political
economic environment in which the political "balancing exercises" were taking place.
'	 Basic differences between the way in which political authority is organised in the US and
the kind of majoritarian government that is prevalent in Europe and throughout the countries of
the former British Commonwealth - as well as the kind of problems that they create for the
development of multilateral domestic disciplines - will be examined in Part II. See below,
especially pp. 198 - 215.
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Constitutional Discrepancies
John Jackson has developed a model for the way in which treaty-making powers are
allocated amongst national government institutions, and the procedures nation states follow
when entering into a treaty.' 49 This model, described by Jackson as a "landscape of treaty
application", identifies the following features of national "legal and constitutional settings"
that are relevant to the negotiation of a treaty:
1) the power to negotiate;
2) the power to "sign" (usually ad referendum, only to certify the text);
3) the power to "accept" the treaty as a binding international law
obligation;
4) the "validity" of the treaty under national constitutional law (closely
related to (3));
5) the power to implement the treaty obligations;
6) direct applicability of the treaty in domestic law;
7) invocability in municipal law (contrasted with direct applicability);
8) a hierarchy of norms in domestic law when treaty norms conflict
with norms of that law; and
9) the power to administer the treaty, which includes a series of issues
such as the procedure for formal "ratification"; the power to
interpret the treaty for domestic application and as a matter of
international law; the power to represent the country in institutional
procedures relating to the treaty (e.g., bilateral or multilateral
meetings); and the power to terminate the treaty...''5°
Later sections of this thesis will examine some of the implications arising from Jackson's
model in detail. It is presented in entirety here because it provides a good introduction
to the scale of the challenge faced by negotiators trying to reconcile different national
regulatory regimes: On the one hand, the model is indicative of the number of different
policy permutations from which any set of negotiations may be proceeding. Each of its
149 Jackson, J.H. "Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis". The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, 1992, pp. 315-319.
°	 ibid.,p.316.
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various elements potentially reflects an area in which national policies may be proceeding
from differing assumptions with respect to the proper allocation of political power. On
the other, it also highlights the institutional constraints under which individual negotiators
must labour. The cooperative policy solution ultimately embodied in any treaty reflects
a reconciliation of all of the potentially competing assumptions concerning the proper
allocation of political authority.
In the OECD debate over discrimination in public procurement markets, the previously
described "chicken and egg" dilemma emanated in large part from differing approaches
to allocation of the power to negotiate and implement treaty obligations. In the US, because
of the Constitutionally-mandated separation of powers, a dvision of labour exists between
the different branches of government that is not present in most other liberal democracies,
certainly, in any case, ones based on parliamentary majoritarianism. The American
Constitution, in the words of Louis Henkin, "gives (domestic) legislative power to
Congress, executive power to the President (and) judicial power to the courts". Foreign
relations powers similarly:
"reflect commitment to Separation... but what each branch can do alone, when the other
is silent or even in the face of its opposition, is not determined by any natural division...
Foreign relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fissured, along jagged lines
indifferent to classical categories of governmental power..."5'
The practical implications of this particular approach to the allocation of political authority
stem from the fact that it generally dictates that the regulatory decisions of Congress have
to be committed to statute in order for the executive to implement them.
151 Henkin. L. Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1972, pp. 3 1-32.
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In 1933, during the Depression, the US Congress passed the Buy American Act, governing
the "purchase of articles and supplies by, and the construction of public buildings or works
for the federal government".' 52 Designed primarily to relieve domestic unemployment,
assuage protests by manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment against competition from
German manufacturers and retaliate against trading partners' discriminatory practices,
the Act effectively mandated discrimination against foreign participants in public
procurement markets by prohibiting:
"federal agencies from procuring raw materials or manufactured articles from foreign
sources for use within the United States, unless the head of the procuring agency determines
that domestic procurement is inconsistent with the public interest or that the domestic
cost is unreasonable, or unless domestic materials or products are not available in sufficient
quantities or not or satisfactory quality.''53
Throughout the OECD discussions, and despite the earlier efforts of the ITO negotiators
and the general inconsistency of this legislation with the American commitment to a liberal
international economic order, these laws remained on the books.
Although the executive branch of the US Government is generally responsible for the
negotiation of treaties and other international agreements, the Congress is charged with
their implementation if they entail domestic legislation, or require appropriation of funds.'
152 Knapp, L.A. "The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment". Columbia Law
Review, Vol. 61, 1961, p. 431.
See P.H. Gantt and W.H. Speck's "Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal
Government Contracting: Buy American Act and Executive Order", in Journal of Public Law,
Vol. 7, 1958, p. 379 for a discussion of legislators' motivations for the Act and Knapp, op. cit., p.
431 for the quoted review of the terms of the Act.
op. cit., Henkin, p. 161. Herein, it should be mentioned that the two houses of the
Congress have differing responsibilities with respect to the treaty and executive agreement
processes. For the purposes at hand, it is sufficient to note that the political controversy in
question was related to the role that the legislative branch of the US Government would
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Leaving aside questions concerning the mechanics of the actual application of the norms
ultimately embodied in the GAIT Government Procurement Agreement, this particular
manifestation of Jackson's "landscape of treaty application" ultimately meant that the US
executive would have to negotiate the abolition of the Buy America Act and other
discriminatory legislation with the Congress before taking on new duties under any
prospective multilateral procurement regime. This, in itself, did not present an
insurmountable barrier to agreement. It did, however, pose particularly challenging
problems when viewed from the perspective of the "constitutional landscapes" and
associated political "cost structures" from which other participants in the discussions were
proceeding.
In parliamentary democracies, like Japan, Canada and most of the national governments
that make up the EU, there is no formal, or constitutionally-sanctioned rivalry between
the executive and legislative arms of government; indeed, the prime minister is generally
selected on the basis of his leadership of the party or coalition claiming a parliamentary
majority. In terms of both national and international relations, this implies a much more
relaxed approach to executive and administrative implementation of the "legislative will".
Typically, there is no reason to commit regulatory policies to statute and/or identify explicit
formal procedures for their implementation. Intra-party differences of opinion, if they
are too severe, bring down governments. Checking discrimination in public procurement
markets in "constitutional contexts" of this nature is largely a matter of introducing
procedures to ensure what Winham and others have termed "greater transparency" in the
ultimately have to play in any potential multilateral agreement.
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public tendering process.' 55
 Procedures which, as was described in the introductory chapter,
constitute "positive policy obligations", designed to compel equal treatment for foreign
suppliers".
'When nations meet to create a single international practice out of diverse national
practices," as Winham put it, "it is to be expected that they will seek wherever they can
to extend their national procedures into the international arena." 56 In the OECD
discussions concerning the "concept of discrimination", the impasse that developed between
the US and everyone else arose from the fact that the policy prescriptions that each of
the competing camps was offering would not, in isolation, have resolved the multilateral
problem. The US call for procedural mechanisms to counter informal discrimination would
have done little to counter the discrimination implicit in its Buy American iaws. Similarly,
the other Quad countries' bid for commitment to the withdrawal of discriminatory
legislation would not have checked the kind of discrimination manifested in non-US public
procurement markets.
Another way of looking at this impasse, as has been suggested, might be in terms of the
relative distribution, timing and certainty of national "costs and benefits" associated with
multilateral cooperation. For the US, participation in a multilateral public procurement
regime necessarily entailed high, "upfront" political costs; cooperation was conditioned
on the withdrawal of discriminatory legislation. The executive could not "sell" an
institutional change of this nature to Congress without compensating, immediate prospects
op. cit., Winham, p. 192.
156	 ibid.,p. 192.
101
for cooperative gains. For the other Quad countries, on other hand, both the costs and
benefits were more disperse. The realisation of gains required the introduction of legislative
changes whose costs would be spread out over an indefinite future. This was problematic
in that each participant had little security that the cooperative gains that were supposed
to follow would actually be realised, i.e. that the other parties to the agreement would
not, in the words of the game theorists, find a way to "defect from the game".
The reminder of this chapter looks at environmental issues that affected the perceived
"political cost structures" with which the competing "constitutional camps" were
contending, and, arguably, re-defined the parameters of the institutional problem.
A Changing Political Economic Environment
Nearly 50 years passed between the iTO negotiations, the signature of the Tokyo Round
Government Procurement Code and its 1988 and 1994 revisions. During this time, the
international political economic environment was not static. This section of the chapter
outlines a series of developments in this context that may have contributed to the evolution
of the political consensus that ultimately found reflection in the multilateral public
procurement regime. It is organised around three different, albeit intimately inter-related
areas in which changes were taking place: 1) The international institutional environment;




Most of the secondary literature on the evolution of the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Government Procurement cites "lessons" from regional integration and the OECD
discussions as particularly critical factors in the evolution of the Agreement. The learning
processes described, whatever their institutional setting, fall into two distinct, although,
at times, over-lapping phases:
A "definitional" stage - encompassing discussion and exchange relating to the nature of
public procurement and discrimination in such markets, manifestations of the latter in
different jurisdictions, and its political and economic costs and benefits.
An ongoing "remedial" stage - during which different policy options for rectifying such
discrimination were identified, implemented and subsequently improved. This latter phase
has been described by the OECD as a quest leading to the "framing of new rules or
disciplines, or the reaffirmation of existing ones, making them more precise or...
detailed".'57
Activities in the context of OECD cooperation made particularly important contributions
to the "institutional learning" that took place during the first phase. The previously-cited
OECD study of its member states' procurement policies (the 1966 "Pink Book") was the
first important formal exercise in this process. Although it had been motivated by Belgian
and UK appeals against the US' Buy American Act, the significance of this study was
associated with its findings that, in the words of Morton Pomerantz, "the US was not alone
'' OECD Document TD (91) 100. "The Trade Committee of the OECD: Thirty Years and
a Hundred Meetings". Paris: November 1991, p. 43.
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in favoring domestic suppliers in the procurement process") 58 As Blank and Marceau
put it, "Practically all (of the) countries examined had in place some kind of 'preferred
treatment' or 'preference'..."59
 A US Government report quoted by Pomerantz concluded:
"The major difference between the US and other countries was that the US stated clearly
visible percentage preferences for domestic suppliers, whereas most other countries used
highly invisible, administrative procurement practices and procedures to achieve the 'buy
national' result".'6°
The "constitutional" reasons for these differences have been addressed. From an
"institutional learning point of view", their significance lies in the fact that they were
formally recognised. This was a key step in terms of the definition of the multilateral
policy problem, requiring discussions in this forum covering nearly twenty years' worth
of meetings.' 6 ' According to Blank and Marceau, it ultimately "explains why the
(institutional) solution elaborated later on addressed both the transparency of purchasing
procedures (in setting minimum standards requirements) and formal price preferences")62
As regards the "second stage" of institutional edification, the introductory chapter of this
thesis referred to Ken Dam's observation that the "general lesson" offered by the process
of European integration for the liberalisation of trade in public procurement markets was
158 op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1272.
159 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 15.
° Staff of the US Bureau of the Budget report on "Foreign Procurement of the US
Government" (1964) quoted by M. Pomerantz in "Toward a New International Order in
Government Procurement". Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 11, 1979, p. 1272.
161 Earlier sections of this paper have referred to the constitutional, or definitional problems
faced by the ITO negotiators. If one considers these experiences as well, this definitional
problem took significantly more than 20 years to resolve!
162 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 15.
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that the elimination of discrimination in these markets was dependent on the introduction
of policy measures that were both "negative" and "positive" in nature.' 63 As Pomerantz
has further suggested, however, this lesson is difficult to appreciate without an
understanding of the complicated interplay between economic institutions of the
Community, the EFTA and the OEEC/OECD.IM It entails a "story" that, according to
a previously-cited OECD Secretariat Report on the history of its Trade Committee, proceeds
from the "lifting of quantitative restrictions between the European OEEC Member
countries... (and) the 1958 return to currency convertibility".' 65
 At one level, this story
relates to the question of what the trade role, or institutional competence of the OECD
was going to be relative to that of the GATT. At another, and, more fundamentally, it
concerns competing approaches to liberalisation.
The OEEC was established in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan for European postwar
recovery. Between then and 1957, when the European Economic Community was created
by the signing of the Treaty of Rome, it was the forum for European economic cooperation.
According to Willem Molle's, the OEEC "aimed for trade liberalisation by the elimination
of all manner of obstacles", providing for a "light form of positive integration".' This
integration involved only minimal "coordination of national policies", eg. with respect
to energy and manufacturing. The EEC, on the other hand, sought to facilitate what Molle
has described as, "drastic forms of integration", including, but not limited to a complete
163 op. cit., Dam, p. 209.
op. cit., Pomerantz, pp. 1273 - 1276.
165 op. cit., OECD Secretariat' s "The Trade Committee of the OECD", p. 8.
op. cit., Molle, p. 51.
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customs union, free movement of persons and capital and integrated policies in a number
of important policy areas.' 67 Its construction, as described by the OECD Secretariat, was
based on the "pragmatic" concept of "mutual recognition", although the need for a certain
degree of harmonisation with respect to national policies and practices affecting trade
was recognised as inescapable.'68
After the EEC came into being, negotiations between it and the remaining European OEEC
Member countries were undertaken with the idea of establishing a vast European Free
Trade Area. They quickly broke down, foundering on what the OECD terms, "conceptual
and political" differences of opinion relating to "two different philosophies or concepts
of free trade and how to achieve it".' 69
 The first of these concepts views free trade as
ultimately demanding "a broad degree of harmonisation of the policies and practices
affecting trade", whereas the second sets "few prerequisites for free trade" and doesn't
involve "even partial relinquishment of internal or external economic independence".
The debate between the two approaches is the same as the dilemma surrounding:
"the relationship between regional integration and multilateral liberalisation, i.e. about
the question of whether there is a limit to the latter of which the former is an extension
or, on the contrary, whether regional integration is an inevitable transition or one which
facilitates multilateral
167	 ibid., p. 52.
168 op. cit., OECD Secretariat's "The Trade Committee of the OECD", p. 9.
169	 ibid., p. 9.
'°	 ibid.,p.9.
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Following the breakdown of the European Free Trade Area discussions, the European
Free Trade Association was established in 1959 amongst non-EEC European countries
to offset the economic division of Europe that seemed inevitable in the wake of the new
Community. Its membership, according to Molle, consisted of those "countries that could
not, for different reasons, accept the organisation of the Communities") 7 ' Shortly
thereafter, in October of 1961, the OECD became the successor to the OEEC; its mandate
in the trade area was the product of lengthy debate, both with respect to European-wide
co-operation, and in terms of its relationship with that of the GA1'T. In the end, both the
institution's agenda and membership were expanded. As the previously-cited OECD report
put it, the
"parenthesis represented by the OEEC was ending and the GA1'T was reclaiming its ftill
role... On the other hand, the majority of European countries remembered with some
nostalgia the atmosphere that had prevailed at the OEEC and the particularly effective
form of co-operation that they had known there... GATT disciplines and cooperation
seemed to them less sound than those they had known in the OEEC".'72
Molle's text describes how, during the course of the 1960s, "the advantages of such
integration as was being realised in the EC became rapidly evident to other European
countries". In 1972, he says, "the UK, Denmark and freland left the EFTA to join the
EC... (and, in) 1981, Greece was admitted, followed, on 1st January 1986, by Spain and
Portugal".' 73
 This apparent change of "philosophical opinion" with respect to the
technology of free trade is illustrated in the government procurement area by the 1967
op. cit., Molle, p. 52.
172 op. cit., OECD Secretariats "The Trade Committee of the OECD", p. 10. The fact that
this report speaks of the Kennedy Round as a further "answer to the creation of the Common
Market and its expansion" also bears mention. See p. 14.
op. cit., Molle, p. 52.
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EFTA review of national laws, regulations and practices relating to the award of public
contracts. According to Pomerantz, it constituted a formal acknowledgement that "a
normative rule would not be sufficient by itself to halt discriminatory practices'.' 74 Further
European economic integration, in other words, was going to necessitate a measure of
policy harmonisation, or positive coordination.
What then were the specific "lessons" offered by EC co-operation in the public procurement
area? The Community's basic strategy for removing competitive distortions in its public
procurement markets has been described by Freidl Weiss as being built on recognition
of three sources of discrimination in the field of public procurement: a certain margin
of inevitable administrative discretion, formal legal inequality of treatment, and
discrimination due to habitual administrative practices.' 75
 Negatiie policy disciplines
were introduced in a series of "liberalisation directives" designed primarily to counter
formal barriers to legal equality, and positive integration measures, in the form of
procedural requirements for the contracting process, were incorporated in a series of
"coordination directives". To facilitate Member States' administration of these measures,
the new rules only applied to positive lists of government entities (initially) and
projects/supply contracts exceeding a certain minimal value.'76
op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1274. Similarly, Jacques Pelkmans has recently argued that this
strategic "change of heart" is best illustrated by the EFTA's replacement of its so-called
"Luxembourg process" with the "Oslo process", a regulatory approach that "entailed an almost
wholesale adoption of EC regulatory strategy and substance". See "Towards a European
Community Regulatory Strategy: lessons from 'learning-by-doing" by J. Pelkmans and J. Sun in
Regulatory Cooperation for an Interdependent World, edited by the OECD Secretariat. Paris:
OECD Publications, 1994, p. 193.
op. cit., Weiss, p 38.
176 The coverage of Community Directives is still subject to limitations with respect to value
thresholds. Nevertheless, these have been substantially decreased over time, and rules have been
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It is important to distinguish here between this kind of positive policy cooperation and
policy harmonisation. Because of what Weiss has described as the "great diversity of
procurement systems in Member States" and "considerable differences in the organization
of relevant markets and of public authorities and bodies", the strategy for the liberalisation
of the Community's procurement markets did not entail the enactment of precise rules,
embodied in a separate and independent Community legal regime.' 77 Rather, the
Conmiission proceeded pragmatically, elaborating lowest-common-denominator, procedural
norms as a "first step towards legal integration". National rules, as long as they were
consistent with the minimal legislative standards of the Community, remained the basis
of applicable market disciplines.'78
Returning to what Pomerantz described as the "complicated interplay between institutions
of the Community, the EFTA and the OEEC/OECD", the ultimate implication of this
European "lesson" is reflected in the OECD's 'Draft Instrument on Government Purchasing
Policies, Procedures and Practices": Blank and Marceau have characterised it as a
introduced to proscribe the practice of "contract splitting". See Weiss, op. cit., p. 33 and the texts
of the Public Works, Supplies, Services and Utilities Directives, i.e., respectively, Directive
7 1/305, OJL 185/5 of 16 August 1971, Directive 77/62, OiL 13/1 of 15 January 1977, Directive
92/50, OJL 209/1 of 24 July 1992 and Directive 90/531, OJL 297/1 of 29 October 1990.
op. cit., Weiss, p. 33 and pp. 38-39.
In a recent Wall Street Journal article entitled, "Time for a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade
Agenda", Patrick Messerlin termed cooperative arrangements of this nature, "mutual recognition
arrangements", or MRAs. Such institutions, he said, "consist of two parts - a set of common core
rules negotiated and adopted by all signatories ("minimal harmonisation") and the commitment
by each signatory to recognise the domestic provisions of the other signatories (the "mutual
recognition" part). Wall Street Journal Europe, 17 November 1995.
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"reconciliation of the US procedures and practices with the approach of the European
Economic Community and the Directives which were being elaborated in the EEC".'79
The International Context
It is difficult to divorce the institutional learning processes that have been described from
the international economic environment in which they were taking place. It does not seem
inappropriate, that is, to discuss the latter in terms of broader, on-going efforts to learn
about how the international economy, in general, functions. The purpose of this thesis,
however, is to study the political motivations underlying the multilateral public procurement
regime. The dependent variable under analysis, might be described as a political decision;
economic arguments for various policy alternatives are thus but individual factors in the
equation that must ultimately be evaluated. Brian Hindley, an economist, has discussed
this distinction in a procurement context in terms of a difference between politically and
economically motivated multilateral agreements: Politically-motivated rules, he sald,
are designed to facilitate "commercially fair" public purchasing practices, whereas
economically justified ones promote "more effective use of world resources".' 8° For reasons
that have been introduced in the introductory chapter and relate ultimately to values, the
two types of agreements seek distinct objectives and implicitly involve different, though
not necessarily mutually exclusive kinds of learning experiences. So as to underscore
this distinction, environmental changes entering into economic assessments relating to
op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 1.
'° Hindley, B.V. "The Economics of an Accord on Public Procurement Policies", The
World Economy, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 1978, P. 286.
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the WTO Agreement, as well as the implications of the lessons associated with such
assessments will be addressed separately.
Ken Dam has described the economic learning processes that played a role in the evolution
of the GATT public procurement agreement in terms of growing recognition of the cost
of discrimination in these markets. In his 1969 text on the GATF, he identified three major
factors contributing to costs of this nature, arguing that "In view of the incontestable impact
of government procurement regulations and procedures on international trade, it is striking
that the General Agreement does not attempt to control discrimination in procurement".
These factors included: 1) the economic significance of government entities as consumers,
broadly reflected in the percentage of the GNP that passes through public budgets; 2) Costs
associated with foregone price competition in public procurement markets and; 3) Costs
emanating from lost customs revenues)8'
As regards the economic significance of government entities, statistics on the volume
of public purchasing are not always readily available and can be difficult to compare across
national jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the relative economic importance of the government
sector, in general, has been widely recognised in recent years.' 82 Weiss, for example, cites
data compiled by the OECD that show that the size of the public sector as a percentage
18t op. cit., Dam, p. 199. Herein, in addition to the "percentage of the GNP of most
countries that passes through public budgets", Dam also cites a 1954 US study that estimated that
the Buy American Act was costing the US government up to $100,000,000 annually in higher
prices and another $100,000,000 in foregone customs revenue.
182 It will be recalled that earlier sections of this dissertation have described recent
endeavours to find practical solutions to the problem of obtaining statistics on the value of public
procurement contracts that took place in the context of the negotiations over the 1994
Government Procurement Agreement's coverage. See above, pp. 83 - 86.
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of GNP has increased in every OECD country since WWI) 83 Similarly, John Jackson
has referred to a "trend of increasing the government sector of a number of economies"
throughout the 1 960s, characterised by the nationalisation of a series of industries in which
export trade opportunities were seen as an important area for future growth) 84 More
recently, the Economist, in an article entitled, "The myth of the powerless state",
commented on the fact that, since 1980, the average public spending ratio in the larger
economies has increased, on average, from 36% to 40%.185
Costs relating to foregone customs revenues have become relatively insignificant as the
average tariff in OAT!' countries has fallen from some x% in 1948 to y% today. Those
generated by foregone price competition in these markets, on the other hand, have grown
increasingly important. So much so, in fact, that David Held recently observed, "To remain
in power in a liberal democratic regime, governments (today) must take action to secure
the profitability and prosperity of the private sector... welfare, taxation and economic
policies.., must function in the context of powerful pressures to keep productivity
costs/profit ratios competitive and to keep the economy in step with broad international
trends")86
183	 op. cit., Weiss, p. 6.
op. cit., Jackson, p. 199.
185 
"The myth of the powerless state". The Economist, 7 October 1995, p 13.
186 Held, D. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 183.
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The economic benefits that may be associated with multilateral disciplines in public
procurement markets, according to Dr. Hindley's previously-mentioned paper, are relative
in nature, and largely a factor of the "cost conditions that are assumed to prevail in a given
industry") 87
 Such conditions, he said, dictate the likely "distributional consequences"
of policies designed to promote unbiased government procurement. Unlike the "costs"
associated with the imposition of a tariff, the welfare loss emanating from discriminatory
public procurement practices is likely to be borne by the country employing the policy.
For this reason, a complete:
"ban on bias in public procurement policy.., is not necessarily desirable... It is not an
appropriate aim or function of international agreements to prevent a signatory country
from 'damaging its (economic) interests' should it wish to do so. The aim of such
agreements should be to prevent one country from damaging the interests of another."88
A 1988 study prepared for the European Commission on public procurement, more
specifically, identified five "key characteristics" of the structure of the public sector that
are important for national "patterns of public procurement":
"- the degree of de-centralistion, the number of individual purchasing entities and hence
the size and accessibility of contracts
- the allocation of responsibilities for purchasing between central and local authorities,
especially for roads, public works, health and public order
- the size, number and constitution of public enterprises, together with the degree of
government control over their management and purchasing activities
op. cit., Hindley, p. 281.
ibid., p. 281.
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- the nature and extent of legal restrictions and central control over public sector purchasing
procedures and policy".'89
These "factors", the study concluded, determine the potential economic impact of opening
up public procurement markets to greater competition.
The Commission's study also endeavoured to quantify economic costs associated with
discriminatory purchasing practices in the EC. In the process of doing so, it identified
the following as general types of benefits likely to be associated with the liberalisation
of public purchasing markets:
"Static trade effects - emanating from new trade due to static price differentials between
national markets, i.e. procurement from the cheapest supplier at present prices.
Competition effects - produced by the reduction in national producer's prices that follows
their having to contend with foreign competition
Re-structuring effects - longer term benefits flowing from greater reliance on economies
of scale, engendered by processes of industrial adjustment"°
The Political Environment
Just as it was difficult to isolate institutional learning experiences reflected in the
multilateral public procurement regime from changes in the international economic
environment in general, so, too, is the relationship between economic and political
189 Commission of the European Communities. Research on the "Cost of non-Europe -
Basic findings, Vol. 5, Part A - The "Cost of non-Europe" in public-sector procurement.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1988, pp. 91 - 92.
op. cit., p. 9. It might also be mentioned that this study qualifies its assessment of the
potential benefits of liberalisation with observation that "public sector legislation alone may not
achieve these benefits without... (inter alia) changes in supplier's attitudes and strategies." See p.
15.
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developments relating to these rules often clouded.' 9 ' Such difficulties are a product of
the way in which political economic phenomena are connected with other phenomena
in what Gunnar Myrdal termed the "social flux". As he explained,
"The causal phenomena... are so elusively intertwined, so difficult to grasp directly that
a political measure which seems entirely justified as long as the indirect effects are
disregarded, often turns out to be absurd from the standpoint of the same set of political
valuations when all its.., effects are taken into account."92
With due respect for the above and in keeping with arguments that have been presented
earlier concerning the importance of understanding the variety of interdependent variables
that can enter into a public policy equation of this nature, this section will summarise major
political issues and developments, other than those associated with the previously-described
international institutional environment, that may have played a role in the evolution of
the GATT Government Procurement Agreement.
So as to illustrate the general economic importance of government entities, the proceeding
section referred to statistics concerning the size of the public sector as a percentage of
national GNP across various national jurisdictions. Aggregate statistics of this nature
fail to capture the full political economic impact of the public sector in public procurement
'' This is not a problem unique to this particular policy context: Classical scholars viewed
economics as a subdivision of political science in that both disciplines fundamentally involved
the study of social activity. Since the time of Bentham, however, this relationship has frequently
been inverted. In criticising this development, Gunnar Myrdal said, "From the point of view of
its ideological origins, political economy is a grandiose attempt to state in scientific terms what
ought to be... It is the tragedy of economic inquiry that the further we have advanced in out
attempts to observe and explain social phenomena, the further away we have moved from our
aim of defining the conditions (emphasis added) for the maximisation of social utility". See The
Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, London: Transaction Publishers, pp.
56-57.
'	 ibid, p. 2.
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markets, at least as it has been recognised during recent years. The reasons why provide
a good example of how the relationship between the disciplines of political science and
economics can become clouded: In certain industries, governments are the most important
clients, controlling budgetary means that can effectively seal off such markets from any
meaningful competition. If a particular industry is, in turn, characterised by significant
economies of scale and high research and development costs, the market power wielded
by the government sector is likely to be compounded. This power may be further enhanced
if the national market in question is substantial in size, enabling the achievement of local
economies of scale. As Gerard de Graaf and Matthew King, two members of the EU
delegation to the Uruguay Round negotiations, explained in a recent article on the
negotiation of the 1994 WTO Government Procurement Agreement, "For d ynamic industry,
a wider market offers the possibility to benefit from economies of scale and provides a
solid base to bear high r&d costs".'93
An example of this phenomenon was suggested by an October 1995 Wall Street Journal
article which cited a classified US report that predicted that more than $1 trillion in overseas
capital projects will come up for bidding in the next decade.' Shortly thereafter, David
de Pury, then co-chairman of ABB Asea Brown Boveri, a Swiss/Swedish producer of
heavy capital goods, observed in a speech at the Graduate Institute of International Studies
in Geneva that virtually all of the growth that his firm is likely to achieve in the medium
to longer term is going to come from developing country infrastructure projects; unimpeded
op. cit., de Graaf, G. and M. King, p. 437.
'	 Greenberger, R.S. "U.S. Firms Lost Business Due to Bribes, Report Says," The Wall
Street Journal Europe, 12 October 1995.
116
access to developing country procurement markets is therefore one of his firm's most critical
strategic concerns)95
According to John Jackson, recognition of the strategic value associated with access to
certain key public procurement markets was a critically important factor in the institutional
advent of the Tokyo Round Code. In his previously-cited text, The World Trading System,
he referred to the fact that "US manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment (such as
turbines) saw great exporting potential if foreign restrictions on government purchases
of imports could be softened" as one of the major reasons why the government procurement
exception to the GATF rules of MFN and national treatment had become "very troublesome
by the l97Os") Taking this argument a bit further, Pomerantz has contended that,
"Since enactment of the Buy American Act, a very considerable part of the debate has
continued to center on the manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment... The industry
was involved in the initial (Tokyo Round) code negotiation on the basis that the opening
of foreign procurement markets will ensure that competitors will not be able to use profits
derived from protected home markets to subsidize marginal sales in the United States
or third country markets."97
Gilbert Winham has described this situation in terms of the broader role played by "export
interests", particularly in the US and Canada, in the Tokyo Round, whilst I.M. Destler,
an American political scientist, has discussed it in the context of what he terms the "export
195 Speech delivered by David de Pury, Co-Chairman of the Board, ABB Asea Brown
Boveri, Ltd. at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Geneva: 25 October 1995.
op. cit., Jackson, p. 200.
op. cit., Pomerantz, p. 1270. Later sections of the thesis will return to the implications of
some of the issues raised by Pomerantz for the most recently-concluded round of government
procurement negotiations. See Part III below, especially pp. 258 - 266.
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politics tradition" in international trade politics.'98 Destler's 1986 text, American Trade
Politics: System Under Stress, defined this "tradition" as a way of resolving the political
problems inevitably associated with trade liberalisation. "Export politics", he said, involves
"bargaining over access to foreign markets as a way of countering pressures for import
restrictions at home"; it seeks to focus political attention on the benefits of trade
expansion.' From this perspective, the trade policy process is essentially a
"running battle between 'special interests' favoring protection and 'the general interest'
in open trade. The 'losers' in international competition have their jobs hanging on the
decision, while others have more diffuse interests..."200
The significance of this "battle" as regards the emergence of the Tokyo Round Government
Procurement Code is associated with the fact that during "the last decade and a half, special
interests that suffer from trade restrictions have mounted more vigorous and increasingly
overt political efforts to oppose campaigns for new import restrictions". 20 ' As Robert
Strauss, Head of the US Delegation to the Tokyo Round, observed,
"...the (Tokyo Round) agreements are an historic achievement. The achievement is more
remarkable for having been accomplished over six years which saw the world economy
deeply shaken by two recessions, energy crises, unemployment, inflation and balance of
payments deficits. All of the economic indicators and political skeptics pointed in a
op. cit., Winham, p. 189, and I.M. Destler's American Trade Politics: System Under
Stress. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1986, p. 15.
'	 ibid.,p.45.
200 Destler, I.M. Anti-protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics.
Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1987, p. 1.
201 ibid., p. 1. It bears mention that an important purpose of this book is to explore the
reasons why "anti-protection interests" may have become more active politically. To this end,
Destler and Odell identify "three major forces" that seem to have been particularly important
elements in this development: I) the "increased ambitiousness of protectionist proposals"; 2)
structural changes in the US economy that have left it more dependent on foreign trade and; 3)
the enhanced "private organisational capacity" for political action. See pp. 26 - 30.
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direction opposite from fairer, freer trade - toward a rush back to narrow and selfish trade
restrictions and protectionism that were so destructive in the 1930s."202
'Export interests" could never have exercised the degree of influence that they did in the
Tokyo Round negotiations were it not for certain changes in national and supranational
"constitutional landscapes" that proceeded the Round. The re-specification of treaty-
making powers that took place in the US and the EC during the early 1970s were
particularly important political developments in this sense. The 1974 US Trade Act
"democratised" the US negotiations process by giving the Congress what Harald Malmgren
has termed a "new activist role", whilst structural changes in the EC consolidated the
Commission's negotiating authority, making the EC into what Winham called a
"commercial superpower".203
Earlier sections have described the obstacles that "peculiarities of the American
constitutional structure" presented to Kennedy Round negotiators. Indeed, following the
Kennedy Round, the European Community stated that it was not prepared to commit its
members to another round of trade negotiations until the US had clarified its negotiating
authority to implement the results of any future negotiation. 204 The 1974 US Trade Act
addressed this problem. John Jackson has described it as an attempt to provide a better
202 Strauss, R.S. "Forward to the Law & Policy Symposium on the Tokyo Round". Law
and Policy
 in International Business, Vol. 11, 1979, p. 1259. John Jackson, in an article
entitled, "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal", has also made
similar comments concerning the accomplishments of the Tokyo Round: "The MTN results are
particularly impressive in light of the enormous difficulties through which the international
economic system has been passing in the past decade..." See Law & Policy in International
Business, Vol. 12, 1980, p. 23.
203 See op. cit., Marks and Malmgren, p. 338 and op. cit., Winham, p. 84.
204 op.cit., Marks and Malmgren, p. 333.
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balance between the US legislature's Constitutionally-mandated responsibilities for the
regulation of foreign commerce, and the practical realities associated with the way in which
the Executive branch had to negotiate those regulations with foreign countries; it sought
to ensure the consistency of international trade agreements with domestic law, whilst
providing the Executive with a more functionally appropriate level of authority over the
negotiations process. The Act itself consisted of a series of consultation procedures for
the negotiations process, and what Jackson identified as "3 fundamental (legislative) rules":
"1)	 A bill, when introduced, would not be amendable;
2) Committees to which the bill was referred would be required to report out
the bill within a short period of time; and
3) Debate over the bill in both houses would be limited."205
Matthew Marks and Harold Malmgren have attributed the political significance of the
Act to the fact that it substantially modified the role played by the legislative branch in
international trade negotiations. 206
 Better known as the "fast track procedure", it created
what these authors have termed a "new activist role" for the Congress in the GA1'T
negotiations process. Under its provisions, members of both the House and the Senate
were, in future, to serve as active advisors in the US delegation to the negotiations, and
operating Executive trade policy decisions were to be subject to Congressional scrutiny
and review. In addition, a number of negotiating objectives were set out for the reform
of the GATT system and provisions were made for Executive denial of the benefits of
new trade agreements to industrialised nations who were unwilling to provide their fair
205 op. cit., Jackson's The World Trading System, p. 73.
206 op. cit., Marks and Malmgren, pp. 337-343.
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share of concessions in GATT negotiations. Subsequent to its January 1975 signature
by President Ford, the US' GATT negotiating partners were assured "expedited
congressional approval not only of the agreements which are negotiated but also of the
necessary implementing legislation".
In the EC, the re-specification of treaty-making powers was primarily reflected in the
consolidation and expansion of the Commission's negotiating authority. The Kennedy
Round, as Gilbert Winham put it, "marked the first time that the Europe of the Six had
negotiated externally with other nations. This was not easily achieved.., indeed, internal
disagreement in the Six had stalled the Round for two years" 207 During the Paris summit
of the heads of the EEC Governments in October 1972, however, the Community's intention
to achieve economic and monetary union was reaffirmed. The following January, EEC
membership was formally expanded to include Denmark, Ireland and the UK. In April -
May 1973, the Commission submitted a document to the Council of Ministers that came
to be known as the EC's Overall Approach to the Tokyo Round negotiations. Henceforth,
the combined economies of the enlarged EEC were on a relative par in terms of political
power with the US; the structure of GATT negotiations shifted from a unipolar
configuration to a bipolar one.
Certain "institutional learning experiences" at the multilateral level have also been
recognised as factors that could have influenced the political climate in which the Tokyo
Round Government Procurement Code was agreed. Herein, as was briefly mentioned
in the Introduction, Contracting Parties' experiences with the 1967 AD Code are of
207 op. cit., Winham, pp. 69 - 70.
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particular relevance. From about 1958 on, what Bob Hudec has described as a "legal
malaise" had been plaguing the GATT; Contracting Parties, and the US, in particular,
generally felt that the Agreement as a whole had ceased to provide an "overall balance
of legal reciprocity", a critical precondition for genuine political commitment to the
reduction of such barriers. 208 The AD Code, the first "self-balancing", or conditionally
reciprocical, multilateral agreement, tied the benefits of order more directly to its political
costs. Contracting Parties could not enjoy its market-opening benefits without participating
in the Agreement and offering comparable market access opportunities themselves. John
Jackson used the term "interpretation" in describing it, highlighting its relationship to
existing GATF rules governing contingent protection, or non-tariff-based, administrative
barriers to trade.2® Robert Stern and Bernard Hoekman subsequently discussed this
relationship - and that of the GATT and the Tokyo Round Codes in general - in terms
of the following:
"The Tokyo Round codes form an extension of GATT in that they explicitly extend trade
discipline to, or define more precisely existing discipline and rules for, specific NTBs.
GAiT had already governed most of the subjects that the codes addressed... The basic
208 op. cit., Hudec, p 293. On this particular page of his book, Professor Hudec states that
legal reciprocity is a precondition for effective enforcement. Earlier sections of Hudec's book,
however, are devoted to a discussion of the relationship between political commitment and
enforcement. His general premise would appear to be that effective enforcement requires
political commitment which is unlikely to exist without rough legal reciprocity. See, for
example, pp. 11-15.
209 ibid., p. 33. It should be mentioned that the AD Code was not initially viewed in
politically positive terms, particularly by the Americans. In his forequoted article, "The Birth of
the GA1'T-MTN System...", Jackson refers to the fact that the US Congress had attempted to
block implementation of the 1967 Code when the results of the Kennedy Round were presented
for its approval. A good summary of the reasons why is provided by Matthew Marks and Harold
Malmgren in "Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade". Experiences with the Code, they
conclude, offered a vital general lesson for future American negotiations on NTBs: the executive
branch must work closely with Congress before taking on international obligations. This
problem, as has been discussed, was subsequently addressed by the 1974 Trade Act.
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principles of GAIT... also apply generally to the codes. But the codes go a step further,
in that procedures and provisions are more detailed and specific."21°
The AD Code, in this sense, constituted a "model" for the discipline of NTBs; structurally
speaking, it paved the way for the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Codes.
A final political issue that may have played a role in the evolution of the Procurement
Agreement involves the fundamental inconsistency of formal, or legislated discrimination
in these markets with both national security interests in a Cold War-dominated world,
and the US' ideological commitment to a liberal economic order. These inconsistencies
emanated in large part from the Buy American Act. Its relative institutional importance
was, in turn, a factor of the 'hegemonic role" that the US played in the international political
economic environment during the years that followed the negotiation of the GATT.21'
Earlier sections of this chapter have described how the Act emerged during the depths
of the 1929- 1939 Depression. During World War II, however, US Executive Order 9001
"expressly permitted procurement without regard to the Buy American Act". 212 Once
the war had ended, this left officials involved in the administration of the Act facing a
210 Stem, R. and Hoekman, B. "The Codes Approach", in The Uruguay Round: A
Handbook on the MTN, edited by J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski. Washington: The World
Bank, 1987, p. 59. Two qualifications are in order here: The basic principles of the GAIT -
namely non-discrimination on the basis of most-favoured nation and national treatment - apply
generally to the codes, but within a code-specific context. Non-Members are not extended these
privileges. In addition, the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, unlike all 5 of the
other Codes, governed an area of commercial activity that had not previously been subject to
GAIT disciplines.
211 See the discussion of hegemonic stability theory in the Introduction to this thesis, pp. 46
- 51, or in Robert Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 72 - 80.
212 Gantt, P.H. and W.H. Speck. "Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal
Government Contracting: Buy American Act and Executive Order". Journal of Public Law, Vol
7, 1958, p. 396.
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"quandary", namely trying to reconcile the later's legislatively-mandated preferences with
new, internationally cooperative programs like the Mutual Security Administration. Up
until the War, the Buy American Act had been considered to be virtually a complete ban
on the purchase of foreign goods and materials. After the war, however, trade liberalisation
was increasingly seen as what Lawrence Knapp termed "an essential requirement of the
individual and collective security of the United States and its allies".213
At the same time, economically-derived political pressures for repeal or liberalisation
of the Act were also growing: As part of his discussion of "export politics", I.M. Destler
outlined the objectives of US postwar economic policy:
"The ultimate goal of postwar US trade leaders was not maximum US advantage but
openness in general, a trade world where American products and firms could compete
as freely as possible with others... Trade was a positive-sum game, and liberal politics
would make everyone better off..."2t4
A Congressional report published during this era baldly stated that the Buy American
principle was "in direct conflict with the basic foreign economic polices of the United
States". 215
 Similarly, two other official US reports from this period cited by the Gantt
and Speck article focused specifically on the costs associated with the Act. 2t6 According
to these authors, pressures for change related to domestic political conflicts engendered
213 Knapp, L.A. 'The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment". Columbia Law
Review, Vol. 61, 1961, p. 437.
op. cit., Destler, p. 96.
215 op. cit., Gantt and Speck, p. 397.
216 Earlier sections of this paper have referred to the latter report's estimate that the Buy
American Act was costing the US Government up to $100,000,000 annually in higher prices and
another $100,000,000 in foregone customs revenues. Thid, p. 398, and Dam, op. cit., p. 199.
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by the Buy American Act were particularly strong until 1954. After this time, as described
by Lawrence Knapp, they were effectively overwhelmed by "forces of protectionism that
were growing apace in the US in consequence of the initiation and growth of foreign
competition, induced by the success of the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security
Program".217
 Significantly, however, they never fully went away; "export interests" could
always call upon them to supplement other arguments for change.
217 op. cit., Knapp, p. 437.
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1.3 - The Institutional Mechanics of the GPA
The first two chapters of this section have traced the historical evolution of WTO public
procurement disciplines and surveyed dominant features of the political economic context
from which they emerged, underscoring the dramatic changes that have taken place both
in terms of policy and its context during the past 50 years. The two remaining chapters
will describe the way in which the market disciplines embodied in the GPA were designed
to work and identify what is institutionally innovative about them. Chapter 1.3 focuses
largely on the nature of the rules embodied in the Agreement, whereas chapter 1.4 examines
issues relating primarily to their enforcement. The former proceeds from a brief review
of the distinction between what procurement is, and the "potential" that it possesses as
a mechanism for policy promotion and/or political patronage. It then outlines the "basic
principles" that have served as the foundation for each of the Government Procurement
Agreements, and illustrates the manner in which they have been institutionalised. Much
of the latter discussion involves a review of the distinction between negative policy
disciplines, or measures to contain formal discrimination, and positive ones, designed
to check informal, or administrative discrimination. This distinction is portrayed through
the use of examples taken from European "learning experiences" in the regulation of
regionally-integrating public procurement markets.
Chapter 1.4 will discuss the GPA and enforcement relative to the "codes approach" that
was introduced during the Tokyo Round to contend with the political problems of
negotiating NTBs. In what way, it will ask, might the changes embodied in the most recent
Agreement represent further evolution of this "institutional methodology"? Issues
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surrounding the implementation of the Agreement's positive policy disciplines, and, in
particular, problems relating to the maintenance of the "balance of benefits" flowing from
it will provide the basis for discussion. A review of the 1992 WTO Trondheim Panel
Case will be presented to illustrate some of these concerns.
Public Procurement as a Policy Instrument
Earlier chapters have outlined the way in which procurement in a GATT context has
traditionally been viewed from the perspective of its immediate ends, namely the purchase
of products for government consumption, and not for re-sale. 218 The paragraphs that follow
return to some of the definitional issues addressed at the outset of the thesis in order to
highlight the distinction between what public procurement is, and what it has the potential
to do. These implications are central to an understanding of the way in which the GPA
seeks to contain discrimination in the markets that it covers.
Fried! Weiss, in the chapter 1.1 discussion of definitional issues, characterised procurement
as an activity conducted in relation to a state's exercise of its political powers. In a similar
vein, another legal scholar, Sue Arrowsmith, has said that an "important feature of public
procurement is the use of purchasing power to promote social and economic policies
218 These are the purposes of procurement, as outlined by Blank and Marceau in their recent
paper on the history of the WTO Procurement Agreement, op. cit, p. 5.
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unconnected with actual purchases". 2t9
 The European Commission has been even more
politically succinct:
"Public Procurement is a powerful economic policy instrument. For the public authorities,
it is not only a means of securing the physical resources they need to carry out their tasks,
but also a tool for stimulating economic	 "220
Earlier sections of this thesis have suggested that procurement be viewed as the converse
of taxation, and referred to the way in which such policies are ultimately related to the
social role of economic systems. Practically speaking, Matthew Marks and Harald
Malmgren have described problems caused by differing standards of social equity in a
procurement context in the following fashion: The manner in which governments organise
themselves to fulfill their economic functions is, they said, a reflection of vital national
decisions with respect to 1) the appropriate role of government in shaping and guiding
the economy and 2) the openness of governments in their internal decision-making
processes. 22 ' Each state has its own conception of how the public sector should be
structured; public purchasing practices are but one manifestation of it. Such conceptions
impinge upon fundamental political issues in a society, including:
219 The operating definition bears reiteration: "Government procurement is an activity which
is designed to fulfill the economic functions and powers legally attributed to the state, involving
the government or its agent acting as consumer, procuring for its own consumption and not for
re-sale."
The Arrowsmith quotation appears in Government Procurement and Judicial Review. Toronto:
The Casewell Co., Ltd., 1988, P. 207.
220 Commission of the European Communities. "The Large Market of 1993 and the
Opening-up of Public Procurement". Brussels, 1991, p. 2.
221 Marks, M.J. and H.B. Malmgren. "Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade". Law
and Policy in International Business, Vol. 7, 1975, p. 403.
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"employment policy for providing jobs at home; regional development policy for assisting
stagnant or relatively slowly growing regions; technology policy for promoting domestic
sources of new technology and where possible, keeping new developments at home; and
industrial policy for promoting growth or modernisation of specific industries."222
Willem Molle, similarly, has suggested that decisions of this nature be considered in terms
of "public policy functions". 223
 Citing the work of J. Buchanon and R. and P. Musgrave,
he identified three general functions for economic policy:
allocation of resources, requiring mainly micro-economic policy
instruments aiming at the efficient use of resources...
stabilisation, requiring mainly macro-economic and monetary policy
instruments to obtain such objectives as high growth rates, price stability
and full employment;
redistribution of income, requiring policies that aim to ensure to different
social groups and regional groups a fair share of the benefits of integration
should the market mechanism fail to achieve an equitable outcome..."
Public procurement policies potentially reflect normative, political decisions with respect
to each one of these three fundamental areas of policy.
Basic Principles
Three basic principles, according to Patrick Messerlin, have served as the foundation for
each of the Government Procurement Agreements: national treatment, non-discrimination
and transparency at every step of the national tendering process. 224 The obligations of
non-discrimination and national treatment are reflected in stipulations that a participant's
222	 ibid., p. 404.
223 op. cit., Molle, pp. 27-28.
224 Messerlin, P.A. "Agreement on Government Procurement" in The New World Trading
System: Readings. Paris: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1994,
p. 65.
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tendering procedures "should not discriminate between suppliers from other Parties to
the Agreement" and that potential suppliers from other Parties to the Agreement should
benefit from treatment "no less favourable" than domestic suppliers, whereas the principles
with respect to transparency are operationalised through procedural rules that effectively
specify corresponding "minimum rights" of national treatment.
In a recent article in EU Public Contract Law, a monthly European periodical for public
purchasing practitioners, Alfonso Mattera described the practical implications of these
principles in the following manner:
"...the relevant contracting authority may not select the award-winning company on the
basis of criteria related to the origin of the relevant products or services, or of the bidder's
nationality; instead its selection must be based on objective technical and economic and
maximally transparent and reviewable criteria."2
Generally speaking, if a foreign firm offers products of better quality at a lower price,
a procuring entity whose activities are "covered by the Agreement" must buy those goods
rather than relatively more costly goods produced domestically. More specifically, Article
XIII, paragraph 4(b) of the 1994 Agreement states that value-for-money and/or consistency
with the terms of any "specific evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or tender
documentation" are the grounds on which individual tenders are to be evaluated.226
225 Mattera, A. "The Beginning of a Long and Winding Road". Eu Public Contract Law,
March 1994, p. 5. Although Mattera was describing the implications of the EU's public
procurement regime, the non-discriminatory principles on which it was founded are similar to
those of the GPA.
226 op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 19.
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The obligations of non-discrimination and national treatment only apply in the case of
potential suppliers from other Parties to the Agreement. The Introduction to this thesis,
in describing the fundamental duties to which all Contracting Parties to the GATT are
bound, referred to the fact that the MEN obligation has traditionally been interpreted in
unconditional terms. The benefits of cooperation arising from the Government Procurement
Agreement, however, are distributed in a conditional fashion; they cannot be incurred
without taking on all of the accord's corresponding obligations. Obligations that, in keeping
with the previously described "self-balancing" nature of the Agreement and that of the
Tokyo Round Codes in general, have been negotiated on the basis of strict reciprocity.
The rights and obligations engendered by the Agreement's duties of non-discrimination
and national treatment, in addition, are limited by the fact that its rules only apply to
purchasing entities participating in specifically-agreed sectors, when their purchases exceed
certain value thresholds, and are not specifically excluded from the Agreement's coverage.
A potential supplier's foreign ownership, or affiliation does not affect the grounds on which
it may become subject to rights under the Agreement.
The GPA's principles with respect to transparency are operationalised through procedural
rules that specify "transparency obligations" which the Agreement's participants must
extend to suppliers from its fellow parties to the Agreement at every step in the government
procurement process. Messerlin characterised such rules as addressing the following:
"...technical specifications of the items (goods or services to be subject to the tender (Article
VI); the choice between the various tendering procedures (Article VII); the qualifications
of suppliers (Article Vifi); the invitation to participate for an intended procurement (Article
IX); the selection procedure (Article X); the time limits for tendering and delivery (Article
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XI); the tender documentation (Article XII); the submission, receipt and opening of tenders
and awarding of contracts (Article XIII); the negotiation which could accompany the tender
(Article XIV); the specific-rules for "limited" tenders, that is, tenders where the contracting
entity contacts one or a few suppliers individually (Article XV); and the content of the
notice of award of the contracts (Article XVffl).227
In addition, he said, Article II requires that the value of the contracts shall include "all
forms of remuneration, including any premia, fees, commissions and interest receivable",
while Article XVII outlines the rules covering suppliers from "non Parties" to the
Agreement and Article XIX details reporting requirements that Participants are obliged
to respect.
The Nature of the Rules
John Jackson has described the goal of the draftsmen of the original Tokyo Round Code
as being establishment of a "framework for truly effective discipline against governmental
discriminatory purchasing, recognising that such stringent requirements would make
governments somewhat hesitant to include (purchasing) entities on their list(s)". 228 As
has been suggested, it is important to appreciate the way in which states typically
discriminate in favour of local producers if one is to understand how these disciplines
are structured. In this sense, one of the most important accomplishments of the OECD
discussions on public procurement was the better understanding that evolved amongst
participants of the many ways in which discrimination can be manifested in these markets.
Two basic types of discrimination, it will be recalled, were identified: formal and informal.
Formal barriers to equality amongst competing suppliers in markets covered by the
227 op.cit., Messerlin, p. 66.
28 op. cit., Jackson, The World Trading System, p. 201.
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Procurement Agreement are "traditionally understood" as being forbidden in Article II,
paragraph 1 of the Tokyo Round Code and the 1988 Protocol, and Article ifi, paragraph
2'91 of the 1994 WTO Agreement. - The latter reads:
"With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government
Procurement covered by this Agreement, the Parties shall provide immediately and
unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers and service providers of other Parties
offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable than: (a) that
accorded to domestic products, services, suppliers and service providers; and (b) that
accorded to products, services, suppliers and service providers of any other Party."
Informal discrimination, on the other hand, is also prohibited by Article ifi, paragraph
1, et. al., but, significantly, is meant to be contained by the increasingly stringent
transparency obligations around which each of the Procurement Agreements has been
structured. The essence of discrimination in this form, as has been described by Gilbert
Winham, is that it can be "carried out without publicity and without legislation..." For
this reason,
"The task in negotiating government procurement... (has therefore been) to introduce
procedures into national legislation on government tendering that would compel equal
treatment for foreign suppliers."230
Such procedures, to return to the distinction made by Brian Hindley and set out in chapter
1.2, function to ensure that the tendering process produces fair outcomes; they provide
229 This interpretation is that of Petros Mavroidis and Bernard Hoekman. In an article
entitled, "The WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines,
Declining Membership?", they said, "The two basic principles governing the GPA are non-
discrimination and national treatment (Article ifi). The way... (they) have traditionally been
understood in the GATT-context is that the former refers to a legal prohibition to discriminate
between foreign products... (whereas) the latter refers to a legal prohibition to discriminate...
between foreign and domestic sources". CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1112, January 1995.
230 ibid,p. 139
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standards for the assessment of the commercial "reasonableness" of a particular purchasing
decision, or, in other words, its consistency with Members' obligations of non-
discrimination and national treatment.23'
Negative vs. Positive Disciplines
Another way of looking at the two basic types of market discipline embodied in the
Agreements is suggested by the EU's approach to the integration of its public procurement
markets. Chapter 1.2 touched on this briefly, making a distinction between negative policy
disciplines embodied in the Community's public purchasing 'liberalisation directives",
and positive policy disciplines reflected in its "coordination directives". The former entail
the elimination of formal, legislated obstacles to trade; they involve governments
undertaking obligations to each other not to do certain policy-related things. As a recent
publication by the OECD's Public Management Committee put it,
"Negative integration... (involves) the removal of barriers, obstacles, constraints and
distortions that impede transactions among economic actors in different countries".232
Positive policy disciplines, on the other hand, endeavour to create what Jan Tinbergen
has been credited with identifying as equal conditions for the functioning of integrated
parts of an economy.233
 They entail duties for states to do certain policy-related things,
231 op. cit, Hindley, p. 286. Although Dr Hindley's paper focuses on the problems
associated with the inherent subjectivity of such commercial decisions and questions the
objectives of the Agreement, it provides a good overview of the code of behaviour embodied in
the Procurement Agreement.
232 Metcalfe, L. "The weakest links: building organisational networks for multi-level
regulation" in Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World, edited by the OECD
Secretariat. Paris: OECD Publications, 1993, p. 56.
233 See op. cit., Molle, p. 11, referring to Tinbergen's 1954 classic, International Economic
Integration. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
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and function by engendering private rights that enable non-state entities to challenge
governments' interpretation of these obligations. 2
 For reasons that will be considered
in some detail, the two must ultimately operate in tandem if the benefits of economic
integration are to be achieved. The remainder of this chapter will explore European
experiences in the regulation of "common" procurement markets. In keeping with the
approach adopted in chapter 1.2, the exercise is premised on an assumption that institutional
"learning processes" in regional settings may offer insights for multilateral policy-making.
Early efforts to integrate European public procurement markets involved the introduction
of negative disciplines that were, in a word, ineffective. 235
 The 1957 Treaty of Rome did
not contain provisions specifically related public purchasing; rather, as Dennis Swann
has reported, the Treaty "provide(d) general powers which could be brought to bear",
including the provisions of Article 7 which "pronounced a general ban on discrimination
on grounds of nationality and enabled the Council to enact measures designed to prohibit
this", and those of Article 30 which "prescribed a prohibition on both quantitative
restrictions on imports and exports and on measures having equivalent effect".236
234	 ibid,p.1l.
235 In the 1988 Cecchini Report, Paolo Cecchini, in describing the result of 30 years of
negative integration - or what had by then come to be known as the EC's "Uncommon Market" -
said, somewhat more dramatically, "In public procurement, the divide between economic reality
and political appearances is so deep as to be almost hallucinatory". The European Challenge
1992:The Benefits of a Single Market by P. Cecchini with M Catinat and A. Jacquemin.
Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co Ltd., 1988, p. 18.
236 Swann, D. "Standards, procurement, mergers and state aids" in The single European
market and beyond: A study of the wider implications of the Single European Act, edited by D.
Swann. London: Routledge, 1992, p. 62.
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In late 1969, the Commission adopted a directive which gave effect to the Article 30 ban
on discriminatory practices. Its purpose, according to a description that has been offered
by Friedl Weiss, was to "establish the principle of national treatment for all Community
supplies of goods... "237 As described by the Commission, it functioned by defining
"discriminatory practices which Member States... (had to) terminate in order to eliminate
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions". 238 Dennis Swann outlined
the contents of the directive in terms of the following:
"The directive prohibited measures, imposed by law, regulation or administrative practice,
which prevented the supply of imported goods from other member states, which granted
domestic products a preference or which made the supply of imported goods more difficult
or costly than domestic products".239
The following year, the Community formally recognised that general directives for the
liberalisation of public procurement markets would no longer suffice, and that there was
a need for "specific directives relating to particular kinds of... procurement"; it adopted
the first Public Works Directive in mid-1971 P240 Moreover, before the year had ended,
the Council enacted the first of its "coordination directives", introducing positive procedural
obligations for Member States' tendering practices, and setting the stage for the
liberalisation that was ultimately to follow during the coming two decades.
237 op. cit., Weiss, p. 34. It is also interesting to note that Weiss characterised this Directive
as a 'classic example" of one of the Commission's early liberalisation directives.
238 European Commission. "Communication by the Commission to the Council. Public
Supply Contracts: Conclusions and Perspectives". Brussels: 14 December 1984, p. 6.
239 op. cit., Swann, p. 62.
240 Friedl Weiss has described this as a regulatory "approach" based on the German model.
It is, he has said, "based on the object of the procurement involved - supplies, works, utilities -
not (as in France,) on the status of the purchasing entities - central government, territorial sub-
divisions". See op. cit., p. 33.
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Despite early optimism amongst proponents of the Common Market, by 1974, it was widely
recognised that discrimination had not been eliminated in European public procurement
"markets". The Commission commissioned a study designed to determine why the
integration of these markets had stagnated. Conducted by G. Charpentier and R. Clarke,
it confirmed that existing Community Directives were of "little practical effect", remarking
upon the wide variation of public purchasing policies amongst the then-9 Member States
and correspondingly varied commitments to market liberalisation. 24 ' This report called
for reconsideration of the "political objectives" embodied in the Treaty of Rome, and
recommended that, for strategic reasons, public utilities be excluded from any future
exercise in Community liberalisation. It also observed that practical "experience(s)
acquired by EFTA regarding public purchasing... could be most useful" should the
Community find the political will to do something about the over-all situation, concluding:
"The necessary rules should.. be expressed less as a method of legal constraint than as
instructions for the application of declared governmental policies and they must be the
same for everyone. They should be oriented towards action, and not towards repression".242
10 years later, little had changed. Except perhaps for the fact that nationalistic political
tides were ebbing. David Allen has described this period of EU liberalisation in the
following terms:
"... (B)y the start of the 1980s European policy makers were beginning to lose faith in
national solutions to their various economic problems and were once again beginning
to show an interest in European solutions... The idea of completing the single market
241 Charpentier, 0. and R Clarke. "Public Purchasing in the Common Market: Report to the
Commission of the European Communities". Brussels: 15 May 1975, pp. 4-10.
242 ibid., p. 13 and p. 29.
137
as a response to the... threat from Japan and the US... developed steadily during the early
1980s with considerable encouragement from influential transnational business elites".243
Reflecting an emerging political consensus, a 1984 document published by the European
Commission, "Public Supply Contracts: Conclusions and Perspectives", stated,
"... the obligation not to take certain action... is... not (going to be) sufficient to bring about
the desired interpenetration of the public procurement market. For that, an obligation
to take certain action is required. While a regime that guarantees effective competition
between private or public firms is sufficient to assure the interpenetration of markets,
a complementary approach is needed to open up the public procurement market".2
For reasons that will be explored at the end of this chapter, the views expressed in this
report are best understood in the overall context of the Community's 1985 initiative for
the completion of the internal market, the research programme relating to the "costs of
non-Europe" subsequently launched in 1986 by Lord Cockfield, then vice president of
the Commission, and the re-allocation of Council voting rights mandated by the 1986
Single European Act. A period of regulatory co-operation that Jacques Pelkmans has
termed "qualitatively different than earlier European integration" was burgeoning.245
The 1985 Single Market initiative, formally embodied in the Commission's White Paper
on Completing the Internal Market, was an exercise to set the pace for the removal of
243 Allen, D. "European union, the Single European Act and the 1992 programme" in The
Single European Market and Beyond: A Study of the Wider Implications of the Single European
Act, edited by D. Swann, op. cit., p. 37.
244 Commission of the European Communities. "Communication by the Commission to the
Council - Public Supply Contracts: Conclusions and Perspectives". Brussels: 14 December
1984, p. 4.
245 Pelkmans, J. and J. Sun. "Towards a European Community regulatory strategy: lessons
from 'learning-by-doing'?" in Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World , op. cit., p.
179.
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remaining physical, technical and fiscal barriers to the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital in the Community. Jacques Delors, the former President of the
Commission, described it an project in quest of a "common objective which could raise...
(Member States') sights above daily routine problems and thereby concentrate their
energies". 2
 The "strategy of regulatory rapprochement" that it entailed focused on the
removal of non-tariff, regulatory barriers to trade in the Community's internal markets,
and introduced the ideas of "minimum harmonisation" and "mutual recognition" as tactics
for balancing the demands of Community-wide liberalisation with the need to maintain
nationally viable public policies.247
In addressing public procurement, the White Paper identified "transparency" and the
"opening-up of the (public procurement) sector to effective competition" as "priority
objectives" for the single market campaign. The specific policy mechanisms that were
offered to achieve these ends were largely procedural in nature; they embodied the "action-
orientation" that various experts had been proposing as a remedy for the Community's
"integrative malaise" since at least the mid-1970s. "Community legislation", as the
Cecchini Report put it shortly thereafter, had finally proven to be "no match for national
and local purchasing bureaucracies". 248
 According to a summary included in the latter
Report, the reasons why centred on the following:
246 Forward to P. Cecchini's The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single
Market. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1988.
247 The term "regulatory rapprochement" was first employed by Jacques Pelkmans, and the
summary of the objectives of the EC-1992 Programme is also his. See op. cit., p. 188.
248 op. cit., Cecchini Report, p. 18.
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there... (were) too many ways to evade the rules or influence the choice
of supplier during the evaluation of bids;
•	 other barriers to trade (like divergent national standards) still exist(ed)
and these... (led) to price differences, distorting competitive bidding;
•	 in many countries, purchasing... (was) significantly decentralized, making
EC transparency rules hard to enforce."249
In 1991, the Commission published a report, "The Large Market of 1993 and the Opening-
up of Public Procurement", that reviewed the policy obligations it had introduced to
augment existing Community legislation to counter nationalistic practices in public
procurement markets. This report stressed the fact that the aim of these obligations.
embodied in a series of "coordination directives", was specifically "not to harmonise all
national rules on public procurement". Rather they were to be viewed as "common rules",
designed to contribute to the completion of the internal market by ensuring a minimal
"coordination of national contract award procedures". The new "rules" consisted of the
following:
"(1) rules defining the type of procurement agency and the scope of contracts
subject to the Directives;
(2) rules defining the type of contract award procedure agencies should
normally use;
(3) rules on technical specifications, whereby preference is to be given to
Community standards, and discriminatory technical requirements from
the contract documents;
(4) advertising rules, whereby tender notices must be published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities, must comply with specific
requirements concerning time-limits and must be drawn up in accordance
with pre-established models;
(5) common rules on participation, comprising objective criteria for qualitative
selection and for the award of contracts (either for the lowest price or the
most economically advantageous tender, at the contracting authority's
choice);
249	 ibid., p. 18.
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(6)	 obligations as regards statistical reporting."25°
Les Metcalfe, in the previously-quoted OECD publication, defined positive policy
integration as a:
"process of creating a comprehensive institutional framework, based on common principles,
which both establishes the conditions in which markets operate and defines the rules of
the game for non-market activities".25'
Metcalfe's paper, in turn, argued that one of the most significant institutional lessons to
emanate from European integration involved understanding that the 'long-term success
of a programme of negative integration depends on the development of a complementary
programme of positive integration"? 2 Jacques Pelkmans and Jeanne-Mey Sun, in another
paper included in the same book, outlined the basic dynamics of this learning process,
identifying "five guiding regulatory principles that emerged over the course of the 1992
programme". The remainder of this chapter will summarise Pelkmans and Sun's argument,
highlighting those aspects of it that might lend themselves to application in a broader
integrative setting.253
250 Commission of the European Communities. 'The Large Market of 1993 and the
Opening-up of Public Procurement". Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1991, pp. 5-6.
251	 op. cit., Metcalfe, p. 56.
252	 ibid., p. 56.
253 It is important to underscore the relative, dynamic and fora-specific nature of the positive
policy integration process at the outset of such an exercise. As Pelkmans and Sun put it in
describing the dangers of trying to draw policy analogies from EC experiences: "Carrying over
the regulatory strategy of the Community to other regional groupings, to OECD co-operation, or
to other global fora makes little sense, given the ambitious guiding principles at the core of the
EC strategy". Later, in the same article, however, they concluded, "Partial applications of the
various policy applications and innovations may be useful... In adopting such an approach... the
nature of the integration accomplished thereby will.., be less far-reaching'. Op. cit., p. 193.
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Dynamics of the European Regulatory Context
Earlier sections of this chapter suggested that the evolution of positive policy disciplines
in the EC - or recognition of the fact that "the obligation (for EC Member States) not to
take certain action... (was not going to be) sufficient to bring about the desired
interpenetration of the public procurement markets" - was best understood in an "overall
context" whose parameters were defined by the following: the Community's 1985 "Single
Market" initiative, the Cecchini Report on the "costs of non-Europe", and the re-allocation
of Council voting rights mandated by the 1986 Single European Act. Pelkmans and Sun's
text proceeds from a description of how the 1985 initiative ushered in a period of regulatory
reform "qualitatively different" from that of earlier European integration; this process,
as it was generally manifested in European public procurement markets, has been reviewed.
The role played by both the Cecchini Report and the 1986 Single European Act, as well
as their relationship to the market disciplines emanating from the "Single Market" initiative,
however, is somewhat less straightforward. The "EC brand" of regulatory co-operation,
as Pelkmans and Sun emphasised in their paper, is the product of a series of "complex
interactions" 254
The Cecchini Report sought to quantify the costs of European "non-integration". The
purpose of this exercise, as described by Lord Cockfield, was to provide "...hard evidence,
the confirmation of what those... engaged in building Europe... have always known: that
the failure to achieve a single market has been costing European industry millions in
op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 188 and p. 183, respectively.
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unnecessary costs and lost opportunities..." 255
 It identified three broad categories of
"frontiers", or barriers to integration within the EC's internal market:
".	 physical barriers - like intra-EC border stoppages, customs controls and
associated paperwork;
•	 fiscal barriers - especially differing rates of VAT and excise duties;
• technical barriers - for example, meeting divergent national product
standards, technical regulations and conflicting business laws; entering
nationally protected public procurement markets".256
Pelkmans and Sun's paper focused on the "institutional innovation" that occurred in the
context of the latter. Its significance, they said, was associated with the fact that the
changes in question "paved the road for the emergence of beneficial regulatory competition
among the member states..." Such competition was, in turn, a product of the interaction
of "five guiding regulatory principles": free movement, minimum harmonisation, mutual
recognition, subsidiarity and no-internal-frontiers (elimination of the above-mentioned
fiscal, physical and regulatory barriers to integration).
According to Pelkmans and Sun, EU Member states' commitment to an effective internal
market, reflected in the principle of free movement, is the "cornerstone" on which the
Community's post-1985 regulatory strategy rests. Charpentier and Clarke's 1975 report
to the Commission illustrated the way in which earlier phases of European integration
were handicapped by problems of political commitment. By comparison, however, the
demands of negative integration on policy, as Willem Molle has put it, "are relatively
simple":
255 op. cit., Cecchini Report, p. xiii.
256	 ibid., p. xiii.
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"There is no need for permanent decision-making machinery... (negative integration
measures) can be clearly defined, and once negotiated and laid down in treaties, they are
henceforth binding on governments, companies and private persons."257
If there is sufficient political consensus to implement a given negative discipline, in other
words, this is usually adequate for process of integration to continue.
The operationalisation of the rights and duties arising from positive policy disciplines,
on the other hand, is impossible without commitment of this nature. Herein, Molle has
said that the implementation of such measures 'always involve(s) more complex forms
of government policy":
"(Positive integration) often takes the form of vaguely defined obligations requiring public
institutions to take action. Such obligations leave ample room for interpretation as to
scope and timing. They may, moreover, be reversed if the policy environment changes...
(The domain is one of) politics and bureaucracy rather than law".258
For these reasons, the "flexibility" that characterises the Community's post-i 985 regulatory
strategy cannot be what Pelkmans and Sun termed "an end in itself'. 259 Fundamental
transnational rights, emanating from shared political commitments, are driving the
integration process that is now underway in the European setting.
In their 1975 paper, Charpentier and Clarke also addressed the wide divergence of opinion
amongst member states with respect to how - and even whether - the process of integration
op. cit., Molle, pp. 11-12.
258	 ibid.,p.l2.
op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 189.
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should proceed. Where did the political consensus that is embodied in the rights that are
now compelling EU integration come from? Pelkmans and Sun characterised the co-
operative policy-making environment that has evolved since the implementation of the
Single Market programme as a "derivative of integration". 260 Understanding the process
of change that is reflected in this "derivative", they said, requires, in turn, appreciation
of the role of regulatory competition, or what might, in other words, be described as a
process of differentiation on the basis of the five principles of the regulatory quintet.
The 1988 Cecchini Report, as has been mentioned, drew widespread attention to the costs
associated with maintaining the status quo of "nationally fragmented markets" in an
international economic environment characterised by r.gionaI and global integration.
In so doing, it effectively started a process of re-allocation of the costs of European
protectionism; considerations with respect to this process lie at the heart of Pelkmans
and Sun's notion of "regulatory competition".
At the outset of the Single Market exercise, there were few incentives for European industry
not to persuade national regulators to block competitive imports via the erection of
protective NTBs. The balance of political pressure on the national officials receiving
these appeals, in turn, was similar. As Molle explained,
"The negative effects of protection on welfare in terms of jobs lost... (were) plain to see
and directly attributable to trade, while the positive effects ... (were) more general and
diffuse and hence less visible".26'
260	 ibid.,p. 193.
261 op. cit., p. 448. Herein, Molle cites the work of Caves (1975), Frey and Schneider
(1984) and Baldwin (1984) relating to the "political market for protection".
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Such circumstances - especially when combined with "politicians anxious to be re-elected' -
made for a policy environment in which it was not difficult to convince policy-makers
of the need for protection.
"Regulatory competition" gradually evolved from the introduction of a series of new
"intervening variables", or what Pelkmans and Sun termed the "regulatory quintet" into
this political "policy equation". Its practical effect, in conjunction with competitive
pressures emanating from the outside the Community, has been to force Single Market
participants to take a broader, longer-term perspective when evaluating the potential
benefits of "administered or contingent protection"; in particular, the institutionalisation
of various avenues of appeal for non-national parties whose interests may have been
negatively affected by a protectionist policy, and stringent limitations on what national
policy-makers can do to shield local industries from external competitive pressures have
fundamentally altered the dynamics of business-government relations. Although the way
in which this new competition has been manifested is dependent on sector-specific market
conditions and the relative geographic mobility of individual firms participating in a given
market, in general, it has caused the inversion of incentives for protectionist lobbying.
Increasingly, there is little to be gained from such a course of action and much more, from
a national strategic perspective, to be lost. The "new competition" has, in addition,
engendered positive incentives for firms to lobby national governments to adopt regulations
that reduce regulatory discrepancies within the Community. Since barriers to free
movement are now generally proscribed, such discrepancies potentially represent
competitive disadvantages for firms. On the whole, the European regulatory environment
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has become one in which a premium has been placed on the development of efficient
institutions.262
Pelkmans and Sun's paper stressed the fact that regulatory competition and the EC's "brand
of cooperation" are a result of a complex series of interactions amongst elements of the
"regulatory quintet". Before concluding this discussion of their model, it is thus important
to outline the general integrative roles played by the three other elements in the new
"cooperative policy equation": minimum harmonisation, mutual recognition and
subsidiarity.
Since the introduction of the 1985 Single Market programme, the job of the Community's
policy-makers has entailed what these authors termed a quest for "an appropriate balance
between liberalisation (the removal of barriers to intra-EC trade and production) and
hannonisation (the centralisation of regulation at the EC level of government, when such
regulation is justified by the existence of certain types of market failure)".263 Much of
the latter part of this chapter has been devoted to a description of the way in which EC
officials' understanding of the mechanics of liberalisation has gradually improved during
the years since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. The majority of the institutional
learning with respect to regulatory harmonisation, its integrative corollary, on the other
hand, has been fairly recent; in this context, the policy reforms that were introduced in
262 The idea of "efficient institutions" has been developed by Douglass North in his book,
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990. Part Ill of this thesis will examine this idea and its applicability to the
institutional innovation occurring in a WTO context. See below, pp. 263 - 266.
263 op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 179.
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the wake of the 1992 programme relating to minimum harmonisation, mutual recognition
and qualified majority voting are of particular significance.
In the early years of the Community and through the beginning of the 1980s, "total ex
ante harmonisation" of member state national regulations, via the introduction of
Community directives and regulations, was the legislative means to the Community's
integrative ends. "The objective," as Pelkmans and Sun put it, "was to replace national
regulations with common regulations so that all member states would have the same
regulations in a given policy area.2M As summarised in the Cecchini Report, however,
this approach presented two major problems: it was politically tedious and, therefore,
practically infeasible and; when its protracted processes finally produced harmonised rules,
they were often technically obsolete.265
The 1992 programme did not aim to achieve total harmonisation. Rather, as Friedl Weiss
has explained, the initiative sought to leave room for the kind of regulation and intervention
typically required in 'mixed economy systems':
"instead of the outright elimination of barriers, it... (sought) the approximation of their
aims and form throughout the Community. Policy measures and domestic regulation,
which have been successfully approximated, cause only insignificant distortion and may
in consequence be subject of 'mutual recognition' as functionally equivalent and thereby
cease to hinder trade within the Community".266
264 op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 180.
265 op. cit., Cecchini Report, p. 29.
266 op. cit., Weiss, p. 9.
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The means to the new programme's ends, in other words, involved minimum harmonisation
and mutual recognition, or what Pelkmans and Sun called "regulatory flexibility"; they
reflected an "institutional lesson" that total uniformity is not practical, whereas a minimum
of "common rules" is indispensable.
By comparison with total regulatory harmonisation, the aims of minimum harmonisation
are modest: it seeks only to safeguard "inviolable interests such as 'public morality, public
policy, or public security" via the harmonisation of the 'essential requirements" of national
regulation. 267
 Molle has used term policy "coordination" in describing the cooperative
processes from which common rules, embodying these "essential requirements", are
derived.2
 Such processes, he said, generally entail "the adaptation of regulation to make
sure that they (sic) are consistent internationally". They reflect commitment amongst
the parties concerned to "(sets of) actions needed to accomplish a coherent policy for the
group" and may, in turn, lead to "convergence of the target variables of policy". The
previously-cited "common rules" designed to engender minimal "coordination of national
contract award procedures", in this sense, are typical "products" of this kind of cooperation.
Mutual recognition, on the other hand, might be described as a way of contending with
the "regulatory remnants" of approximation. It is a policy convention that, as outlined
in the Cecchini Report, is designed to "ensure that business avails itself of its basic right
to trade within the Community.. "269 In describing how it works, Pelkmans and Sun said
267 op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 180.
268 op. cit., Molle, p. 14.
269 op. cit., Cecchini Report, p. 28.
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that, compared to the other principles in their "regulatory quintet", this one operates
indirectly, "against the background of the European Court of Justice's doctrine ofjudicial
review..." The latter doctrine involves the Court's interpretation of the Community's
principle of free movement as "not merely prohibit(in) barriers to intra-EC trade, but
positively... (requiring) the mutual acceptance of the goods of one member country by
another".27° Thus, although Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome permits member states to
restrict imports on the basis of their inconsistency with "inviolable interests", once these
states harmonise "essential regulatory requirements" in a given policy area, there can be
virtually no remaining legitimate barriers to free movement in that particular context.
Superfluous national regulations that may be applicable to an exporter's production must
be "mutually recognised" by importing country authorities.
Minimum harmonisation, and, therefore, the Community's general strategy of "regulatory
flexibility" has been facilitated by changes in its voting procedures that were introduced
under the 1986 Single European Act. Pelkmans and Sun argued that one of the main
reasons that the post- 1985 strategy is more flexible than its predecessor is because qualified
majority voting (hereafter, QMV) has become politically acceptable, and formally been
extended to govern all internal market legislation. The previous "requirement of unanimity
in the Council", they say, "had proved extremely cumbersome, particularly where some
270 This summary of the way in which the principle of free movement was interpreted in the
Cassis de Dijon case was extracted from the Cecchini Report, op. cit., p. 28. Pelkmans and Sun's
review of the principle of mutual recognition appears on pp. 181-182 of their article, "Towards
European Community regulatory strategy: lessons from 'learning-by-doing". The following
chapter will explore the implications of the Community's doctrine of judicial review in greater
detail, i.e. examine the corresponding claim rights that are associated with Member States' duties
of "mutual acceptance".
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minimum harmonisation... (was) indispensable". QMV, on the other hand, has made such
harmonisation both "more politically feasible" and "less costly":
"QMV has a potential to make it difficult for one or a few recalcitrant member states to
'extend' minimum harmonisation by detailing the 'essential requirements' beyond 'essentials'.
Moreover... (it) makes it more difficult for one or a few member states to veto a proposed
EC directive, as this requires a blocking minority. If it proves impossible to achieve such
a minority, the minority countries are forced to innovate, find alternatives that are attractive
or superior, or be overruled. This is likely to upgrade the quality of legislation and lower
the costs of harmonisation".
Finally, there is the fifth principle of the "regulatory quintet", subsidiarity. It, too, is best
understood in the context of its relationship to the other terms of the integrative function,
but, generally, addresses questions surrounding the appropriate division of intra-
governmental labour. "(F)or a given set of objectives", as Pelkmans and Sun explained,
"to what level of government should various public economic and regulatory functions
be assigned?" Subsidiarily is a principle based on the premise that "problems of
information and preference-revelation, as well as regional and local differences in
preferences between voters, prevents central government from supplying an optimal set
of public goods, including regulation". Politically, it has the "great virtue of respecting
local values and preferences as much as possible, and thereby avoiding superfluous




The institutional learning processes that Pelkmans and Sun describe did much to enhance
European regulators' understanding of the policy dilemmas that integration was bringing
their way, but they did not resolve them. The Single Market exercise resulted in a better
Community rule-making process, but there were still lingering problems relating to the
implementation of these rules. Commission papers on the Community's procurement
regime have subsequently described this situation in terms of problems with the common
rules' "credibility and efficiency". Questions, in other words, that generally pertain to
issues of enforcement. The following chapter will address this situation in more detail,
drawing parallels between the institutional dilemmas faced in a European context and
those with which negotiators of the WTO procurement Agreement were contending in
a multilateral setting.
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1.4 - Institutional Innovations
Chapter 1.1 of this thesis described the obligations that States party to the Tokyo Round
Government Procurement Code assumed with respect to re-negotiation of the Agreement.
It also referred to commitments that signatories to the subsequent 1988 Protocol of
Amendments took on concerning its improvement, broadening and expansion, or coverage
of services contracts. Although the negotiations that followed the 1988 accord coincided
with the Uruguay Round, they were technically separate. This, as has been described by
Blank and Marceau, had implications with respect to the intra-institutional forum in which
they were held (the Committee on Government Procurement's Informal Working Group
on Negotiations as opposed to the Uruguay Round's Negotiating Group on Goods), the
number of countries that participated in them, and the pace at which they proceeded.27'
Moreover, the 1994 WTO Government Procurement Agreement that they ultimately
produced was plurilateral in nature; signature of the Uruguay Round's "Single Undertaking"
did not automatically entail membership. Nor was the possibility of cross-Agreement
retaliation, contained in the provisions of the Round's Dispute Settlement Understanding,
to be allowed in the procurement area, or extended to disputes arising under this Agreement.
This chapter examines the accomplishments of the latest round of government procurement
negotiations from the perspective of this distinctive institutional context. It seeks answers
to the following questions: "What are the specific institutional innovations associated
with the new Agreement? Why were they agreed? How are they related to previous textual
developments in this context? Are they in any way products of the "plurilateral setting"
271 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, pp. 40- 41.
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in which they were negotiated?" Subsequent chapters, in turn, will examine political
reasons why the Agreement might have been negotiated in this manner.
This approach to the study of GPA innovations has been adopted because of superficially
apparent consistencies between the way in which the Agreement was negotiated, how
the benefits flowing from it are to be distributed, the institutional mechanisms that have
been introduced for its enforcement, and the "codes approach" that was developed during
the Tokyo Round for managing the political difficulties associated with the negotiation
of NTBs. According to John Jackson, one of the most important institutional implications
of the "Single Undertaking" of the Uruguay Round was that "... the Tokyo Round approach
of side codes, resulting in a 'GATT ala carte" would henceforth cease to be the rule-making
norm.272
 Except for the fact that the US and EU, in their December 1995 Madrid
Agreement on a "New Atlantic Agenda", called for its immediate "multilateralisation",
the new WTO Procurement Agreement, would appear to be inconsistent with Jackson's
observation. A secondary purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for subsequent
exploration of this "discrepancy", asking whether the latest re-negotiations are consistent
with the "codes approach" and, if so, how and why. Part II of the thesis, as has been
mentioned, will examine this issue in detail.
As was mentioned at the close of the previous chapter, this one's to be particularly
concerned with issues of enforcement. It proceeds from a premise that there is an important
272 Jackson, J. "Testimony prepared for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
June 14, 1994 Hearing on the WTO and US Sovereignty".
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distinction between the establishment of a set of international rules and compliance with
these rules. Bob Hudec has described this distinction in terms of the following:
"...governments have been hesitant about making difficult decisions relating to their
compliance with the rules without some further assurance that the rules will in fact be
brought to bear upon other governments... (E)xperience has suggested that when
governments are left to judge compliance among themselves, the pressures for compliance
tend to vary according to the relative power of the governments involved, creating an
inequitable situation in which the rules bind the weak but not the strong."273
Much of the last chapter was devoted to discussion of institutional 'lessons" emanating
from the integration of European government procurement markets; the evolution of the
Union's procurement regime was traced so as to illustrate the contribution positive policy
disciplines have made to the realisation of "supplier equality before the administration".
In a similar way, this chapter will argue that the nature of the obligations engendered by
transnational Agreements like the EU's "Public Sector Directives" and the 1994 W'FO
Procurement Agreement generate important constraints that subsequently guide
enforcement. Such issues have been given considerable attention in the context of
discussions concerning the "effectiveness" of the EU's 1989 Compliance Directive.
Continuing to respect the "relative, dynamic and fora-specific nature" of the economic
integration process, insights from this work will be used to structure the chapter's review
of the major institutional innovations associated with the 1994 WTO GPR.
273 Hudec, R. "Adjudication of International Trade Disputes", Thames Essay No. 6, 1977,
as quoted in D.V. Anthony and C.K. Hagerty's "Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign
Government Procurement", Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 11, 1979.
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Benefits and Obligations Arising from a Treaty
Because there is no formal international legislative organ, the matter of sources in
international law has been what Nicholas Onuf termed, 'the source of great confusion"274
Most writers nevertheless agree, he said, that there are "two primary sources" of such law,
custom and treaties. Legal instruments of the latter nature operate as a kind of liaison
between two or more separate, national legal orders; they generally function by creating
obligations for signatories to make their municipal law conform to whatever undertakings
have been made under a given accord. 275
 Max Sørensen has described processes relating
to the national application of treaty norms in terms of the following "established principle"
274 Onuf, N.G. "Global Law-Making and Legal Thought" in Lint .Making in the Global
Community, edited by N.G. Onuf. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1982, p. 14.
275 The word "generally" merits further comment here, especially given the way in which
this paper has sought to derive insights from the integration of EU public purchasing markets for
the liberalisation process that is underway in the multilateral context of the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement. In many ways, EU diplomacy has to be viewed as an exception to
traditional diplomacy, namely the kind based on inter-governmental relations: Although the EU's
rule-making process is treaty-governed, as an institution, it possesses an "international
parliament", as well as politically autonomous decision-making organs, eg. the Commission.
Many of the rights and duties engendered by the Treaty of Rome and subsequent integrative
instruments, in turn, are directly effective and emanate from norms that take a higher status than
national ones; they create a separate, supranational legal order. See R. Dehousse and R. Weiler's
"The legal dimension", in The Dynamics of European Integration, edited by W Wallace.
London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, pp. 249-253.
The EU enjoys "exclusive competence" in the policy fields under discussion in this paper.
Directly applicable Union norms establish the regulatory framework in which all Member States
conduct their public procurement. WTO norms - including those that govern government
procurement - on the other hand, are more voluntary in nature. Differences in national
"constitutional landscapes" may cloud this distinction, but, on the whole, the rights and duties
arising in this institutional context are only indirectly binding; implementing legislation at the
national level is required in order to make them operational. This is a technical point, but, as will
be seen, it is of substantial political importance. Because of the EU's unusual legal pedigree, the
issue will be effectively "black boxed" throughout the discussion of the enforcement of the EU
procurement regime that follows. Problems relating to the domestic application of the
multilateral rules, however, will be addressed in some detail at the end of this chapter. See
below, pp. 193 - 207.
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of international law, emanating from a 1925 advisory opinion of the Permanent Court
of International Justice:
"...(A) State which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken... (I)n the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties
to a treaty the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty... (Nor
can a State) adduce, as against another State, its own Constitution with a view to evading
obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force".276
The purpose of Sørensen's paper was to query "whether international law imposes any
more specific obligations concerning the procedure to be followed or the techniques to
be adopted" when implementing treaty obligations. To this end, he identified four general
types of treaties, each having different implications for signatories' domestic law, and,
ultimately, the interpretation of obligations arising from a treaty. John Jackson has
summarised Sørensen's typology in the following manner:
"(There are) l)treaties with purpose and substance outside the sphere of national law,
such as alliances, peaceful settlement of international disputes; 2)treaties affecting the
administrative sphere of rights and duties of various public authorities, and not relating
to individuals; 3)treaties relevant to relations between public authorities and individuals;
and 4)treaties concerned with relations between individuals or other subjects of private
law."277
Sørensen's is an important distinction because of its relationship to questions concerning
the kind of political obligations a nation state party to a treaty assumes, namely what
government entity is ultimately going to be subject to the disciplines it engenders, who
276 SØrenson, M. "Obligations of a State Party to a Treaty as regards its municipal law" in
A.H. Robertson's Human Rights in National and International Law. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1968, p. 12.
277 Jackson, J.H. "Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis". The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, p. 318.
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will benefit from any rights arising from these duties, and whether an act of the national
legislature is required in order to implement a given obligation. The distribution of these
rights and duties, in turn and in conjunction with the "national constitutional landscapes"
outlined in Chapter 1.2, dictates what might be described as parameters for implementation
and enforcement. if, for example, governmental decisions that are illegal under a certain
provision of a treaty affect individual trading interests and rights, an international dispute
settlement system that is designed to resolve differences of opinion between government
entities may be inadequate, or insufficient on its own as a mechanism for securing these
interests. In addition, an act of each of the signatories' national legislatures may be required
in order to "guarantee to the individual a judicial or administrative means of challenging
the legality of measures which affect him".278
Negative policy disciplines, as has been described in preceding chapters, seek to contain
formal, or legislatively-implemented discrimination. They operate by limiting national
legislative prerogative, or powers. Such limits, in turn, govern relations between public
authorities and individuals. In Sørenson's words, they "define the scope of citizen's rights
and duties in relation to the State of which he is a national, or the relations between the
State and individual without regard to nationality". 279
 Arnold McNair, speaking at the
Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva in the early l930s, described
measures of this nature as "constitutional international law". 28° Such law, he said, creates
278 op. cit., Sørensen, p. 25.
279	 ibid., p. 22.
280 McNair, A.D. 'The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties". British
Yearbook of International Law. London: Oxford University Press, 1930, p. 112.
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a "kind of public law transcending in kind and not merely in degree the ordinary agreements
between states". Its purpose is to "settle the political affairs of a group of countries in
a particularly solemn and semidictatorial fashion which likens the arrangement to a
governmental act imposed from above on the parties affected..." More recently, and, in
the specific context of the international economic order, Jan Tumlir has characterised
such law as a "constraint" on the re-distributive powers that sovereign states exercise
through their economic policy initiatives.28'
As was illustrated in Chapter 1.3, all states party to the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement have assumed what are "traditionally understood" to be negative duties of
non-discrimination and national treatment towards the covered goods and services of fellow
signatories. Article 3(1) of the 1994 WTO Government Procurement Agreement, however,
reads:
"With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government
procurement covered by this Agreement, the Parties shall provide (emphasis added)
immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers and service
providers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less
favourable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services, suppliers and
service providers; and
(b) that accorded to products, services, suppliers and service
providers of any other Party."282
281 Tumlir, J. Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies. Washington: American
Enterprise Institute, 1985, PP. 13-16.
282 GA1'T document GPR/Spec/77. "Agreement on Government Procurement". Geneva:
15 December 1993, p. 8. It bears mention that negative duties of non-discrimination and national
treatment, despite the previously described "traditional GATT understanding", are not, per Se,
specified in Article III. The third paragraph of the Preamble to the Agreement, however, reads:
"Recognizing that laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement
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The duties it engenders, in other words, would seem to imply what Mavroidis and Hoekman
term "obligations of result"; they are what this thesis has identified as positive policy
obligations. Signatories are not merely obliged not to discriminate between the goods
and/or services of various suppliers on the basis of the former's nationality. Rather, they
are bound to ensure that the behaviour of their "covered" administrative entities conforms
with the Agreement's principles of non-discrimination and national treatment.
Mavroidis and Hoekman assert that the "means of satisfying this (positive) obligation
are not spelled out". "Parties," they say, "are free to choose whatever means they deem
appropriate to achieve the agreed result". At the same time, they conclude their discussion
of Article ifi with the observation that, 'inaction by signatories, as well as action to the
contrary, gives adequate grounds to affected parties for legal proceedings to be initiated".283
Proceeding from Sørensen's typology of the different kinds treaties and applying the
"regulatory logic" of the EU's procurement regime to questions surrounding the extent
of Parties' "freedom" in this context, however, suggests that it may be appropriate to take
a closer look at how "adequate grounds" arise for the initiation of legal proceedings under
should not be (emphasis added) prepared, adopted or applied to foreign or domestic products and
services and to foreign or domestic suppliers and services so as to afford protection to domestic
products or services or domestic suppliers or services providers and should not (emphasis added)
discriminate among foreign products or services or among foreign suppliers or service
providers;" (Parties to this Agreement... Hereby agree as follows:)
Much of Hoekman and Mavroidis' paper is subsequently devoted to a discussion of how
the "GPA pays particular attention to ensuring and enhancing transparency". It is important to
reiterate here, therefore, that this thesis is concerned with political issues relating to why such
transparency is important. From this point of view, the apparent discrepancy between the
freedom of Parties to "choose whatever means they deem appropriate to achieve the
(Agreement's) agreed result(s) whilst, at the same time, their actions can provide "adequate
grounds" for the initiation of legal proceedings is particularly interesting. This is a relationship
that Hoekman and Mavroidis do not examine.
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the Agreement. More specifically, might there not be institutional parallels between the
"transparency obligations" incorporated in this Agreement, and the procedural obligations
that have been introduced to augment the substantive disciplines embodied in the EU's
"liberalisation directives"? Could "common rules" for multilateral public procurement
be emerging? If so, how might such rules be related to questions of enforcement that
were addressed during the latest round of re-negotiations?
Institutional "Improvement" and the GPA
The Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code was designed to be largely self-policing.
Article VI, paragraph 5 of Agreement requires that:
"There shall also be procedures for the hearing and reviewing of complaints arising in
connexion with any phase of the procurement process, so as to ensure that. to the greatest
extent possible, disputes under this Agreement will be equitably and expeditiously resolved
between the suppliers and the entities concerned."284
Under the terms of this Agreement, however, no criteria were provided for the
establishment and operation of such review procedures; Parties were simply obligated
to establish some kind of administrative review.285
Bob Hudec has suggested that this procedural lacuna is best understood as but one
manifestation of the "piecemeal way" in which the Tokyo Round Codes addressed the
28-I op. cit., GATT, "The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements", p. 41.
285 Article VI, paragraph 5, also requires that "entities shall establish a contact point to
provide additional information to any unsuccessful tenderer dissatisfied with the explanation for
rejection of his tender or... (having) further questions about the award of the contract". No
guidance is provided, however, as regards the way in which this reviewing authority is to
function, ibid, p. 41.
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institutional problems that had been ailing the GA'FT since the late 1950s. 286 Earlier
sections of this paper have addressed some of the major sources of the legal malaise"
lying at the heart of this institutional dilemma, eg. an expanding membership with divergent
stages and systems of economic organisation, etc. Although the "self-standing" Codes
were supposed to enable their participants to circumvent many of the political problems
that had made it difficult to introduce effective GATF disciplines over NTBs, economically
powerful Contracting Parties remained unwilling to cede any meaningful authority to the
multilateral trading system for enforcement of the rules that had been agreed. 287 In
describing this state of affairs, John Jackson said, "The question of 'rule' versus 'power'
diplomacy has been answered with a compromise."288
The "compromise" to which Jackson referred provided a "solution" to enforcement-related
institutional problems in the form of administrative committees, given the authority to
implement Agreement-specific dispute settlement procedures. Jackson portrayed the
enforcement role that the committees were designed to play as a manifestation of the
economically powerful Contracting Parties' broader efforts to de-centralise GAIT decision-
making procedures during the Tokyo Round. 289
 His analysis proceeded from an outline
of GAIT rule formation and decision-making processes:
286 op. cit., Hudec, pp. 292-297.
287 In this context, it is interesting to note that, according to Gilbert Winham, the
"derogations and/or escape clauses" section of the OECD Draft Code on Government
Procurement that the Tokyo Round negotiators "inherited in 1970" was "completely bracketed";
no specific provisions were included under it, indicating an absolute lack of consensus on this
issue. See International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, op. cit., p. 140.
288 op. cit., Jackson's "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System...", p. 46.
289 ibid., pp. 47-52.
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"The GATT decision-making structure is not elaborate... (It) provides that the 'contracting
parties shall meet from time to time for the purposes of giving effect to those provisions
of (GATT) which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of... (the Agreement).' ... Each contracting party
shall have one vote and... on most issues a majority vote shall prevail."
In addition, he said, although the GATT does not generally "use this formal decision-
making authority for rulemaking... the waiver power under the GA1'T allows a special
two-thirds majority of the OAT!' Contracting Parties to waive obligations... (and) some
waivers have a certain de facto effect of creating new rules..."
The process of the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Codes was, in Jackson's view, generally
consistent, nevertheless, with the realities of the international distribution of economic
power. Key country groupings developed during the negotiations and, on some matters,
the critical decisions depended only on the US and the EC. The broader "compromise"
reflected in the Codes arose from the fact that more basic questions surrounding GATT
decision-making processes were "largely ignored" during the negotiations; the Round
did not reconcile increasingly glaring "disparities between real economic power and actual
voting power in a one-nation, one-vote system". The institutional innovation associated
with the independent administrative committees, in any case, came from the fact that they
had what Jackson described as a potential to influence GAiT decision-making processes
in meaningful ways. This potential emanated from the following characteristics of the
Committees: 1) The power that each was delegated for the administration of the Codes;
Jackson saw this as likely to contribute to less centralised GAY!' decision-making in that
it would tacitly reduce the power of the Contracting Parties, the Council and other GATT
bodies. 2) The fact that their activities were going to exclude non-members to a given
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Code, making it institutionally more difficult for these interests to be heard. 3) The
dominance of developed countries in the initial membership of the Codes and the likelihood
that they would, therefore, exert greater influence over the activities of the Committees
than developing countries, at least until the latter made up a more significant percentage
of the membership in a given Code-governed policy area.
The nature of trade in public purchasing markets was an important consideration in the
enforcement, or dispute settlement-related role that was envisaged for the Committee
on Government Procurement. Government procurement, as has been described, generally
involves a process of awarding a contract for the provision of goods or services for public
use. Once this process has been completed, the nature of a procuring entity's relationship
vis-à-vis the field of potential suppliers, and the winning bidder could be said to change.29°
This "changing relationship" is fundamental to the way in which GATT disciplines
governing these markets were structured; the rules embodied in the Code establish
290 In a book on the EU's procurement regime, Remedies for Enforcing the Public
Procurement Rules, Sue Arrowsmith, D. dHooghe and others describe this distinction in terms
of the "severable acts", or "actes détachables" theory of French legal doctrine. Its basic premise
is that the decision to award a contract has an independent existence; the duties of the state that
arise in this context may be different than those relating to a concluded contract. See, for
example, pp. 59-6 1, and chapters 2, 4 and 5.
This relationship, in turn, must also be distinguished from the more informal, commercial bond
that may exist concurrently between a procuring entity and a supplier. A given supplier, for
example, may have been providing an entity with products or services for some time; the fact that
both he and that entity have commercially valid reasons for wishing to maintain this relationship
in between the letting of new contracts for this business does not technically alter the nature of
the formal relationship described above. Nor does a situation in which the product or service in
question requires post award delivery of further related services or products not included in the
initial contract; the latter may, however, provide grounds for limited tendering under the
provisions of Article XV of the 1994 WTO Agreement.
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limitations on the activities of procuring entities prior to the conclusion of a contract.29'
Although potential suppliers may incur additional costs as a result of a breach of these
rules after a contract is concluded, eg. foregone profits, the dispute-settlement
responsibilities of the Government Procurement Committee focused on facilitation of
the resolution of disputes during the procurement process. They were part of a system,
in other words, that implicitly sought to resolve differences of opinion with respect to
interpretation of the Agreement arising between government entities and aggrieved
suppliers, not the respective national entities under whose sovereign jurisdiction each
was operating. Morton Pomerantz, a USTR official who participated in the Tokyo Round
procurement negotiations, has summarised the Committe&s responsibilities in the following
terms:
"Given that there is a business premium for resolving disputes during the procurement
process, the drafters of the Code contemplated that only a few cases would fail to be
resolved in this manner. For those few cases, the Code establishes bilateral consultations
between the procuring government and the government of the aggrieved supplier... If
the bi-lateral approach fails the Code.., establishes a Committee on Government
Procurement ... to handle disputes... If the Committee examination does not bring about
resolution within three months, either party may request the establishment of an impartial
panel of three or five members. The panel will make findings of fact, arrive at conclusions
and submit recommendations to the Committee... The only Code guideline for Committee
action is that it shall aim at the positive resolution of the matter on the basis of the operative
provisions of the Agreement and its objectives..."292
Enforcement-related Objectives of the 1988 Protocol of Amendments
In describing Parties' objectives for the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the 1988
Protocol of Amendments to the Tokyo Round Agreement, Annet Blank and Gabrielle
Marceau said:
291 The EU's government procurement regime also reflects this aspect of the "severable acts"
doctrine.
292 ibid., pp. 1286 - 1287.
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'Parties generally felt that the Agreement was not implemented in a reciprocal fashion
and that this created a credibility gap, which could be overcome by improving the text...
(They) also felt that if the positive momentum that had been created by the negotiation
of the Agreement was not maintained, or reinvigorated, the risk of protectionism could
increase, perhaps even in areas presently covered by the Agreement".293
Accordingly, in May of 1985, the Committee on Government Procurement established
an Informal Working Group on Negotiations (hereafter 1WG), whose mandate, according
to Blank and Marceau, initially focused "on the improvement of the text...", despite the
fact that Article IX, paragraph 6(b) of the Tokyo Round Code had specifically called for
"broadening and expansion as well".2 ' In summarising the subsequent achievements
of these negotiations, these authors emphasised the way in which discussions had been
constrained by disagreements concerning whether it was appropriate to extend the
Agreement's coverage when remaining textual problems made it difficult to "make a
definitive assessment of the potential and benefits offered by the entities already covered",
and, in addition, concurrent negotiations then taking place in other fora involving, inter-alia,
the rules that were being developed to govern EC-wide public procurement and the Uruguay
Round Services Negotiations that had commenced in 1986.295 Specific textual
improvements contained in the 1988 Protocol were ultimately, as was outlined in Chapter
1, largely procedural in nature, and involved enhanced stringency of the tendering rules
that were already in place and the introduction new surveillance and monitoring procedures,
including post award notification requirements and new statistical reporting standards.
293 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 32.
294	 ibid.,p.34.
295	 ibid., p. 35.
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The Uruguay Round-vintage Negotiations
Chapter 1.1 also described the way in which Article IX 6(b) of the Protocol called for
yet further negotiation of the Agreement. The decision with respect to where such
negotiation would take place proved controversial; it would, among other things, determine
who was entitled to participate. Questions with respect to broadening and expansion were
of particular concern in this respect. As Blank and Marceau explained,
"Certain developing countries (that had been observers to the Agreement)... expressed
the view that... continuation of the negotiations... should be done within the framework
of the Uruguay Round negotiating group on Negotiations in Goods... and not in an Informal
Working Group with limited membership... (They stressed) the need to make the
Agreement... more broad-based by facilitating the accession of more developing
countries" 296
At the same time, existing Signatories were particularly concerned about the way in which
the principles of MFN and national treatment were to apply to the procurement of services
by potentially covered entities. There was a desire, according to Blank and Marceau, "Not
to move forward too quickly in the IWG before things were clearer in the GNS (Uruguay
Round Group on Negotiations on Services)". 297
 In the end, it was decided to continue
the negotiations in the existing forum: "The Committee on Government Procurement('s
1WG) could contribute to the Uruguay Round by taking into account deliberations and







Many of the participating delegations in the initial meetings of the reconvened IWO in
late 1988/early 1989, as was described in Chapter 1, were of the opinion that the dispute
settlement provisions of the 1988 Agreement, and, in particular, its review provisions,
were problematic. The problem, as they saw it, was that the existing review provisions
did not provide adequate avenues of appeal for suppliers seeking to do business with
procuring entities in the other Parties' territories. Despite this early concern, textual, or
improvement-related issues received limited attention during the first couple years of the
negotiations. Through 1990, the IWG focused on the establishment of what Blank and
Marceau termed, the "structure and criteria for negotiations"; that is, which government
entities were to be potentially covered by the Agreement and how concessions with respect
to such coverage were going to be exchanged. 21 In June 1991, however, the US informed
the Committee on Government Procurement that it had held bi-lateral consultations with
Norway under the provisions of Article VU, paragraph 4 of the 1988 Protocol concerning
the latter's purchase of an electronic toll collection system for the City of Trondheim.
That September, following the failure of these two Parties to reconcile their differences
via consultations, the US requested that a panel be established to examine the facts
surrounding the procurement in question. The results of this Panel had a significant impact
on subsequent IWG activities with respect to "surveillance, monitoring and control".
299 op. cit., Blank and Marceau, p. 41.
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The basic facts in the Trondheim case, according to the official panel report, were as
follows:
March 1991, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration announced that the toll ring
planned for the City of Trondheim would be based on an electronic and mainly unmanned
toll collection system, forming part of an integrated payment system for the city, and that
a contract had been concluded with a Norwegian company, Micro Design A.S. (Micro
Design), relating to parts of this system. This contract was characterised as a 'research
and development" contract... No tender notice was issued for the contract... and no tenders
or offers were invited from companies other than Micro Design..."30°
As described by the same official document, the main points made in each of the parties'
arguments concerning this contract consisted of:
"The US argued that, since in its view the procurement was for products and not for
research and development, and the contract value exceeded the threshold, the totality of
the procurement fell within the scope of the Agreement pursuant to the provisions of Article
I. Whether or not the supplier awarded the contract had to create new equipment
incorporating and integrating new technologies was not relevant to a determination of
coverage by the Agreement."
Norway, on the other hand, contended that,
"...since research and development was not a product and the contract was for research
and development, only the part of the procurement concerning prototypes was covered
by the Agreement, given the provisions of Article V: 16 (e)..."
In turn, the US asked that the GA1'T Panel,
"find that Norway had violated its obligations under the Agreement... recommend that
Norway take the necessary measures to bring its practices into compliance with the
Agreement... and negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution with the US that took into
account the lost opportunities in the procurement of US companies..."
°° GATT. "Report of the Panel. Norway - Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for
the City of Trondheim". Gatt Document No. GPR.DS2IR, dated 28 April 1992.
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As was suggested by Morton Pomeranz in his review of the Government Procurement
Committee's dispute settlement responsibilities, the formal Article VII enforcement
mechanism in the 1998 Protocol, like that contained in Article XXIII of the General
Agreement, seeks to resolve differences of opinion between Contracting Parties by making
an assessment of the facts of the matter as they relate to the application of the Agreement,
and recommending the termination of any measures found to be inconsistent with the
Agreement. In practice and in keeping with a 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Contracting Parties to the GATT have
had recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of the General Agreement "only when
in their view a benefit accruing to them under the General Agreement was being nullified
or impaired". 30 ' In cases where there has been an infringement of the obligations assumed
under the General Agreement, the action has been considered to constitute what the
Understanding terms a "prima facia case of nullification or impairment", requiring
"consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorisation
of suspension of concessions or obligations." A key issue for the Panel in the Trondheim
case, given the US request that Norway negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution that
took into account the "lost opportunities" in the procurement of US companies, thus
involved the question of whether there were reasons that would justify disparities between
the practices of a dispute settlement panel under the Procurement Agreement and one
under the General Agreement. The US, in other words, was asking for an institutional
remedy that the GATT was not structured to provide. According to the aforementioned
official Panel report, the adjudicative body concluded:
°' GATT. "Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance". BISD 26S/210.
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"... because benefits accruing under the Agreement were primarily in respect of events
(the opportunity to bid), rather than in respect of trade flows, and because government
procurement by its very nature left considerable latitude for entities to act inconsistently
with obligations under the Agreement in respect of those events even without rules or
procedures inconsistent with those required by the Agreement, standard panel
recommendations requiring an offending Party to bring its rules and practices into
conformity would, in many cases, not by themselves constitute a sufficient remedy and
would not provide a sufficient deterrent effect."302
Although the Panel ultimately concluded that it would not be appropriate for it to
recommend that Norway negotiate the kind of mutually satisfactory solution that the US
had requested, it did note that "Considerable trade damage could be caused... by an
administrative decision without there necessarily being any GATT inconsistent
legislation..."
The Trondheim case underscores the fact that GATT dispute settlement mechanisms,
including those contained in Article VII of the Government Procurement Agreement, are
targeted at containing discrimination that is effected through protectionist legislation;
they are designed to safeguard the rights of states party to the treaty. Rights, in other words,
that arise from the negative duties that signatories assume not to discriminate in the
application of either their external trade policies, or internal "laws, regulations, procedures
and practices" that affect imported goods, or services. When signatories undertake positive
"duties of result", however, a breach of these obligations impinges upon private interests.
Such interests possess only indirect avenues of appeal under the enforcement provisions
of both the GATT and the Government Procurement Agreement. As John Jackson has
30! op. cit., Report of the Panel, pp. 22-23.
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explained, the GATT has traditionally applied "only to government action, and not to the
actions of private firms or individuals..."303
In his previously-quoted discussion of positive policy integration in a European setting,
Willem Molle outlined enforcement-related problems arising from the fact that policy
measures designed to ensure national treatment affect private, or individual rights, not
public ones. Measures of this nature, he concluded, are problematic in that they leave
"ample room for interpretation as to scope and timing". 3°4
 A German legal scholar,
anonymously-quoted in a recent Wall Street Journal article, was somewhat more cynical
on this point, describing these measures as "political law", dispensed like burgers at a
"Drive-through McDonald's... If you get the jargon right, they just wave you through-and
you get a free Coke as well." 305
 The remainder of this chapter reviews steps that have
been taken in a European institutional setting to ameliorate this problem; it then concludes
with a summary of the enforcement-related institutional innovation that occurred in the
context of the negotiation of the 1994 WTO Procurement Agreement.
Before proceeding, however, it may be useful to summarise the accomplishments of the
latter half of Part I: The previous chapter identified what Patrick Messerlin termed, "three
basic principles" embodied in each of the GATTIWTO Government Procurement
Agreements: non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency. It concluded with
303 op. cit, Jackson's The World Trading System, p. 42 and 103, respectively.
op. cit., Molle, p. 12.
Pressley, J. "EU Antitrust Chief van Miert Seeks to Break Up Borders,". Wall Street
Journal Europe, 17 October 1995.
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a lengthy discussion of the distinction between negative and positive policy disciplines,
characterised the WTO Procurement Agreement's "transparency obligations" as instances
of the latter, and described why such "obligations of result" have been necessary in order
to contain the informal discrimination that has continued to segment European public
procurement markets.
The first part of this chapter introduced the idea that different kinds of provisions within
a treaty can have differing implications with respect to the kind of political obligations
states party to them undertake. The nature of these obligations, in conjunction with what
John Jackson has termed "constitutional landscapes", conditions their implementation
and interpretation. A review of the way in which the obligations of non-discrimination
and national treatment contained in the 1994 WTO Procurement Agreement have
"traditionally been understood" as negative, "legal prohibitions" followed. This, in turn,
was succeeded by a survey of steps taken in the negotiations leading up to the 1988 Protocol
of Amendments and during the early stages of the Uruguay Round-vintage re-negotiations
to improve the "credibility" of the disciplines engendered by these prohibitions. The
discussion concluded with a summary of the unsatisfactory way in which the Agreement's
dispute settlement system reconciled differences of opinion with respect to its interpretation
in the Trondheim Panel Case.
Compliance and the EU's Public Procurement Regime
Considerable study has been made of the relationship between procuring entities and
suppliers, and its implications for dispute settlement in the context of the evolving EU
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public procurement regime. In an article entitled, "Enforcing the Public Procurement
Rules in Belgium", David O'Hooghe described the process of public procurement as an:
"exercise of administrative authority", involving a "public institution('s)... acting in the
general interest and mostly empowered to impose unilateral obligations to attain the purpose
for which it has been set up".306
While the exercise of such administrative powers is an important element in the regular
functioning of a state, he said, it also has the potential to impinge upon fundamental -
often constitutionally-guaranteed - rights of the individuals who are contending for a
contract, including the right to equality before the law. The essential question for
Community rule-makers, O'Hooghe concluded, is increasingly one of "balancing limits
on administrative authority" against the "principle of continuity" in the functioning of
the public service.
The procedural constraints incorporated in the EU's "coordination directives" introduce
limitations on the administrative powers of its Parties' procuring entities by providing
what O'Hooghe terms, "general principles of a sound and proper administration". Chapter
1.3 of this thesis traced the institutional evolution of these measures and described their
"complementary relationship" to the EU's programme of negative integration. From an
enforcement point of view, such "rules" - in conjunction with the equivalent national
remedies that are supposed to be guaranteed by the "compliance directive" - play an
important role in helping to ensure the consistent application of EU law across various
national jurisdictions. SØrensen's forequoted model offers insights with respect to how:
306 O'Hooghe, D. "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules in Belgium", in Remedies for
Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules, edited by S. Arrowsmith. Winteringham: Earisgate
Press, 1993, pp. 91 - 97.
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At first glance, the "common rules" would seem to be characteristic of a treaty whose
aim is "related to the unification of the internal law of the contracting States"; the function
of the "rules", as the Commission said, is to ensure a minimal "coordination of national
contract award procedures". 307
 Treaties of this unitary "type", according to SØrensen, are
supposed to be "concerned solely with relations between individuals or other subjects
of private law". As was discussed at length in the proceeding chapter, however, the
"common rules" cannot be understood in isolation from the EU's programme of negative
integration, a programme that's firmly based on what has been described as "constitutional
international law", or rules governing relations between public authorities and individuals.
Pelkmans addressed this issue in his discussion of "regulatory flexibility". The objective
of the "common rules", he said, is to "establish an internal market, and to ensure that it
functions effectively in practice."308
 Harmonisation, even on a minimal basis, is not an
end in itself. In this sense then, the "rules" would fundamentally appear to be more
consistent with what Sørensen termed a treaty that "define(s) the scope of citizen's rights
and duties in relation to the State of which he is a national, or the relations between the
State and individual without regard to nationality". 309
 They are merely a "means" to the
ultimate "end" of non-discrimination; any rights that they engender must ultimately arise
from the substantive, negative conmiitments that Member States assume under the Treaty
of Rome and the "liberalisation directives".
307 
op. cit., Commission of the EC, "The Large Market of 1993 and the Opening-up of
Public Procurement", p. 5.
308 op. cit., Pelkmans and Sun, p. 189.
ibid.,p.22.
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Given circumstances of this nature, SØrensen concluded, it is "useless to endeavour to
classify treaties according to the criterion under consideration". 31° Rather, an intermediate
level of analysis is in order. One that proceeds from what he termed the "recognition that
each provision of a treaty separately may confer rights and obligations on different parties".
Before we can understand the kind of political commitments a nation state party to a treaty
assumes, in other words, we must first recognise the variety of different kinds of
undertakings that may be embodied in any given international accord. Sørensen
distinguished five separate kinds of provisions, any one, or combination of which could
potentially be included in each of the 4 different "types" of treaties. The domestic
implementation of these obligations, in turn, remains a product of local "constitutional
landscapes". Significantly, however, it may be their purpose to reinforce these local
"landscapes". The 6 categories of "conventional clauses" identified by Sørensen include:
those containing the "obligation to refrain", i.e. negative disciplines; provisions "obliging
the public authorities to take certain action", or positive policy measures; provisions which,
"while enunciating individual rights, are concerned with matters which presuppose that
the relevant laws have been introduced by the State"; provisions which "authorise the
public authorities to take certain action which they would otherwise not be entitled to
take; those which, "in the interest of the individual and in order to guarantee him effective
protection, establish a certain division of powers between different public authorities";
and, finally, provisions which "regulate the procedure which the judicial authorities are
to follow in the exercise of their functions".3"
310	 ibid., p. 24.
ibid., pp. 24-27.
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In order to understand the particular obligations and rights associated with the EU's
procurement regime, it is helpful to recall that the rules are premised on an assumption
that the duties of the state that arise in this context change over the course of the contract
award process. Rights are at the heart of this changing relationship; political ones in the
case of a yet-to-be-awarded contract and civil ones in post-award situations. As has been
mentioned, the EU's "common rules" govern the activities of procuring entities prior to
the conclusion of a contract. The procedural constraints incorporated in the its
"coordination directives" introduce limitations on the administrative powers of its Parties'
procuring entities and, in so doing, provide "general principles of a sound and proper
administration". When such rules are broken, the detrimental effect of their breach is
immediate, that is, the administration has exceeded its authority and impinged upon the
political, or constitutional-like rights of contending suppliers. But how, in an institutional
universe legally segmented by diverse "constitutional landscapes", are these rights to be
secured? A right without a remedy, as some have held, is no right at all.312
Thomas Grey, in an article entitled "Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework", arguably
addressed this problem, distinguishing between "political" and "special" enforcement
of constitutional norms. He said,
"Constitutional norms are subject to political enforcement if the decision of ordinary
lawmaking and law-approving bodies is final on the constitutionality of laws that arguably
conflict with them... (Special enforcement, on the other hand, entails enforcement) by
institutions that do not have general authority to prevent the enactment of laws they judge
to be on the whole undesirable... (W)hen legislatures... are left free to interpret the legal
312 Also known as the "Bentham-Austin-Kelsen position", this view was quoted and
discussed in Thomas Grey's "Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework', in Constitutionalism:
NOMOS XX, edited by J. Pennock and J Chapman. New York: New York University Press,
1979, p.197
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norms meant to restrain their own powers, they will naturally have a greater tendency
to find justification (for the questionable measure) than might a more independent body".313
Grey was, of course, talking about the enforcement of constitutional norms at the national
level. Insights from yet another legal scholar, Carlos Vazquez, are necessary if Grey's
ideas are to be applied in an institutional setting that transcends national borders. In a
recent article, Vazquez said,
"Like other laws, treaties are enforceable in courts only if they impose obligations. Some
treaties do not impose obligations, but instead, set forth aspirations... (That such) treaties
are not judicially enforceable is neither surprising nor troubling. The role of the courts
in our governmental system is to enforce the rights of individuals. If a treaty does not
impose an obligation on the defendant to treat the plaintiff in a given way, it does not give
the plaintiff a correlative right to be so treated".314
In light of the above and returning yet again to Sørensen's model, it seems appropriate
to reconsider the way in which the fundamental substantive duty of non-discrimination
is operationalised in the EU's procurement regime. The negative duties of non-
discrimination that are embodied in the Treaty of Rome and the succeeding "liberalisation"
directives are clearly what Sørensen would term "obligations to refrain". Leaving aside -
for the moment, at least - technical complications relating to the way in which states
implement such "law" domestically, the ultimate beneficiaries of the corresponding claim
rights that arise from these duties are individuals; constitutional international law, as has
been described, establishes limitations on government powers and, in so doing, controls
relations between public entities and individuals. Whether these rights are subsequently
313	 ibid.,p. 197.
314 Vasquez, C.M. "The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties". The American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 4, October 1995, p. 712.
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to be administered by national courts, or the political branches of government, however,
must be treated as a separate question.
According to Eric Stein, a former justice of the European Court of Justice, in order to
"ascertain whether a provision of an international treaty gives nationals of the state party
a right which national courts must protect, it is necessary to consider... 'the spirit, the
general scheme and the wording of these provisions". 315
 From the standpoint of the
particular treaties under study and the general issues under discussion, it is significant
that the rights engendered by the Treaty of Rome and the succeeding "liberalisation"
directives were not sufficiently well specified to provide adequate legal recourse for any
individual who might have wished to invoke them. Nor were there adequate procedures
to guarantee to this individual ajudicial or administrative means of challenging the legality
of these measures.316
The positive policy disciplines embodied in the EU's "coordination directives" constitute
what SØrensen termed obligations for "public authorities to take certain action in certain
315 Stein, E. "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution". The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75, No. 1, January 1981, P.9. Herein it is
important to note that Stein contrasts these criteria with those set out by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in its 1928 Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig.
This opinion, he said, held that "the intention of the two parties in question would be determined
from the contents, the wording, and the general tenor of the agreement and from the manner in
which it was applied". Stein justifies his departure from this "established principle" with the
argument that the reasoning in that case would "hardly fit modem conditions since it arose at a
time when government intervention in national economies was still limited, when treaties
intended to affect private parties were relatively rare, and agreements designed to harmonise and
even integrate national economic and social policies were nonexistent".
316 The role of political commitment - or what Stein refers to here as "spirit" - in the
evolution of increasingly stringent EU public procurement disciplines was described in Chapter
1.3. See above, pp. 136- 137.
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circumstances". As was described in the proceeding chapter, they create a "comprehensive
institutional framework" to govern the Union's procurement markets, based on "minimal
coordination of national contract award procedures"; it functions by introducing limitations
on the administrative powers of its Parties' procuring entities. The "general principles
of a sound and proper administration" embodied in these limitations, in turn, serve to clarif'
the rights of potential suppliers to equality before the administration. In so doing, they
play an important role in the allocation of political responsibility for the enforcement of
the "common rules".
Vazquez said that treaties are enforceable in courts only if they impose obligations to treat
plaintiffs in a "given way". 317 In this context, he outlined a distinction between what
lawyers term "political" and 'judicial questions", referring to the "nonnativejudgements"
that are implicit in decisions about the "role of the judiciary" in a given governmental
system. Questions of the latter nature arise from treaty provisions that set forth "sufficiently
determinant standards for evaluating the conduct of the parties and their attendant rights
and duties", whilst political questions emanate from treaty standards that are "too vague
for judicial enforcement...(or are) phrased in broad generalities". Vazquez concluded,
"A treaty provision setting forth a vague standard often leaves the parties with considerable
discretion concerning the manner of bringing about the desired objective... (D)etermining
how to achieve.... (it, in turn,) is more appropriately a task for the legislative branch".
317 op. cit., Vasquez, pp. 7 12-715. Herein, Vazquez cited the US Supreme Court's opinion
with respect to the 1884 Head Money Cases, and subsequent "lower court decisions", including
People of Saipan v. US Department of the Interior (9th Circuit, 1974) and Frovola v. USSR (7th
Circuit, 1985).
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From this perspective then, the private rights that flow from the positive duties of non-
discrimination and national treatment embodied in the EU's 'coordination directives"
serve the political function of contributing to the creation of ajudicial task.
As was mentioned before, however, the problem with respect to the enforceability of the
rights engendered by the pre-1985 EU procurement regime was fundamentally twofold:
the private rights emanating from the Treaty of Rome and the succeeding "liberalisation"
directives were not sufficiently well specified to provide adequate legal recourse for any
individual who might have wished to invoke them and the requisite procedures necessary
to guarantee to this individual ajudicial or administrative means of challenging the legality
of measures affecting him did not exist. Although the "common rules" embodied in the
EU's "coordination directives" served to enhance what Friedrich Kratochwil has termed
the "mandatory quality and definiteness" of the rights arising from the treaties in question,
they did not directly address issues pertaining to who was to resolve disputes with respect
to their interpretation and how. 318
 Michael Hodges, Stephen Woolcock and K. Schreiber
depicted this procedural lacuna in their 1991 publication, Britain, Germany and 1992:
The Limits of De-Regulation:
"The legal structures governing public purchasing and remedies against illegal practices
vary considerably across the EC. Some countries, such as France and Italy, have detailed
administrative law and administrative courts. Others, such as Britain and Denmark, have
no administrative courts, and redress must be sought either informally via a member of
parliament of local councillor or by application to a high court for judicial review. Germany
is a special case because its Basic Law is interpreted as requiring public purchasing to
be governed by private law and thus precludes any intervention by a public body to enforce
318 Kratochwil, F. "The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal
Order", in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, edited by R. Falk, F. Kratochwil and
S. Mendlovitz. London: Westview Press, 1985, p. 253.
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compliance. In theory, all member-states provide for some form of remedy, but these
are seldom, if ever, used"319
At about the same time, a High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market drew
attention to the political and economic importance of institutional shortcomings of this
nature in its discussion of problems associated with the post-1992 Internal Market, "The
Internal Market After 1992: Meeting the Challenge":
"The expectations of industry must be converted into reality by ensuring that barriers are
not recreated. There is a risk of fragmentation of the market arising either from divergent
interpretation and enforcement of Community law or from the introduction of national
rules, which needlessly segment the market".32°
In December of 1989, the Council adopted the 'Compliance, or Remediesb Directive.
According to a summary subsequently offered by Sue Arrowsmith, it was "part of a general
drive to improving the efficiency of the open procurement policy following the Commission
White Paper of 1985" and was "...concerned mainly to improve the enforcement system
at the national level". 32 ' More specifically, according to testimony given in the J 988 UK
319 Hodges, M., S. Woolcock and K. Schreiber. Britain, German y and 1992: The Limits of
De-Regulation. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991.
320 High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market. "The Internal Market After
1992: Meeting the Challenge'. Brussels: October 1992, pp. 7-8.
321 Arrowsmith, S. "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules" in Reniedies for Enforcing
the Public Procurement Rules, edited by S. Arrowsmith. London: Earisgate Press, 1993, p. 50.
As discussed in this paper, the legal remedies that are available to "prevent and redress breaches"
of the EUs procurement regime exist at two levels: In addition to the provisions under which an
individual can make a claim in the national courts, "(w)hen an institution of a member state is
alleged to have infringed an obligation arising under the EEC Treaty, the Treaty provides that the
state concerned may be brought before the European Court, either by the Commission, under the
procedure laid down in Article 169, or by another member state under Article 170". Given the
"slow and cumbersome nature" of Article 169 provisions, the fact that "in practice, the Article
170 procedure has not been important" and the lack of an executive authority comparable to the
Commission in the institutional environment surrounding the WTO, however, this paper will
limit its focus to the remedies available before the national courts. See Arrowsmith, pp. 3-4 and
p. 43.
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House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Hearings on Compliance
with Public Procurement Directives, the Directive sought to reconcile the need for
uniformity in the application of the Community's "common rules' with the requirement
for "due regard to separate (national) legal traditions and procedures". 322 Proceeding from
a principle that national law should retain the authority to determine remedies for breaches
of the "rules", the Directive, as characterised in the testimony of H.G. Schermers, essentially
"order(ed) the governments to set up a particular legal system", or "court procedure"
In outlining this procedure, Schemers made a distinction between the existence of legal
supervision over EU directives and the nature of court proceedings in individual Member
States. Even though the proceedings for going to court may remain quite different in
various national jurisdictions, he concluded, the directives can still effectively be applied
in the same way:
"...in the Netherlands you bring these cases normally before the civil court, in France and
Belgium you bring them before an administrative court. That means already totally
different proceedings and it is hardly possible to harmonise that, because in France they
do not belong in a civil court and in Holland they do not fit in an administrative court.
In England you have again completely different ways of acting before the courts... (A)s
long as you have legal supervision over all the Directives, (however) then... (they) can
be applied in the same way. I think that the important thing is that there are procedures
available that make it possible for the individual to go to court."323
As regards the nature of this "legal supervision", or the "common conditions for remedies"
prescribed by the Compliance Directive, Sue Arrowsmith suggested that its provisions
fell into three general categories:
322 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1987 - 88.
"Hearings on Compliance with Public Procurement Directives". London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 19 April 1988, p. 48.
ibid., pp. 52-53.
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First they obligate states to "take the measures necessary to ensure that 'decisions taken
by contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as
possible'... (I)n implementing the requirements of the Directive member states must ensure
that the benefit of any rules on remedies which are more favourable than those of domestic
law can be used by home contractors as well as those from other EC states. The second
category of provisions.., require that certain specific forms of relief be made available...
(including) interim measures, the setting aside of unlawful decisions and damages. Finally,
the Directive lays down a number of rules concerning the forum for review and procedure.
It provides for safeguards where a review body is not judicial in character; it provides
that decisions shall be capable of being effectively enforced; and it stipulates that review
procedures shall be available, in effect, at least to interested contractors".324
Earlier sections of this chapter referred to the fact that the nature of trade in public
purchasing markets has been an important consideration in the enforcement of both the
EU and GATT regimes, and described the two kinds of interests that may be affected by
an illegal tendering process, public, or political ones and private, or civil ones. In this
context, Arrowsmith addressed an on-going enforcement related debate over whether
the Compliance mechanism safeguards public, or private interests:
It should be pointed out that there is some ambiguity in the notion of 'effectiveness': it
may refer either to the need for a remedies system which is effective to protect individuals,
or to a system which is effective to ensure that a public interest behind a particular rule
is upheld by ensuring that rule is enforced. A damages remedy is generally seen as one
protecting individuals as such, although the threat of damages may of course play an
important role in deterring infringements of the law for the wider interest, and in
encouraging legal actions... (T)he requirement of an effective remedies system is one
which can and should also be applied to require an effective mechanism for enforcing
Community rules in the public interest, and likewise the Court should also be prepared
to prescribe specific remedies where necessary for this purpose"325
Given the fact that the "common rules" contained in the EU regime must he applied in
what this paper has been describing as differing "constitutional landscapes", this
324 op. cit., Arrowsmith, pp. 5 1-52.
325	 ibid., p. 49.
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"ambiguity" cannot be resolved definitively; different national legal traditions and
procedures, such as those governing court proceedings, dictate a unique answer to this
question in each Member State. If, as in the Netherlands, for example, the awarding of
public contracts is generally considered as an act subject to civil law, suppliers appeal
nationally against illegal tendering acts on the basis of their civil rights, not their public
ones; to the extent that such appeals are successful, the enforcement mechanism thus serves
to protect suppliers' private, or civil rights.
From this paper's political point of view, however, this problem is not so intransigent as
it might appear. In this sense, it is possible to discuss what these laws may be endeavouring
to do, outside of the limits that existing legal systems pose with respect to how it is that
they can do what it is they seek to do; the analysis is focused on the nature of the political
consensus and objectives that the laws reflect, rather than the interpretation of the existing
legal rules, per se. 326
 This section of the paper, accordingly, has depicted the EU's
procurement regime as an instance of international administrative law, designed to
safeguard the political rights of suppliers to non-discrimination or, more specifically,
equality before the administration. Just as positive policy disciplines were necessary in
order to achieve Member State's negative policy commitments, so, too, is the harinonisation
326 Hedley Bull addressed this issue in a 1972 paper, "International Law and International
Order" observing, "Norms or rules have a central place in international politics, but the study of
them falls uneasily between the disciplines of international politics and international law... It is
no doubt desirable that students of international law should look beyond the bounds of a
narrowly technical exposition of existing legal rules, to consider the social context of these rules,
their function or utility in society and the desirability (or otherwise) of adapting them to changing
circumstances. It should not be forgotten, however, that the exposition and interpretation of
existing legal rules is the distinctive task of the international lawyer... if he loses sight of it, as he
ventures into such fields as ethics, the politics or the sociology of international relations, he will
have nothing of his own to contribute to the discussion of the subject". See International
Organization, Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 1972, pp. 583-585.
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of certain remedial procedures - including those that specify minimum conditions for the
award of damages - required if these negative commitments are to be effectively protected.
Further insights on this process are again provided by Sørensens mode!: In addition to
treaty provisions that specify negative and positive duties for signatories, he identified
ones which "while enunciating individual rights, presuppose the enactment of other laws
or regulations", those that "establish a certain division of powers between different public
authorities" and, lastly, provisions "regulat(ing) the procedures which the judicial authorities
are to follow in the exercise of their functions". The Compliance Directive, in conjunction
with the coordination directives, establishes a division of powers for the enforcement of
the Community's government procurement regime; the task is primarily assigned to the
national judiciaries, rather than the political branches of government. 327 Similarly, both
the negative and positive duties engendered by the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent
"liberalisation" and "coordination" directives effectively "presuppose the enactment of
other laws or regulations". The proceeding chapter showed how the rights arising from
these agreements, despite the fact that some of them were supposed to be directly effective,
needed to be augmented by positive policy disciplines in order to ensure that the internal
market functioned "effectively in practice." This chapter, in turn, has discussed reasons
327 In that the judicial branch of government oversees the relationship between individuals
and the state, the former, therefore, have important roles to play as agents of enforcement. The
availability of damages, as has been mentioned, typically provides an important incentive for
individuals to play this role, at least when their civil rights are threatened, eg. in the US,
individuals may sue for triple damages when competition laws are violated. The EU
procurement regime has operated from the premise that national law should retain the authority
to determine the level of damages for breaches of its "common rules". Whether this provides a
sufficient incentive for individual suppliers to police Member States compliance is, however, an
open question. The fact that these same individuals are likely to be approaching the offending
public entity for further contracts at some time in future certainly provides a strong disincentive
for them to fulfill this role. Many European public procurement experts feel that further
regulatory "coordination" may be required in this area. It is also, as will be seen, of relevance in
a GPA context in that the damages available under Article XX "may be limited to costs
(incurred) for tender preparation or protest".
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why "common rules" may necessitate "common procedures" for their enforcement.
Whereas the coordination directives and the compliance directives jointly create ajudicial
task for the enforcement of the Community's procurement regime, the latter operate as
a series of provisions "regulat(ing) the procedures which the judicial authorities are to
follow in the exercise of their functions".328
Enforcement-related Innovation and the 1994 WTO Agreement
Bringing the discussion back to the multilateral level, the procedural constraints
incorporated in the "transparency obligations" of the WTO Procurement Agreement
introduce explicit limitations on the administrative powers of its Parties' procuring entities;
as was discussed in Chapter 1.3, they provide standards for the assessment of the
328 op. cit., pp. 23-27. Herein, it is interesting to note institutional parallels associated with
the evolution of the XIVth Amendment to the US Constitution. The due process provisions of
this Amendment, along with the positive rights of citizenship that flowed from the Civil Rights
Act, protected rights of national citizenship against the discriminatory acts of state governments.
The rules in question involved the political rights of blacks; the discussion that follows is based
on Kenneth Karst's article, "Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment".
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, November 1977: The thirteenth amendment to the US
Constitution abolished slavery in 1865. "To replace the outlawed Slave Codes, the Southern
states (in response) began to enact the Black Codes - laws systematically imposing disabilities on
blacks and designed to keep them in a status of inferiority and dependency closely resembling
slavery... To abolish this new system of serfdom, Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of
1866... (providing) All persons born in the US... shall have the same right.., to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, to purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens..." Whilst the proponents
of the Act assumed that Congress had the power to enact it under the thirteenth amendment,
President Johnson vetoed the bill; nevertheless, it became law over this veto after Lee's surrender
at Appomattox. Subsequently, "(t)he framers of the fourteenth amendment sought to write the
principle of equal citizenship, with all its modern implications, into the Constitution... By
providing firm constitutional protection for the substantive rights of the 1866 Act, the framers
guaranteed that all citizens, including blacks... would share equally the civil rights that seemed
significant at that time". In sum, the XllIth amendment's prohibition of slavery is like the
fundamental negative duty of non-discrimination emanating from the Treaty of Rome and the
'liberalisation" directives. The positive duties/corresponding "rights of citizenship" embodied in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are similar to those contained in the "coordination" directives.
Finally, the due process provisions of the XIVth Amendment are comparable to the "common
conditions for remedies" prescribed by the Compliance Directive.
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"commercial reasonableness" of a covered entity's purchasing decisions. The political
purpose of these standards is similar to that of the "general principles of a sound and proper
administration" embodied in the EU's coordination directives. As the GAiT Secretariat's
"Practical Guide to the GATF Agreement on Government Procurement" put it, they seek
to "ensure the effective application of... (the Agreement's) basic principles".329
It will be recalled, however, that Mavroidis and Hoekman said that the means of satisfying
the positive obligation of national treatment that is contained in Article ifi of the 1994
GPR are "not spelled out". Moreover, they referred to the fact that the duty of national
treatment in a GATF setting has traditionally been understood in a negative sense. Nation
states party to the Agreement, on this view, are prohibited to discriminate between foreign
and domestic sources in "respect of all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement covered by the Agreement", but they are "free to choose whatever
means they deem appropriate to achieve... (this) result". Does a discrepancy exist here?
If so, how might it be explained?? Could it have anything to do with the textual changes
that were introduced in the 1994 GPR?
Earlier chapters have described the way in which Part II of the GATT forms the basis
of what John Jackson has termed a "uniform code of conduct" for its Contracting Parties'
commercial policy; it was designed to protect the reciprocal tariff concessions negotiated
under Part I of the Agreement. This "code" functions through the obligations of national
treatment that it imposes under Article ifi, and a series of general restrictions on countries'
329 GATT Secretariat. "Practical Guide to the GATT Agreement on Government
Procurement". Geneva: 1989 Revision, p. 3.
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use of NTBs that are contained in Articles 1V-XXI. Article ifi, paragraph 8 of the GATT,
as was also discussed, specifically exempts the "laws, regulations and requirements"
governing CP's public procurement from the "code's" fundamental duty of national
treatment, whilst Article ifi of the GPA reintroduces a similar obligation for its Member
States. Although the disciplines of the latter are significantly less broad in terms of
coverage and involve reciprocity-based discrimination, their purpose is comparable to
that of Article ifi of the GATT; they were designed to ensure that domestic laws and
practices could not operate as surreptitious forms of protection.
The Article XXII consultations and dispute settlement provisions of the GPA, like those
of Articles XXII and XXffl of the GATF, provide for remedies in the case of "nullification
and impairment" of the reciprocal benefits expected to flow from the respective
Agreements. Earlier sections of this Chapter explained that there need not be an
infringement of obligations assumed under either Agreement in order for instances of
"prima facia nullification or impairment" to arise; actions of a state that undermine the
"reasonable expectations" of fellow contracting parties as regards the reciprocal benefits
they have negotiated may be sufficient. Differences of opinion with respect to the
interpretation of the national treatment obligation often involve "prima facia nullification
or impairment", or non-violation-type questions. It is practically infeasible to have
multilateral rules to govern every conceivable domestic measure that may impinge on
trade; the number of regulations and practices that could potentially be used as protectionist
measures to defeat the purpose of tariff bindings is only limited by the imagination of
the lawyers who have to draft the necessary legislation, and that of the
politicians/bureaucrats who, subsequently, have to implement it. Nevertheless, as Jackson
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has said, "The ingenuity of man in devising import restraints which skirt the formal rules
of international trade seems boundless".33°
This situation has been associated with enforcement-related ambiguities since earliest
days of the GAIT. As was the case with the previously-discussed EU procurement regime,
these difficulties are fundamentally related to the question of who is to administer the
rights - if in fact they can accurately be described as rights - that arise from the treaty.
In his text on the GAIT legal system, The GATF Legal System and World Trade
Diplomacy, Bob Hudec argued that enforcement-related ambiguity was a distinguishing
characteristic of the "diplomat's jurisprudence" that this system embodies. 33 ' Many of
the draftsmen of the both the ITO and the GATT, he said, distrusted "lawyers and what
was understood to be the legal method". Nevertheless, they did not counsel a "retreat
to the negotiated solutions of the... (prewar) trade agreements model". Rather they proposed
a "diplomat's jurisprudence", designed to "blur and soften the more forceful parts of a
conventional legal system"; it consisted of a series of clear limitations on what governments
could do, combined with a high degree of discretion in the application of these limits.
Transgression of the limits, in turn, was to result in moral "chastisement", rather than legal
"punishment". In discussing the subject of "rights" in this legal setting, Hudec quoted
a memorandum submitted by the British delegation during the 1946 iTO negotiations:
330	 ibid., p. 203.
op. cit., p. 30. The following summary of the ITO/GATT legal system is extracted from
Chapter 3 of this book, pp. 23-36. Herein, the fact that, as Hudec put it, there were "few
substantive differences between the GAIT and the final ITO Charter" needs to be emphasised.
The latter, originally envisaged as an interim agreement that would only be necessary until the
ITO was ratified, "assimilated the basic elements of the ITO legal system". Pp. 49 - 52 of
Hudec's text address this issue.
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"...(T)here are numerous provisions of the charter which require the exercise of discretion
and economic judgement rather than precise interpretation of the terms of the Charter...
(T)he law of the iTO should be dynamic, and should be open to amendment and addition
in the light of experience in this new field of international activity. The making of rulings
under the Charter should, therefore, we feel, be the function of the ITO itself and not of
an outside body such as the International Court whose proper function is to determine
questions of law and not to appraise economic facts".332
The efforts to "moderate the force of the ITO('s) legal obligations", however, were to have
what Hudec termed a "paradoxical effect" with respect to the interpretation of "non-
violation complaints" arising from the GA1'T. This situation, in turn, was further
complicated by the fact that, although the obligations engendered by the latter were
substantially the same as those of its "institutional" predecessor, they had only been
accepted "provisionally" by GATT CPs, and, even more sign fi cantly, these states had
agreed to bind themselves to the Part II "code" only "to thc fullest extent not inconsistent
with existing legislation".
Many of the political issues associated with this unusual legal situation were addressed
in a 1950 Working Party Decision on Australian Ammonium Sulfate Subsidies.333
According to the Parties' Report that was adopted by the CPs on 3 April 1950, the dispute
arose from the "removal.., of nitrate of soda from the pool of nitrogenous fertilizers which...
(was) subsidized by the Australian Government..." After determining that this act did
332	 ibid, p. 29.
"Working Parties" were the institutional predecessors of GATT "Panels"; because of the
legally fluid way in which they operated, they were, according to Hudec, an important
manifestation of the informal, discretionary way in which disputes arising from the Agreement
were to be resolved. See pp. 78-80.
The "Working Party Report on the Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate" cited later in
this paragraph is re-printed in entirety in Appendix D of Hudec's book, pp. 337 - 345.
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not conflict with specific obligations Australia had undertaken under the Agreement, the
Working Party considered the question of "whether the... measure had nullified or impaired
the tariff concession granted by Australia to Chile on nitrate of soda in 1947". In this
context, it found itself squarely confronting the "paradox" to which Hudec had referred.
At issue, according to a summary of this case offered Professor Hudec's The GA77'Legal
System and World Trade Diplomacy, was the extent of the GA1'T's authority to judge
the consistency of a CP's "otherwise legal conduct" with its obligations under the
Agreement's nullification and impairment clause.
According to Hudec, "extra-legal regulatory powers", or "common law possibilities"
emanated from the legally unorthodox way in which the GATF was supposed to resolve
such differences of opinion. This was the so-called "paradox". As manifested in the
Australian Ammonium Sulfate Subsidies Case, it required that the Working Party balance
a CP's sovereign "freedom under the Agreement" to support its domestic agricultural
producers via a policy mechanism that was not, per se, inconsistent with the obligations
of the Agreement, with its concurrent duty not to exercise this "freedom" in a way that
would nullify or impair another country's reciprocal benefits. By design, the Working
Parties' judgement was to be a political one, not a judicial one; the "nullification and
impairment procedures", as Hudec put it, "had virtually no substantive guidelines".334
In ruling against the Australian subsidy policy, the "adjudicative body" thus effectively
exercised law-making powers over the Australian Government. The formal Australian
response to their decision, according to Hudec, remains institutionally unprecedented in
terms of the strength of its rejoinder:
op. cit., Hudec, p. 39.
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"Australia cannot consider it a sound argument that what a country might now say was
its reasonable expectation three years ago in respect of a particular tariff concession should
be the determining factor in establishing the existence of impairment in terms of Article
XXffl... The history and practice of tariff negotiations show clearly that if a country seeking
a tariff concession on a product desires to assure itself of a certain treatment for that product
in a field apart from rates of duty and to an extent going further than is provided for in
the various article of the General Agreement, the objective sought must be a matter for
negotiation in addition to the actual negotiation respecting the rates of duty to be applied.
if this were not so, and if an expectation (no matter how reasonable) which has never been
expressed, discussed or attached to a tariff agreement as a condition is interpreted in the
light of the arguments adduced in the report of the working party, then tariff concessions
and the binding of a rate of duty would he extremely hazardous commitments and would
only be entered into after an exhaustive survey of the whole field of substitute or
competitive products and detailed analyses of probable future needs of a particular
economy".335
The idea of "freedom under the Agreement" as discussed by the Australian Subsidy
Working Party is a fundamental political presumption in the institutional environment
that has gradually evolved from the iTO Charter. Whatever parties to the Agreement were
not specifically forbidden to do under the terms of the Part II "code", they were generally
free to do. This constitutes the notion of negative liberty to which Mavroidis and Hoekman
were referring in their discussion of the 1994 WTO GPA; it also, as will be seen in Part
II, is characteristic of the way in which political authority is constrained under the unwritten
British constitution. Hudec's "paradox" thus explains how CPs can enjoy such "freedom"
whilst, at the same time, their "inaction.., as well as action to the contrary... (may give)
adequate grounds to affected parties for legal proceedings to be initiated"... Formal
limitations on CP's domestic "liberty under the Agreement" would not, that is to say, have
been consistent with the "diplomat's jurisprudence" on which the systems' "code of
commercial conduct" was premised. How, then is this situation specifically related to
the institutional changes that are reflected in the 1994 GPA?
op. cit., Hudec, pp. 344-345.
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Remedying the GPA's "Shadowy" Legal Commitments
Earlier sections of this chapter described the (Committee on Government Procurement's)
IWG participants' dissatisfaction with the dispute settlement provisions of the 1988
Government Procurement Agreement; an outline of the Trondheim Panel case was
presented to illustrate how existing enforcement mechanisms protect the rights of states,
rather than those of the individuals whose interests might be affected by an illegal tendering
process. A lengthy discussion of how and why the GPA primarily impinges upon interests
of the latter nature preceded this review. Since the Tokyo Round Government Procurement
Code was agreed, many of the textual changes that have been negotiated - including those
in the 1994 WTO Agreement - have arguably served to clarify the "individual rights" it
indirectly engenders; "lessons" from EU integration would suggest that this change is
designed to make them more justiciable. Similarly, "private rights" in this particular
institutional context emanate from explicit limitations on Parties' "freedom under the
Agreement", or positive requirements that government officials conduct covered tendering
activities in accordance with certain procedures. Herein, the "regulatory logic" of the
EU's public procurement regime would imply that such disciplines - if they are to be
effective - necessitate the introduction of common procedures for their enforcement, as
well. The remainder of this chapter "revisits" the textual changes associated with the 1994
GPA, considering them, this time, from the "institutional vantage point" offered by on-
going processes of EU integration.
The re-negotiation of the GPA that paralleled the Uruguay Round, as was described at
length in Chapter 1.1, was motivated by its Parties' recognition that more of the trade
conducted in this context should be brought under GATT disciplines. This quest was
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effectively conditioned on enhanced "credibility" of the existing rules and, in particular,
those with respect to the resolution of disagreements arising from their implementation.
A 1989 communication from the Government of Switzerland to the Uruguay Round
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement addressed issues of this nature, in general, in
a review of enforcement-related problems arising from "illicit governmental decisions
affecting... (individual) trading interests and rights". 336
 Proceeding from an observation
concerning the inadequacies of a dispute settlement system geared solely towards the
resolution of conflicts of interest between CPs in a globalising world, this paper called
for the opening of a multilateral dialogue concerning the "problem of domestic
implementation of trade rules and enforcement of governmental decisions related to
international trade". Earlier sections of this chapter have consciously side-stepped this
particular issue, "hiding behind" an argument that it would have introduced unnecessary
complications that would have made it more difficult to understand fundamental political
parallels between the European and WTO public procurement regimes. It was simply
noted that the EU rules enjoy "exclusive competence" over the public procurement that
is conducted throughout the Union, and that they are part of a separate, supranational legal
order that, among other things, creates private rights that transcend national boundaries.
The existence of the Treaty of Rome-engendered rights of European suppliers in other
Member States were but one instance of this.
It will be recalled that the "directly effective" rights connected with this simplifying
assumption were not sufficient in and of themselves to ensure the realisation of a "common"
336 Government of Switzerland. "Communication from Switzerland", dated 29 December
1989, and distributed at the IWG Negotiating Group meeting of 18 January 1990, p. 1.
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EU procurement market. Positive policy disciplines needed to be introduced in order
to help to "de-politicise" processes associated with their interpretation, and "common
enforcement procedures" were ultimately required as well so as to guarantee individual
suppliers ajudicial or administrative means of challenging the legality of national measures
impinging upon their interests. Rules governing the implementation of the supranational
rules, or, more specifically, allocating the political responsibility for their enforcement,
were of critical importance in the achievement of the EU's integrative ends.
The legal order embodied in the GAIT, by comparison, has been an exeedingly loose,
or voluntary one. As has been discussed, the "code" of commerical behaviour embodied
in Part H of the Agreement reflects a commitment to the principles of non-discnrnination
and national treatment, but it is riddled with exceptions, eg. the "grandfather rights"
associated with its longstanding provisional application and the exclusion of government
procurement markets from its disciplines. Generally speaking, the rights and duties arising
in this institutional context, including those individuals may gain, are only indirectly
binding; they are a product of national implementing legislation. Such legislation, in turn,
is subject to the vagaries of national "constitutional landscapes". Furthermore, any clashes
that may arise between "code" norms and domestic jurisprudence are, by design, supposed
to be resolved by political judgements, not judicial ones. Given this institutional setting,
what meaningful options would have been open to the IWG negotiators, meeting in late
1988, to "enhance the credibility" of the rules embodied in the GPA?
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The previously-mentioned Swiss Communication proposed 3 different "models" for the
improvement of domestic enforcement and realization of GA1'T law, each associated
with a "different level of ambition" as regards integration:
1) "The most radical step... would be the introduction of obligations of contracting parties
to give full effect within national legal systems to relevant provisions... In accordance
with their constitutional relationship of international and national law, countries would
choose appropriate techniques to comply with such obligations..."
2) "Another less far reaching proposal might leave contracting parties the choice to pick
and choose a qualified number of provisions of said agreements, and have them directly
implemented on a reciprocal basis... Private subjects or entities would be entitled to invoke
such provisions before the administration or the courts of law of the importing contracting
party only to the extent the country of origin equally provides for direct or transformed
application of the provision invoked..."
3) "Finally, it is conceivable to reinforce obligations of contracting parties to provide for
effective remedies and review of governmental decisions related to international trade,
yet without prescribing full effect to substantive GATT rules and disciplines. Such an
approach is not new to GATT. It is already contained in Article X:3 of the General
Agreement. Contracting parties are under the obligations to adniinister the law in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner and to establish judicial review...."337
The first option is roughly comparable to the approach that has been applied in an EU
context. It basically involves the creation of a supranational legal entity. Earlier chapters
have described the important role political commitment plays in such an undertaking;
it is clear that such commitment does not exist at this time in a multilateral setting. Nor
can it be introduced by means of international obligations. 338
 Similarly, the second model,
according to the Swiss, "also implies major conceptual shifts of GATT in its relation to
domestic law". In that "concepts would have to be designed in order to preserve the unity
ibid., p. 2.
338 This is arguably still an on-going problem with the EU's public procurement regime. A
recent article in the Wall Street Journal described the introduction of a common EU procurement
"vocabulary", a mechanism apparently designed to counter continuing compliance problems.
See Wall Street Journal Europe, 5 September 1996.
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of the system", the Swiss proposed that "further work (for the time being) should be based
on the third and modest level of ambition":
"... (T)he general scope of Article X:3 (of the General Agreement) should be clearly
expressed and applied to all areas covered by the General Agreement, including non-tariff
barriers... (In this context, it would be) conceivable to introduce, for example the following
requirements to be met by national procedures:
-	 Provisions for fair hearing for all parties substantially affected by
administrative orjuridicial action related to international trade...
-	 Obligation to provide, at least upon complaint, a reasoned decision without
undue delay.
-	 Prompt and effective provisional measures in case of pending irreversible
damage.
Prompt and effective administrative or judicial review of administrative
action related to international trade. The scope of judicial review may
be limited to issues of law, excluding questions of fact and discretionary
exercise of authority within the law."339
In their discussion of multilateral judicial review-like requirements, the Swiss made a
distinction between the substance of trade regulations affecting individual rights and
obligations, and the implementation of such measures. As long as it remains politically
infeasible to give full effect to the multilateral provisions impinging upon such interests
The text of GA1'T Article X:3 reads: (a) "Each contracting party shall administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings... (b)
Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and
correction of administrative action relating to customs matters. Such tribunals or procedures
shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their
decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless an
appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed for
appeals to be lodged by importers... (c) The provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph
shall not require the elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a
contracting party on the date of this Agreement which in fact provide for an objective and
impartial review of administrative action even though such procedures are not fully or formally
independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement..." See op. cit., GATT,
"The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", pp. 16-17.
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within national legal systems, the content of individual rights and the obligations of private
subjects, in their view, should remain fundamentally in the realm of national law.
Nevertheless, the manner in which any "common" regulations are administered is rightly
a matter for inter-governmental discussion and debate. Minimum procedural standards
such as those embodied in the GPA's "transparency obligations" are designed to assure
consistent administrative processes, or uniform application of Member States' substantive
commitments, eg. to non-discrimination; their purpose is to enhance the predictability
of the individual rights and obligations arising from cooperative regulatory measures.
Questions pertaining to the interpretation of national regulations affecting individual
interests and "whether they cause nullification and impairment by violation of international
rights and obligations under GAiT', on the other hand, should, according to the Swiss,
remain the subject of traditional dispute settlement procedures. This includes disputes
arising from alleged violations of the minimum procedural standards.
Article VI of the Tokyo Round Code and the 1988 Protocol, as was described in Chapter
1.1, obligated Parties to the Agreement to establish some kind of administrative review;
it failed, however, to specify criteria for the establishment and operation of such procedures.
The fact that, during the early days of the negotiation of the 1994 GPA, many of the IWG
participants were concerned by this procedural lacuna has also been addressed. By mid-
1989, both the EC and the US had formally recognised the role that review might play
in the integration of regional government procurement markets; a "Bid Protest Mechanism"
had been introduced in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the EC's "Compliance
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Directive" was scheduled for adoption in December.° Supplier-initiated review had
moved firmly onto the multilateral negotiating agenda during the June 1989 meeting of
the 1WG.'
The idea for a "bid challenge mechanism" had first been proposed in the 1WG by the
Nordics in 1985, during the negotiation of the 1988 Protocol. 2
 A company-initiated
review system had been introduced in the EFTA following the 1967 review of national
laws, regulations and practices relating to the award of public contracts described in Chapter
1.2. Experience with that measure had served to reinforce what this thesis has described
as a "sea change of philosophical opinion" with respect to the technologies of free trade
that was then getting underway. The Scandinavians had, in any case, clearly recognised
that substantially more than normative rules were going to be required in order to halt
discriminatory practices in public procurement.
Delegates' early concerns with the proposed GPR review mechanism involved: 1) the
way in which independent reviewing bodies would inter-relate with national jurisdictional
court processes; 2) whether or not such bodies would have investigative powers and; 3)
if the proposed system involved the introduction of new guidelines, or obligations for
° See Arrowsmith's forequoted "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules", p. 50 and "The
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and Government Procurement: An Assessment", published by
External Affairs and Supply and Services Canada. Ottawa: 1989, pp. 19-20.
' 'Secretariat Note Circulated at the IWG Meeting of 13-15 June 1989".
342 
"Informal Nordic Discussion Paper" of 4 October 1988, p. 5.
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Parties to the Agreement. 3
 Japan and Israel also expressed concern regarding the
possibility of "frivolous complaints" under such a system.
Despite these reservations, in October of 1989, the first concrete proposal for an amendment
to the 1988 Code on this point was tabled by the US. Discussions within the IWG
Negotiating Group on the mechanism continued through 1990. Concern amongst the
delegates had, by this time, shifted to the usefulness of such a system relative to its likely
cost. In November of 1990, Japan and the 3 developing country participants in the
negotiations stated that they would have difficulties in making the proposed procedures
legally binding. 5
 By 1991, 3 delegations had submitted detailed information to the Group
concerning possibilities for such a system within their national legal systems, the EC,
the US and Canada. 6
 The challenge mechanism that ultimately emerged from these
negotiations was substantially the same as the one that had been proposed by the EC in
1989. It was described at length in Chapter 1.1; its objectives, nonetheless, merit re-
iteration: The review mechanism was designed to ensure that the Agreement's principles
of non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency were respected in an efficient
and timely manner; that administrative errors in implementing these principles could be
corrected when identified; and, that if such mistakes could not be amended, commercially
satisfactory remedies would be available to the injured party.
GATT Secretariat. "Secretariat document on surveillance and monitoring", dated 11
August 1989.
" US Government. "Proposal for Code Bid Protest Mechanism", dated 4 October 1989.
See also BISD 37S/304 for further discussion of this proposal.
GATT Secretariat. "Status in the Government Procurement Negotiations Under the
Code Committee", dated 26 November 1990.
346 GATT. BISD 36S/448, Geneva: July 1990.
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Chapter 1.1 also referred to the new bid challenge mechanism as being fully consistent
with the established, "phased approach" to the resolution of government procurement
disputes: Supplier-initiated information and review provisions are contained in Article
VI of the Tokyo Round Code and the 1988 Protocol, and Articles XVffl-XX of the 1994
Agreement. Formal state-to-state dispute settlement procedures, on the other hand, are
defined in Article VII of the Code and 1988 Agreements, and Article XXII of the 1994
Agreement, combined with the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules and
procedures Governing the settlement of Disputes. It also addressed the fact that Article
XX, paragraph 7 (c) of the 1994 Agreement introduced an important additional element
into this process: consideration of damages. Under this provision, Parties' challenge
procedures must provide for "correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensation
for the loss or damages suffered, which may be iinited to costs for tender preparation
or protest."
This chapter has introduced the idea that two different kinds of interests may be affected
by a breach of the rules governing the contract award process: public or political rights,
and private or civil ones. An argument has been developed that an administration's failure
to adhere to both the EU and WTO GPA's "general principles of a sound and proper
administration" impinges upon the political rights of contending suppliers. Suppliers
who invoke the terms of the Agreement against a particular administrative entity in either
institutional context are effectively acting as third party agents of the public interest. Article
XX, paragraph 7 (c) of the 1994 GPA, on the other hand, governs what has been described
as the "post-award relationship" between suppliers and procuring entities. It requires that
Parties to the Agreement offer injured suppliers an opportunity to recover damages at
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least sufficient to cover their tendering or bid protest costs. Such costs are directly
associated with civil interests affected by a breach of the Agreement.
In discussing the damages provisions of the EU's "Compliance Directive", Sue Arrowsmith,
it will be recalled, referred to the difficulties associated with determining whether they
function to safeguard public or private interests. "A damages remedy", she said, "is
generally seen as one protecting individuals as such, although the threat of damages may,
of course play an important role in deterring infringements of the law, and in encouraging
legal actions". 7
 Like the EU Compliance Directive, the GPA's challenge mechanism
is now being implemented in a variety of different national "constitutional landscapes".
For this reason, it is similarly problematic to identify the specific legal interest it serves
to protect. From this paper's political point of view, however, this is, once again, not really
the most interesting question. Rather, what is significant is that the mechanism creates
ajudicial task, recognises certain political interests in the process of doing so, and assigns
responsibility for completion of the task to national court-like entities. The individual
interests that are recognised in this process, for reasons that will be examined in the
following section, are instrumental to the end of creating and maintaining the public good
that is reflected in the wider market created by the rules.
Thinking about some of SØrensen's forequoted ideas with respect to the way in which
the provisions of treaties work together to achieve a given end, or ends, sheds further light
on the way in which the Article XX bid challenge mechanism is likely to function in a
given national jurisdiction. The purpose of the mechanism, as has been described, is to
op. cit., Arrowsmith's Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules, p. 49.
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create national fora in which individual suppliers have the opportunity to formally question
the consistency of Member States' administrative practices with specific procedural
obligations that they have assumed under the Agreement. This institution must be capable
of performing what has been termed a "judicial task". How has a task of this nature been
created? In his discussion of self-executing treaties, Vasquez said, "(C)ourts enforce the
rights of individuals... If a treaty does not impose an obligation to treat plaintiff in a given
way, it does not give him a correlative right to be so treated..."
	 In discussing such
obligations, John Jackson has made a distinction between obligations with "direct
application", and those with "invocability". 349
 Direct application, he said, pertains to the
"treaty's role in domestic law"; it expresses the notion that the international treaty
instrument has a 'direct' statutelike role in the domestic legal system. Earlier sections
of this chapter have used the European Community's tenn. "effectiveness", when
considering issues of this nature. According to Jackson, these two concepts are not
precisely the same; for the political purposes of this thesis, however, their differences
are of minor importance. The fact that WTO norms governing government procurement,
unlike those embodied in the EU regime, are usually neither directly effective, nor directly
applicable, however, is; the former typically require national acts of transformation in
order to become binding obligations on the governments implementing them.
Jackson's concept of invocability "refer(s) to a group of concepts, one of which is similar,
but not necessarily identical to 'standing'... (It involves a determination with respect to)
348 op. cit., Vasquez, p. 712.
op. cit., Jackson's "Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: a Policy Analysis", p.
310.
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who is entitled to invoke or rely on the treaty norms". 350 Policy decisions with respect
to a given treaty obligation's invocability, he said, depend on things like, "the precision
of the language, definitions of categories of persons, or concepts ofjusticiability or 'political
question". Before the introduction of the EU's "common rules" for public procurement
and "common remedies" for their enforcement, the private rights emanating from the Treaty
of Rome and the succeeding "liberalisation directives" were not sufficiently well-specified
to provide adequate institutional recourse for any individual who might have wished to
invoke them. This chapter has traced the way in which the GPA's "transparency
obligations" have become increasingly stringent during the lifetime of the multilateral
procurement regime. It is posited that this process is related to their invocability. In
conjunction with the introduction of the new bid challenge mechanism, the result has been
to create invocable, multilateral norms, albeit ones that remain, at least from a technical
point of view, voluntary.
To return to the specific issue of damages, the inconsistency of the GPA's damages
provision with traditional remedies in the GAiTs legal system also bears emphasis. In
his discussion of the "diplomat's jurisprudence" that is embodied in this system, Bob Hudec
made a distinction between "punishment" and "moral chastisement". The violation of
legal obligations, he said, usually results in formal sanctions, or punishment. The GAIT's
authority to "punish" those who violate its obligations, however, has traditionally extended
no further than an "escalated series of normative pressures". 35t
 Despite the fact that the
damages provision allows only for the recovery of costs associated with "tender preparation
op. cit., Jackson, p. 317.
op. cit., Hudec, p. 35.
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or protest", it is an instance of something far more than "moral chastisement" for the breach
of multilateral rules.
Enhanced stringency of the procedural obligations and institutionalised avenues of appeal
are not the only factors contributing to the justiciablity of the obligations arising from
the GPA. Patrick Messerlin, in a text prepared for a 1994 OECD workshop on the "New
World Trading System", underscored the fact that the 1994 GPA contains no escape clause,
or safeguard provision. 352
 This, he contended, is inconsistent with the "GAiT's (general)
tendency to introduce (opportunities for) contingent protection". At the same time, it would
seem to be consistent with the introduction of "hard" legal obligations not to discriminate.
Finally, the manner in which the rights and obligations arising from this plurilateral accord
are distributed and subsequently maintained is also, arguably, an important factor in its
"legal credibility". In its discussion of the "coverage" of the 1994 GPA, Chapter 1.1
referred to the fact that market access concessions were exchanged on the basis of a quest
for bi-lateral "balance", or the relative value of a particular opportunity expressed as a
percentage of a Party's national GNP. The benefits of the Agreement, in other words,
are only to be enjoyed by those willing to provide equivalent market access privileges.
Article XXIV, Paragraph 11 extends this conditionality to the benefits that any Party that
may subsequently decide to accede to the Agreement can achieve. It reads:
This Agreement shall not apply as between any two Parties if either of the Parties, at the
time either accepts or accedes to this Agreement, does not consent to such application.353
352 op. cit., Messerlin, p. 66.
op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement', p. 31.
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In addition, the reciprocal market access benefits that any given Party to the Agreement
may have obtained are safeguarded by the fact that the cross-retaliation that is permitted
under Article 22, paragraphs 2 and 3(c) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is
prohibited in a GPA context. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereafter DSB)
authorises a suspension of concessions or other obligations in retaliation for a Member's
nullification and impairment of benefits arising from another WTO Agreement, that is
to say, the complaining Member may not take such retaliation via the withdrawal of benefits
exchanged under the GPA. The relevant sections of the texts in question read:
Paragraph 2:
"If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations
and rulings within the reasonable period of time... such Member shall... enter into
negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view
to developing mutually acceptable compensation".
Paragraph 3(c):
"If that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or
other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concession or other obligations
under another covered agreement"354
Article XXII, paragraph 7 of the 1994 GPA, on the other hand, states:
"Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
any dispute arising under... this Agreement shall not result in the suspension of concessions
or other obligations under any other Agreement..."355
WTO Secretariat. "The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: A Collection of the Legal
Texts". Geneva: August 1995, p. 23.
" ibid., p. 92.
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The following section of this thesis will take a closer look at the nature of the political
obligations associated with this plurilateral Agreement. Whereas this section has
established that the GPA represents a departure from the traditional GATT "regulatory
methodology" in that its positive disciplines and innovative approach to enforcement offer
a way of disciplining Members' domestic policies and practices, Part II will consider the
new Agreement's innovations relative to the issue of intervention. The need to respect
"inviolable sovereign freedoms" - or, the equal liberty of sovereign states to assess and
pursue their citizens' interests - it will be recalled, has, heretofore, made it politically
impossible to develop effective multilateral domestic policy disciplines. The thesis'
introductory preface, more specifically, has attributed the GAT1"s traditional, "politicised"
approach to the discipline of Contracting Parties' domestic policies to the variety of positive,
social welfare-related responsibilities that its otherwise, generally negative Member
governments have assumed. In offering an institutional avenue for the resolution to this
"regulatory dilemma", the GPA and, in particular, its positive legislative and administrative
obligations, interferes with Member States' autonomy. The following section examines
how.
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Part II - Interventionary Aspects of the GPA
2.1	 Recapitulation of the institutional "lessons" offered by the GPA
Before entering in to a discussion of the nature of the intervention associated with the
GPA's domestic policy disciplines, it is probably a good idea to summarise the lessons
that have been gleaned thusfar from its institutional evolution. The thesis' introduction
outlined an institutional problem, specifically, the GATF's traditional focus on the reduction
of trade barriers between national markets and the political problems that have plagued
efforts to develop effective multilateral disciplines to contain non-tariff barriers to trade
that may undennine trade policy liberalisation. The "codes approach" that was inaugurated
during the Tokyo Round - and, in particular, the 1967 Anti-Dumping Code - was described
as an important institutional innovation in that it introduced a politically palatable model
for the discipline of discriminatory domestic policies and practices. The problems of
negotiating NIBs, it will be recalled, had been characterised on the basis of a series of
"operating dilemmas" of liberal international order, including those relating to the fact
that the postwar trading system constitutes a public good, but lacks an international
authority to oversee its production and distribution. Part I subsequently provided evidence
that the GPA offered an innovative approach to the production and maintenance of order
as well as the allocation of its costs and benefits, namely: the alternative to one-state, one-
vote representation reflected in its rule-making body, the Informal Working Group on
Negotiations; the reciprocity-based discriminatory features that govern the distribution
of its market access benefits; the review mechanism that enlists national court-like bodies
as agents for the enforcement of international order; the damages provisions and, finally;
the lack of an escape clause.
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Changes in the international political economic context also played an important role in
the evolution of the domestic policy disciplines embodied in the GPA, arguably altering
Member States' thinking with respect to the relative costs and benefits of "common
practices". Chapter 1.2 identified the following as major factors in the weighting of the
respective variables in the "cooperative equation" faced by each potential Member: the
economic integration that the GATI' has facilitated during the first 50 years of its existence,
the international deregulation of financial markets, the end of the Cold War, and changes
in the relative power of the US, the postwar hegemon. The effect of these changes, in
turn, was characterised as an increased awareness of the "opportunity costs" associated
with non-cooperation.
The kind of intervention that is involved in the GPA's domestic policy disciplines would
appear to be relatively straightforward; its positive policy disciplines, or "transparency
obligations", and judicial review-like enforcement mechanism "impinge" upon both
sovereign legislative and administrative authority. Article XXIV, paragraph 5 of the
Agreement reads, in part:
"Each government accepting or acceding to this Agreement shall ensure, not later than
the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures, and the rules, procedures and practices applied by the
entities contained in its lists annexed hereto, with the provisions of this Agreement".356
Similarly, Article XX, paragraph 2 reads:
356 op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 29.
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"Parties shall provide non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective procedures
enabling suppliers and services providers to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement
arising in the context of procurements in which they have, or have had, an interest".357
To the extent that a provision in the Agreement governs a particular aspect of the tendering
process, Member States are obliged, that is, to 1)implement national procurement rules
in conformity with that provision, and; 2)ensure that administrative and judicial, or "court-
like" entities have been designated and given the necessary authority to act as agents of
enforcement for these rules.
If the lessons of the integration of European public procurement markets are applicable
to the regulatory situation governed by the GPA, neither the Agreement's common rules
nor its common remedies constitute integrative ends in themselves. Rather they are
derivatives of prior integration, designed to facilitate the solidly negative end of non.
discrimination. The only shared political commitment that they reflect is one to the
integrity of a wider market; supplier equality before the law is a means to this collective
end. This suggests a different way of thinking about the intervention that the Agreement's
positive policy requirements involve. The introductory section of this thesis defined
intervention as "interference with the equal liberty of sovereign states to assess and pursue
their citizens' interests". To the extent that GPA Member States have independently
determined that wider public procurement markets are consistent with their citizens'
interests, there is, in this sense, relatively little intervention involved in this Agreement.
Indeed, the GPA's positive policy obligations could be said to reinforce sovereign authority
in that they enable Member States to achieve economic ends that, without cooperation,
ibid., p. 25.
211
would be unobtainable. The Agreement impinges upon sovereign legislative and
administrative authority, in other words, but it does so in a manner that ultimately enhances
that authority.
Member States' poor compliance with the GPA's institutional predecessor, the Tokyo Round
Government Procurement Code would seem to be consistent with this perspective on
intervention. An important objective of the latest round of negotiations, it will be recalled,
was improved "effectiveness", or enforcement of the Agreement's existing obligations;
extended coverage for the accord was conditioned on reinforcement of the cooperative
benefits that it already engendered. Issues that arose in the context of the Trondheim panel
case, in particular, were used to illustrate the nature of the political problems created by
a formal dispute settlement system that functioned only to safeguard the rights of states
party to the treaty. The remainder of this chapter, will take a closer look at GPA obligations
relating to enforcement, and, in particular, the second kind of domestic "intervention"
associated with the Agreement, ie that involving the behaviour of executive entities,
including the review bodies established to hear Article XX complaints. These issues,
as will be seen, are related in a fundamental way to the manner in which governments
are structured. For this reason, the discussion will proceed from some of the previously
described ideas concerning the constitutional function of the international economic order.
What, it will ask, is the specific nature of the administrative intervention that is implicit
in the new Agreement? How is it related to the legislative duties embodied in the GPA's
"transparency obligations"? Is this "intervention" likely to cause political problems that
will undermine the integrity of the markets concerned?
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2.2	 "Constitutional Rights" and the Multilateral Trading System
Earlier chapters of this thesis have talked about the constitutional function of the
international economic order primarily in terms of democratic "political failures" that
are manifest in protectionist trade policies. Such policies, according to the theory that
has been cited, emanate from improperly delegated legislative authority. Jan Tumlir, on
this subject, said:
"Properly delegated legislative power must be accompanied by specific instructions and
clear standards according to which it is used... (This requirement) sets a standard for the
legislative discussion and for the political and electoral process as a whole. It is not enough
for the people's representatives to decide that a particular objective is socially desirable;
they must also have a view of how it is to be accomplished".358
Constitutions, as the Introduction to the thesis explained, define political frameworks,
including that within which legislative activities are conducted. The constitutional role
of the multilateral trading system, in this sense, is related to the structuring of national
trade policy processes. Its purpose is to alleviate "government failures" and political
"externalities" that arise in this context through the regulation of trade policy instruments,
or the stipulation of "rules for the making of rules". More precisely, the GATT's policy
proscriptions and "hierarchy" of policy measures sanction more democratically-balanced
domestic trade policy dialogues, whilst facilitating an internationally equitable distribution
of the costs and benefits associated with these decisions. They achieve this by discouraging
trade policies in which the costs of protection cannot be clearly perceived by the citizens
who will ultimately have to bear them, and by prohibiting, or discouraging policies that
358 Tumlir, J. "International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism". ORDO,
Vol. 34, 1983, p. 78.
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indirectly discriminate against the interests of third countries. As Frieder Roessler has
explained:
"...(T)he essential function of the law of the GATT is... to resolve conflicts of interest
within, not between nations... (It) does not prevent its contracting parties from attaining
economic policy goals, but merely regulates the use of policy instruments... (T)he fewer
unnecessary distortions an instrument introduces in the economy and the more visible
its introduction and consequences, the lower the legal barriers to its use under the GA1'T
legal system".359
For reasons that will be explained in more detail in the paragraphs that follow, such
"constitutional processes" are fully consistent with the GAiTs domestic policy doctrine.°
Indeed, the liberal international order is effectively conditioned upon them; without the
GAiTs negative trade policy disciplines, the sovereign freedom that Member States enjoy
under the Agreement would be considerably less secure. The function of these disciplines
might even be compared to the one served by civil law in a national setting. Without Jaw
of this nature, there is no individual freedom. As John Mill put it,
"(E)very one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the
fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a
certain line of conduct towards the rest... As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question of
Roessler, F. "The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order" in National
Constitutions and International Economic Law, edited by M. Hilf and E. Petersmann. Deventer:
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp. 53-54.
360 This is arguably not the case if these disciplines are viewed, on the other hand, as
mechanisms for the discipline of executive discretion exercised in the process of foreign trade
policy-making. In this case, they would be more accurately described as a kind of "multilateral
administrative law", rather than rules designed to structure legislative processes. That this was
not Tumlir's intention, in any case, is suggested by the distinction that he drew between economic
issues and traditional "strategic foreign policy" ones: The foreign policy issues amongst
democratic countries today, he said, 'have become largely economic and economic issues
demand regulation by law". They should not, in other words, be decided on the basis of
executive foreign policy-making prerogatives. See the discussion in "International Economic
Order and Democratic Constitutionalism", ORDO, Vol. 34, 1983 pp. 80-81.
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whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes
open to discussion".36'
The ultimate purpose of the GATT's trade policy disciplines is thus to facilitate the co-
existence of self-governing national societies via the clarification of sovereign freedoms
relating to the trade policy process. Such disciplines could be said to represent minimum
conditions for states' participation in the "liberal market community" created by the
international economic order.
Jan Tumlir's diagnosis of the political problems associated with the structure of national
trade policy-making processes pointed to another, closely-related, constitutional function
of the multilateral trading system; that of the specification of "constitutional rights", or
spheres of individual activity with which governments may not interfere, including the
institution of judicial review as an avenue for the appeal of these "rights". The remainder
of this chapter examines the national court-like bodies in which the individual rights that
flow from the GPA's duty of national treatment can be invoked, these "judicialised" rights'
relationship to the negative disciplines on which the international economic order is based,
and the nature of the intervention that they entail as regards Member States' domestic
policy-making and implementation authority.
Administrative "Intervention" and the GPA
In the theoretical discussion included in Chapter 1 of this thesis, John Rawls' observation
that constitutions, in addition to fixing the structure of government, "dictate when the
enactments of a (democratic) majority are to be complied with... and when they can be
361 Miii, J.S. On Liberty. New York: Appieton-Century-Crofts, 1947, pp. 75 -76.
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rejected" was cited. 2
 "Alternate political processes" of the latter nature are necessitated
by the inherent fallibility of human institutions, including those of representative
government. Through them, societies with constitutions containing such provisions
safeguard their fundamental values against "government failures". The process typically
proceeds from the specification of "constitutional rights", or spheres of private activity
with which the state may not interfere. Such "rights" are practically de-politicised; prior
to government, they define minimum parameters of individual or freedom, eg. with respect
to life, liberty and property. The legislature is exceeding its authority if it passes a law
that impinges upon these rights.
In common law countries with written constitutions, it is usually the job of the judicial
branch of government to interpret these fundamental individual rights. 363 Such
interpretation, known as the process of constitutional or direct judicial review, is premised
on the idea that no one can be deprived of his constitutionally-guaranteed rights without
due process for the enforcement of the law. On this view, legislation that is specific and/or
retrospective - that is, impinges upon the individual and his existing rights detrimentally -
is punishment. Punishment, however, can only be administered through the medium of
the courts, or following a fair hearing before a neutral agent of the state, acting "judicially".
36'
- op. cit., Rawls, pp. 195 - 196.
Common law countries with unwritten constitutions and countries with civil, or Roman
law systems usually have notions of sovereignty that effectively preclude this role for the
judiciary, or, in any case, structure its "political task" differently. For example, judicial review in
many Continental European countries is abstract rather than adversary; courts' consideration of
constitutional issues need not be confined to particular cases or controversies. Although not
strictly germane for the purposes of this general introduction, this issue will receive considerably
more attention in the thesis' discussion of the kind of political intervention that the GPA
implicitly entails. See below, pp. 251 - 257.
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For this reason, all laws must, first and foremost, be both general and prospective in their
orientation. Judicial review offers an institutional avenue of appeal for minority interests
having reason to question the nature and ends of legislation.
A political system that allows for this kind of judicial review is not necessarily one in
which there is judicial superiority over legislative power. Rather, this institution is better
understood as a particular manifestation of the separation, or counter-balancing of the
various powers of government. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist (No.
78):
"(Judicial review does not) by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that
of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former".365
Courts are given the political authority to judge the consistency of legislation with the
restraints embodied in the Constitution, in other words, to enable the protection of the
people from themselves. Legal sovereignty thus lies with the people, per se, not their
elected agents.
According to Edward Corwin, the political philosophy reflected in the institution of
judicial review can be traced all the way back to the Ciceronian version of natural law: "There is
no one thing so like or so equal to one another as all of us are to one another. And if the
corruption of custom and the variation of opinion did not induce an imbecility of minds and turn
them aside from the course of nature, no one would more resemble himself than all men would
resemble all men..." See the discussion in Liberty Against Government: The Rise, Flowering
and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1948, pp. 13 -20.
365 As quoted by B.A. Ackerman in "Neo-federalism?" in Constitutions and Democracy,
edited by J. Elster and R. Slagstad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 172.
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Through administrative or public law, and administrative or indirect judicial review,
"constitutional rights" also govern the executive's implementation of legislative decisions.
Law of this nature regulates the relationship between the individual and the state.
According to Stanley de Smith's textbook on the subject, it "relates to the organisation,
composition, functions and procedures of public authorities and special statutoly tribunals,
their impact on the citizen and the legal restraints and liabilities to which they are subject.
The basic objective of public law is to confine the discretionary powers of the executive,
including those of the administrative officials who conduct the daily business of
government on his behalf. In the kind of political system that has been under discussion,
this is usually achieved via the specification of detailed administrative procedures that
"structure" the exercise of discretion and, in so doing, ensure that it is used both in
accordance with the legislature's will as it is expressed in a specific piece of legislation,
and a society's "constitutional rights". The procedures are, in turn, operationalised through
the judicial branch of government. The judges who possess the authority to set aside
legislative decisions that violate individual rights to due process, in other words, may
also overrule administrative decisions that do not comply with procedures designed to
protect the same interests. The role of thejudiciary, in political environments of this nature,
might thus be described as an all-purpose "quality control mechanism" governing both
the legislative, or representative process, as well as administrative ones.367
De Smith, S. and R. Brazier. Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th. edition.
London: Penguin Books, 1994, p. 577.
367 In describing the role of the judiciary in the US, the prime exemplar of a country with
the type of political system under discussion, Robert Yates - better known as "Brutus" - a
participant in the US Constitutional debate whose work stimulated publication of the Federalist,
said: "...(W)e can form but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will
work, or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice at
present subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation of the powers of the
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As described by de Smith, administrative law is highly complex, particularly in countries
that do not have written constitutions. It is also an area of the law that has grown in relative
importance as the duties of the liberal state have changed over the course of the last century.
When the state's duties extended no further than those of a "night watchman", or assuring
the preservation of peace, punishment of crime and provision of a few general services,
there were relatively few administrative activities to supervise. The myriad of positive
duties the welfare state has assumed since the end of the First World War, on the other
hand, have complicated the processes of law-making and administration considerably;
during this period, opportunities for the exercise of executive discretion have grown
exponentially. 3
 "Administrative discretion," as Harold Laski put it more than 70 years
ago, "is the essence of the modern State":
"A state built upon laissez-faire has been transformed into a positive state. Vast areas
of social life are now definitely within the ambit of legislation; and a corresponding increase
in the power of the executive has been the inevitable result. For no legislature could hope
otherwise to keep pace with the pressure of public business... What, as a consequence
has occurred, has been the wholesale transference of control from Parliament to the
departments. Legislation by reference and by delegation has taken the place of the older
method which regulated with a jealous precision each item of official activity".369
judiciary and the manner in which they will operate. This government is a complete system, not
only for the making, but for executing laws. And the courts of law, which will be constituted by
it, are not only to decide upon the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, but by
officers subordinate to them to execute all their decisions". As quoted by E. Corwin in Court
over Constitution: A Study of Judicial Review as an Instrument of Popular Government.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938, pp. 23 1-232.
David Levitan, in an article entitled, "The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a
Democratic Society' illustrated the magnitude of this change through a comparison of the
number of US federal employees in Tocqueville's day, 12,000, to those in his day, 2,500,000.
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXI, No. 4, December 1946, p. 564.
369 Laski, H.J. 'The Growth of Administrative Discretion", in The Journal of Public
Administration, Vol. 1, 1923, p. 92.
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It is beyond the disciplinary scope of this thesis to contemplate the technical nature of
the "multilateral administrative law" that governs the relationship between public entities
and individual suppliers under the GPA. For the thesis' political purposes, however, two
general characteristics of this law are particularly significant. Both are related to what
the lawyers would term the "adjudicatory role" played by executive authorities in tendering
processes, and a "constitutional right" that is frequently involved in processes of
administrative judicial review. Stanley de Smith, in his forequoted text on administrative
law, outlined the variety of objectives public law may be seeking to facilitate, eg. obtaining
best possible value for money in the public acquisition of goods and services. Whatever
substantive principles a given set of administrative laws seeks to safeguard, however,
it must he implemented in accordance with standards of natural justice, or what are more
commonly known as principles of fairness. Government officials are the subjects of this
law and, yet, enjoy privileged positions in processes associated with its application. If
the law is to achieve any of its objectives, it cannot be implemented in a biased manner.37°
The principles of fairness thus dictate that the first duty of those exercising political
discretion is to act judicially'. This, according to the common law doctrine of natural
justice cited by de Smith, implies two things: Administrative decisions must be unbiased
and cannot be taken without giving the party or parties a chance to put their case.
In thinking about this doctrine as it might be manifested in a polylateral procurement
context, it is important to recognise that natural justice governs more than administrative
370 Lawyers often make a distinction here between general and specific administrative law.
The former generally involves administrative procedure and duties of fairness, whereas the latter
deals with the regulation of specific policy areas. See the discussion in Jan-Erik Lane's
Constitutions and political theory, op. cit., pp. 149 - 152.
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decisions depriving citizens of existing rights. Its constraints discipline the exercise of
discretionary powers that have the potential to seriously impinge upon such rights (usually
those of property), as well as the expectations of those who possess them. De Smith, for
example, said,
"...(W)hen a citizen has a legitimate expectation that his application for a discretionary
benefit such as a license or permit will not be refused without a chance for him to put
his case then he is entitled to some sort of hearing".37'
In a state that has assumed a variety of positive duties vis-à-vis its citizens, this obviously
covers a wide class of cases.
Of what then, precisely, do the minimum standards for fair decision-making in public
procurement consist? How, in other words, is a judiciary bound to ensure that a tendering
process has been conducted in an unbiased manner, with due regard for the affected parties'
interests supposed to make its assessment? Before proceeding with an examination of
the answer to this question that is embodied in the GPA, a quick survey of a distinction
that political philosophers have made between "concepts" and "conceptions" will be
offered; this is a comparison that, according to Ronald Dworkin, is necessary in order
op. cit., De Smith, p. 609. The rights of ownership have, more precisely, been described
by A. Honoré in terms of the following: "Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to
use, the right to manage, the right to the income of a thing, the right to the capital, the right to
security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful
use, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity". See the discussion in "Ownership", in
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, edited by A.G. Guest. London: Oxford University Press, 1961,
p.113.
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to appreciate how due process-type constitutional clauses are designed to work. 372
 It is
also one that, for reasons that will be described, is not made by legal practitioners.
Constitutional rights are inherently contra-majoritarian. 373 The overt manner in which
they violate democratic convention cannot be left without justification. In political systems
like the one that has been under discussion, such justification is found in social values;
"rights prior to government" are morally grounded in a society's fundamental social beliefs.
"Vague" constitutional standards, such as due process-type clauses, represent appeals to
these abstract values, eg. fairness. They are, on this view, to be distinguished from
constitutional restraints that take the form of precise rules, eg. bans on capital punishment.
Their existence is a reflection of the dynamism of society; the appeals that they make to
moral concepts could not be made more precise by being more detailed. Indeed, more
exacting disciplines would be socially inefficient in that they would inhibit the constitution's
ability to accommodate change.
Dworkin explains this institutional paradox by referring to what he calls the "philosopher's
distinction" between concepts and conceptions. The "vague" due process clause of the
372 The discussion of 'vague" constitutional standards that follows draws on pp. 132 - 137
of Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
" This idea is presented and explored by Alexander Bickel in his book on the US Supreme
Court, The Least Dangerous Branch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 16 - 17.
Mention should also be made, however, of a debate amongst US Constitutional scholars
regarding this subject. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has argued that the Supreme Court is not a
"deviant institution" of American democracy. Rather, when it "invokes the Constitution, it
appeals to legal enactments that were approved by a whole series of majorities - namely the
majorities of those representative bodies that proposed and ratified the original Constitution and
its subsequent amendments". "Neo-Federalism?" in Constiturionalism and Democracy, op. cit.,
p. 187. More will be said on this subject in the concluding section of this chapter. See below,
pp. 267 - 275.
222
US Constitution, he says, represents an expression of that society's desire to be guided
by the concept of fairness. It does not, however, constitute a moral commitment to any
particular conception of fairness. A group has a concept of fairness when they "agree
on a great number of standard cases of unfairness and use these as benchmarks against
which to test other, more controversial cases". Members appeal to this concept in "moral
instruction or argument", but, significantly, may nevertheless "differ over a large number
of these controversial cases in a way that each either has or acts on a different theory of
why the standard cases are acts of unfairness". In such instances, Dworkin concludes,
the group's members have different conceptions of fairness. From the point of view of
policy, the difference here is critical: When an appeal to the concept of fairness is made,
a moral issue is posed. A conception of fairness, on the other hand, is a unique response
to this moral question. The problem that lawyers often have in appreciating this distinction,
in turn, is related to the fact that "conceptions" are functionally indispensable for the
practicing attorney. Jeremy Waidron, in describing the implications of lawyers' particular
conceptions of property, said,
"... (T)he technical lawyer... is concerned most of the time with the law as it is in the
society in which he and his clients live, and not with the law as it might be or is anywhere
else, he never has occasion to raise his attention above the level of the particular conception
of ownership constituted by the property rules of the legal system he is dealing with...
The detailed rights, powers, liberties, and so on which his particular client has, or does
not have, are all that he need concern himself with. Others, however, who are concerned
with questions about the justification of those rules may need to raise their attention to
a somewhat higher (more abstract) level."374
A first step in thinking about Dworkin's distinction in the context of the international
economic order, and more specifically, the GPA, involves recognition of the fact that each
Waldron, J. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 52-53.
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of the national economic systems represented in the WTO potentially reflects different
conceptions of property and other social values, including economic justice. The system
of administrative law that is usually included in any national legal system, in turn, seeks
to facilitate the achievement of these objectives, as well as those that may have motivated
any given piece of legislation; in countries with written constitutions and independent
judiciaries it often includes enforcement procedures that facilitate the protection of
something like a constitutional right to equality before - or due process for the enforcement
of - the law. The fundamental objective of the "administrative law" embodied in the GPA,
as was described in chapter 1.1, is to promote non-discriminatoiy liberalisation of Member
States' public procurement markets. The Preface to the Agreement, it will he recalled,
specifies:
"Parties to this Agreement... Recognizing the need for an effective multilateral framework
of rights and obligations with respect to laws, regulations, procedures and practices
regarding government procurement with a view to achieving greater liberalization and
expansion of world trade... (and) Recognizing that laws, regulations, procedures and
practices regarding government procurement should not be prepared, adopted or applied
to foreign or domestic products and services and to foreign or domestic suppliers and
services providers so as to afford protection to domestic products and services or domestic
suppliers and services providers and should not discriminate among foreign products or
services or among foreign suppliers or services suppliers... Hereby agree as follows:"375
The individual rights that arise from the duties of national treatment specified in the
Agreement's "transparency obligations" are a means to this end. In terms of the
constitutional discussion just offered, they might be viewed as manifestations of a particular
conception of procedural fairness. They constitute a unique answer, in other words, to
the moral question posed by the application of the principles of natural justice in a
multilateral public procurement context. This question is itself a product of the Article
op. cit., GATT, "Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 6.
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XX duty Member States have assumed to ensure that the rights and duties engendered
by the Agreement are implemented in a manner generally consistent with due process
for the enforcement of the law. The relevant paragraphs of the GPA read, in part:
"Parties shall provide non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective procedures
enabling suppliers and service providers to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement
arising in the context of procurements which they have, or have had, an interest...
Challenges shall be heard by a court or by an impartial and independent review body whose
members have no interest in the outcome of the procurement and whose members are
secure from external influence during the term of appointment".376
The proper chronological sequence thus is as follows: GPA Member States have accepted
a negative duty not to discriminate amongst suppliers, or goods and services in the conduct
of their domestic practices and procedures relating to the tendering of public contracts
in markets "covered" by the Agreement. Article XX of this accord reinforces this negative
commitment by obliging Members to conduct their associated administrative processes
in accordance with principles of natural justice, or procedural fairness. The individual
rights that the GPA's procedural, or "transparency obligations" create, in constituting a
commonly agreed conception yof fairness, in turn, facilitate both the realisation of Member
States' moral obligation and their underlying negative commitment.
Domestic Intervention and the GPA "Methodology"
The preceding discussion suggested that the "international administrative law" embodied
in the GPA be viewed as an innovative institutional methodology for the reconciliation
of different social value assumptions reflected in the domestic policies and practices of
WTO Member States. Differing value premises concerning questions of economic justice,
376 ibid., pp. 25 - 26.
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it will be recalled, were identified in the thesis' introduction as the fundamental obstacle
to the development of effective multilateral disciplines for discriminatory domestic policies.
Any attempt to reconcile them is politically problematic in that it implicitly raises the
issue of intervention. On this point, earlier sections of this chapter have resolved that
the positive "transparency obligations' embodied in the GPA are not, per se, interventionary
vis-à-vis the legislative authority of Member States; they are voluntary and only "interfere"
with national authority in order to enable it to achieve ends it could not otherwise hope
to obtain. GPA rules, on the view that has been offered, are best viewed as means to
independent sovereign ends.
Similarly, GPA Member States' commitment to fairness in the application of these rules
would appear to be another manifestation of multilateral means to independent - albeit
necessarily shared - sovereign ends. In accepting the obligation to provide "court-like"
avenues for the review of administrative decisions taken under the accord, sovereign
signatories to the Agreement have undertaken a moral commitment to conduct their
tendering processes fairly. Like the positive policy obligations incorporated in the accord,
this responsibility is voluntary. It is also circumscribed by the common conception of
fairness to which each Member State has acceded. What could be politically problematic
about the GPA? From the point of view of intervention, its political "costs" appear to
be negligible and well contained.
Here, again, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the situation; particularly,
the political presumptions that are implicit in the GPA's institutional methodology. The
remainder of this section offers an outline of these presumptions and an analysis of their
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implications as regards the issue of intervention. It develops an argument that the GPA's
disciplinaiy approach embodies an American vision of the appropriate relationship between
property and the state, specifically that there are certain rights associated with property
that are prior to the law. This argument is based on 1) the separation of executive and
legislative powers that the Agreement obliges its Member States to effect; 2) the limitation
of the respective branches of government by law that necessarily follows, and; 3) the role
assigned to domestic "court-like entities" in interpreting the allocation of GPA rights and
duties. A discussion of how the form of political organisation envisaged by the Agreement
differs from that of the "generic" unitary liberal state is central to this argument; any
political problems that arise in this context are likely to be related to the fact that the GPA
is structured to contain the abuse of executive discretion, whereas the unitary state is faced
with a different manifestation of this problem, the perversion of sovereign authority. If
the Agreement's approach to the reconciliation of what John Jackson termed differing
'constitutional landscapes" is to be successful, on this view, Member States may be obliged
to reconsider certain aspects of their existing approaches to the formal distribution of
political power.377
2.3	 The "Constitutional Landscape" Envisaged by the GPA
The GPA's most important political connotations are related to the fact that it withdraws
certain aspects of the public procurement process from the unequivocal control of national
political authorities. The boundary of the "extranational policy area" in question is clearly
defined by the common conception of fairness embodied in the Agreement. The fact that
" The term, "constitutional landscapes" comes from Jackson's 'Status of Treaties in
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis", op. cit.
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it can be distinguished necessarily implies that executive powers vis-à-vis these
administrative activities are not plenary. This presupposes a certain way of thinking about
political authority, one that does not rest easily with unitarian conceptions of the nation
state. Such conceptions are common amongst GPA Member States; for this reason, this
section distinguishes the absolute political power of the sovereign in the unitary state from
that of the de facto division of political authority - both amongst Member Governments,
and, more importantly, within their component units - that is implicit in the GPA. Starting
with a few comments concerning the history of the unitary state and explaining the
relationship between it and the feudal political order from which it emerged, the section
outlines how political entities in which authority was not concentrated evolved, in some
instances, as a "solution" to the autocratic tendencies of certain unitary states. All of this
serves as an introduction to the analysis that follows relating to the question of whether
the "political re-organisation" that the GPA necessarily engenders is likely to hinder its
operation.
Since the Westphalian settlement of 1648, sovereign states have been recognised as the
legal "building blocks" of international politics; the state is considered to be the supreme
authority within a territorially-defined jurisdiction and the political universe is populated
by sovereign states. Inside any given political unit, the sovereign holds a monopoly over
the use of force; such control enables it, or its governmental agents to ensure, at a minimum,
domestic peace and external security. A sovereign's employment of its powers may be
formally structured in a variety of different ways. The traditional Western approach can
still be seen in the unitary state of today. European states organised in this manner typically
evolved from a reconciliation of the Catholic Church's absolute and transnational claims
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to political authority, with the overlapping local jurisdictions of what were known in
medieval parlance as "other associations", eg. vassals and kings." 8 The unequivocal
authority that had been exercised by the Church was itself a derivative of longstanding
Roman practices. This way of thinking about the location of authority - that is, that there
could be only one indivisible power overseeing "all and eveiy right" within a given realm -
was simply transferred to the territorially-bound state. Power in these entities was, and,
is, today, formally concentrated in the hands of the sovereign. J.N. Figgis explained the
political theory of the unitary state in the following manner:
"The theory of the Church came from the Roman empire. Neither churchmen nor statesmen
believed in two separate social entities, the Church and the State, each composed of the
same persons... Popes could never allow that matters of religion and conscience were
to be at the mercy of politicians; the Emperors could never allow that the state merely
existed on the sufferance of the spiritual power... The great Leviathan of Hobbes, the
plenitudo polestatis of the canonists, the arcana imperii, the sovereignty of Austin, are
all names for the same thing - the unlimited and illimitable power of the law-giver in the
state, deduced from the notion of its unity..."379
Hereditary monarchs controlled the exercise of political power in the first sovereign states.
Their authority, however, was frequently subject to one important condition: In order to
secure the cooperation of the previously-mentioned "other associations" in medieval society
and thereby consolidate their power, princely sovereigns had had to recognise consultative
parliaments, incorporating members of the nobility, clerics, and property owners. 38° Unlike
378 See the discussion in Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics. London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1977, chapter 2 and pp. 254 -255.
Figgis, J.N. "The Great Leviathan", in The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected
Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski, edited by P. Hirst. London: Routledge,
1993, pp. 120-121.
380 The fact that all European monarchies did not possess comparable avenues for the
interjection of public opinion into executive decision-making processes, or failed to take
cognizance of the public input they received had serious political consequences, eg. in France
and Spain. See the discussion in A. Birch's Representative and Responsible Government: An
229
the parliaments of today, however, these bodies were not representative. Rather, they
served as forums for political discussion. Parliamentarians of this period could not formally
second-guess the sovereign, but they could influence his exercise of authority. On questions
of finance, they were particularly influential.38'
In time, the political duties of parliaments expanded. They became governing bodies in
their own rights, albeit ones that, at least initially, represented only limited segments of
any given political society. One thing did not change, however. Political power in the
unitary state remained functionally concentrated in hands of a single national authority.
In some jurisdictions, this authority was formally obliged to respect tenets of social and
political custom; nevertheless, he, or it could not, technically, be forced to comply with
them. Revolution - at least up until the constitutional changes that followed in the aftermath
of the Second World War - was often the only avenue of appeal against the unitary
sovereign.
Structural Characteristics of the Unitary State and International Policy Reconciliation
The way in which authority is structured in unitary states can present a series of special
Essay on the British Constitution. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977, PP. 40 -44. As
this is not an historical exposition of the evolution of democratic government, however, these
consequences are beyond the scope of the thesis. The reference to the political functions of early
parliamentary bodies seeks only to distinguish their role from that of representative entities in
states in which political authority was not concentrated. Whereas in the former, parliaments were
effectively agents of democracy, in the latter, they constituted the most obvious threat to it. The
final section of this chapter, in describing the role played by the judiciary in a federated political
entity, will return to this issue, suggesting that the judiciary may be able to serve a modern day
political function in WTO Member States with unitary government comparable to that of the first
parliaments. See below, pp. 267 - 280.
381 See the discussion in Arthur Hadley's Economic Problems of Democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1923, pp. 80 - 81,
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complications as regards such entities' participation in an international economic order
that is "interventionary". The following highlights characteristics of these entities that
are likely to differ from those of the political systems discussed in the proceeding section
of this thesis: In a unitary state that is parliamentary, there is typically no formal separation
of the executive and legislative branches of government and, thus, no inherent rivalry
between those making laws and those responsible for their implementation. 382 The
executive is merely the leader of the party that controls membership in the legislature.
This is not to say that he and his back benchers never have opposing ideas with regard
to specific pieces of legislation; rather, the way in which such political systems are
structured encourages intra-party compromise and consensus. "Executive discipline"
is ultimately assured by the fact that intra-party differences of opinion, if they are too
severe, bring down governments.
Parliamentary executives' "coincidence of interest" with MPs who are members of their
parties, or coalitions has particularly important implications as regards the application
of the law, or administrative processes. First, there are relatively few political incentives
for officials to pursue bureaucratic agendas that are inconsistent with the policies and
preferences of their parliamentary masters. This means that, at least from the point of
view of discouraging overtly partisan behaviour amongst members of the administration,
there is no reason to structure the exercise of executive discretion through the specification
of formal, detailed administrative procedures. Second, the character of the administrative
382 Unitary states are not necessarily parliamentary. Nevertheless, even those that are
presidential do not typically adhere to the kind of intra-governmental separation of powers that
has been outlined earlier in this chapter, i.e. one in which the legislative will has to be committed
to statute in order for the executive to implement it.
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corps tends to be professional rather than partisan; indeed, in some countries, it is even
viewed as an autonomous branch of government. 383
 Administrative processes in a unitary
state are relatively de-politicised, generating fewer significant partisan challenges and
rewards. The civil service, accordingly, does not offer an especially alluring career path
for politically-ambitious individuals. It usually consists of a professional cadre wherein
jobs aie likely to be allocated on the basis of technical expertise and seniority.
The characteristics of administrative law in a unitary state outlined thusfar are, in fact,
manifestations of an approach to public law that differs substantially from that of sovereign
entities in which there is an institutional division of labour between the law-making and
implementation processes, ie. those discussed in the proceeding section regarding the
GPA's institutional modus operandi. The reasons why are related to the location of
authority, evidenced in disparities between the political prerogatives and responsibilities
of the unitary sovereign, and the legally-delimited rights and duties on which US-style
presidential political entities are premised. Each of the respective political systems is
based on a contrasting fiction as regards the source of authority, or the location of
sovereignty. Furthermore, historically speaking, some presidential entities, as was
383 Whether members of this "autonomous branch of government" are truly independent,
however, raises another question. The ideas of sovereignty on which unitary states are premised
would seem to preclude complete autonomy. As Martin Shapiro has explained, "The
administrative courts of most European countries form a separate hierarchy with local or regional
courts and a central court in the capital... Nonetheless, the Conseil d'etat and most of the (other)
administrative court(s)... consist of one set of elite administrators watching the rest of the
administration... While the form and often the substance are protection of individual legal rights
against the state, the ultimate purpose is the improvement and autonomy of the administrative
machinery of the state... Like England... the Continent has basically been dominated by notions
of parliamentary sovereignty that preclude review". Courts: A Comparative and Political
Analysis. London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 154- 155.
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mentioned before, represented a conscious and revolutionary attempt to moderate
"autocratic tendencies" of a unitary state.
The political power marshalled by the unitary state is a product of the sovereign's historical
role as "defender of the realm". The military origins of sovereignty in early, post-medieval
states have been intimated; hereditary monarchs were ultimately able to consolidate their
authority on the basis of the security that they could offer to property owners and other
conservative interests within their realms. 3
 Unity in the face of threat was critical. The
idea of this authority's being a conscious institutional creation, resulting from its individual
subjects' eminently rational desire to escape what Hobbes termed a "brutal state of nature",
however, does not follow. This notion is rather what C.B. MacPherson has termed a
"logical hypothesis", designed to rationalise the democratic imperfections of these early
sovereign entities. In reality, they were little more than the products of conquest; war,
in other words, had provided the basis for state formation. Sovereignty "by institution",
on the other hand, was, as Hobbes explained, a fiction that was necessary if men were
to move themselves, ultimately, to "more perfectly" sovereign states. 385 MacPherson,
on this point, said:
Arthur Hadley traced this system to the military tenures that had prevailed during the
Middle Ages, contrasting it with the capitalist, or industrial basis of political power that
subsequently prevailed in the New World: "Down to the thirteenth century the system of land
tenure in every country of Europe was a feudal one. It was based on military service. A man
held a larger or smaller estate on account of his larger or smaller amount of fighting efficiency...
The majority of those who wanted to cultivate the soil were unable to protect themselves from
spoliation. In the absence of an efficient protector or overlord no industry was productive and no
large accumulation of capital was possible... It was the military chieftain, therefore, who enjoyed
the largest measure of respect socially, and the strongest position politically". See the discussion
in Undercurrents in American Politics. London: Oxford University Press, 1915, p. 34.
385 MacPherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 20.
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"It made no difference which way the sovereignty was established, as long as the
sovereignty was acknowledged by all the citizens... It was enough if they acknowledged
a defacto ruler or ruling assembly, and gave to it the full measure of obedience they would
logically be obliged to give if they had voluntarily transferred to it the natural rights which
they would have had in a hypothetical state of nature".386
With movement to parliamentary sovereignty, extension of the franchise and the evolution
of administrative law, the democratic "fiction" that lies at the heart of the unitary state
has grown closer to reality. The unitary sovereign, to borrow Hobbes' terminology, has
come a long way towards "perfection". Nevertheless, the issue of individual, or minority
interests vis-à-vis the state remains inherently problematic in institutional contexts of
this nature; unitary state notions of sovereignty are typically based on majoritarianism.
If there is an avenue of appeal against a unitary government's commands, it is usually
one designed to safeguard the interests of the collective; individual freedom "comes from
being a member of a political community that determines its own fate... (not from being
a) bearer of rights that guarantee ... immunity from certain majority decisions". Unitary
state notions of sovereignty are, in this sense, premised on a vision of citizen's interests
that sees them as being largely homogeneous.
Political systems in which authority is divided, on the other hand, were, in some instances,
a revolutionary response to such notions of sovereignty. The American revolt against
British colonial control provides a good illustration of the alternate political theory from
which they proceed: From the time of the previously discussed Westphalian Settlement
in 1648, the international political environment had been largely populated by a number
of perennially competing, unitary sovereign states. Just as with any one of these entities,
386 ibid., pp. 20- 21.
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national security was also an important issue in the consolidation of US sovereign authority.
The Americans, as Daniel Deudney put it, played "the sovereign recognition game as it
had been established by the Europeans" 387
 Similarly, the federation that was envisaged
in the US Constitution of 1787 found moral justification on the basis of a variation on
the Hobbesian idea of a "consent" of the governed. Significantly, however, the American
republic was not a sovereign state whose existence necessarily precluded the continued
institutional tenure of the separate political entities that had agreed to its creation.
Furthermore, the notion of consent on which it was premised was instrumental in a
different, more literal way; initially, the authority of the central government was only
legitimate to the extent that it enabled cooperating state entities to achieve their independent
ends. Ultimately, this changed as institutional mechanisms were introduced that were
designed to ensure that the rights of national citizenship were equally enjoyed by all. In
addition, the sovereign people of the American republic, in agreeing to the Constitution,
retained a right to revolution.
In order to appreciate the implications of these differences and understand the way in which
they are ultimately of relevance in the context of the GPA, it is helpful to view them as
products of difficulties in the operationalisation of a political theory that tacitly assumes
a homogeneity of citizen interests across a broader geographic terrain. It is also useful
to consider a distinction that Felix Morley has made between "directive" and "supervisory"
states, the US being a prominent example of the latter. 388
 According to Morley, "directive"
states are distinguished by the fact that they operate through "exertion by an elite on behalf
op. cit., Deudney, p. 203.
388 Morley, F. Freedom and Federalism. Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1959, p. 13.
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of the masses"; activities of the latter, therein, are always subject to the will of the former.
"Supervisory" states, on the other hand, "keep power in the people", encouraging the
individual to exertion for his own sake. In them, the government's role is basically that
of an umpire, ensuring peaceful reconciliation of competing individual interests. Whether
one or the other approach to the distribution of political authority exists within a given
national realm is largely a question of historical contingency. 389
 British problems in
controlling the American colonies, in these terms, might be explained as a product of the
failure of their "directive" approach to rule in a political environment that was growing
increasingly heterogeneous.
A directive state, in order to operate, requires that a distinction be made between the masses
and an elite charged with responsibility for their rule. 39° At the time of American
Revolution, the elite in Great Britain was represented by the "King in Parliament". The
King was George ifi. Parliament consisted of a legislative House of Commons and an
aristocratic House of Lords, the latter possessing the authority to veto a decision of the
former. Representation in the House of Commons, in turn, was apportioned on the basis
389 It should also be mentioned that the distinction being developed here - that between
popular and unitary, or absolute sovereignty - is not necessarily synonymous with that between a
federated entity and a unitary one. Authority in a non-federated sovereign entity can, for
example, be based on popular sovereignty. At the same time, federated entities necessarily entail
a sharing of political power; for this reason, they are difficult to reconcile with absolute notions
of sovereignty.
° Britain differs from the "generic" unitary state that has been under discussion in this
thesis in important ways, starting with the fact that every citizen, including public officials, is
equal before the common law. Later sections of this chapter will describe these differences in
more detail, explaining how Britain can be a unitary state and, at the same time, one that operates
on the basis of liberty and individualism. See footnote 407 below, p. 246. The discussion of the
organisation of the British Government during the late 18th century that follows, in any case,
draws on A.H. Birch's Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British
Constitution. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1977, chapter 2.
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of community and economic interests within the so-called masses. 39 ' The extent of the
franchise was not regarded as important, for all citizens were thought to be "virtually
represented" through this system. Problems arose with the American colonists because
they did not feel that their interests, as English citizens, were properly accommodated
in the rule-making process. 3
 More specifically, American concerns emanated from the
fact that they were liable for taxes levied by the British Parliament and subject to the latter's
regulatory decrees. The British Constitution guaranteed equality before this, and all
common law. Englishmen in England were represented in the parliamentary processes
that had produced the controversial policies. Although the British contended that the
Americans were "virtually represented" in the House of Commons, as well, the Americans
did not agree. Their position was that the King's laws were unjust in that they reflected
an unconstitutional inequality in the rights and obligations of citizenship.
Gradually, the colonists' grounds for their complaint against the British Government shifted.
The Declaration of Independence that was proclaimed in 1776 represented a culmination
of this process. Closely reflecting the political and economic foment and change then
underway in Europe, it made revolution inevitable. It also set the stage for a new kind
of representative government, reading in part:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving theirjust powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form
' Rule-making authority had, of course, originally been one of the King's prerogatives.
See the discussion on pp. 226 - 229 above.
See the discussion in J. Ely's Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review.
London: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 89.
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of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
abolish it..."393
The revolutionary character of this proclamation was associated with its assumptions
regarding the rights of man; that is, its "self-evident truths" that there were certain
inalienable, individual rights prior to organised government. This doctrine, better known
as that of natural rights, was inconsistent with British notions of sovereignty. In England,
the "King in Parliament" was sovereign; individuals had rights, but only to the extent that
they emanated from the common law made by this unitary entity. The common law,
furthermore, could be changed by Parliament at any time. As J.N. Figgis explained:
"All and every right is the creation of the one and indivisible sovereign; whether this
sovereign be a monarch or an assembly is not material. No prescription, no conscience,
no corporate life can be pleaded against its authority, which is without legal limitation.
In every state there must be some power entirely above the law. To talk of rights as against
it is to talk nonsense".3
Natural rights alter the basis of political association. Earlier parts of this chapter have
described the military origins of the post-medieval state, referring to the "fiction" of the
social contract that came to be employed to justify the unitary sovereign's authority. This
"fiction" had, in fact, been necessitated by the incongruence of such entities with the
principles of natural rights; if men possessed certain fundamental rights, their willingness
to subject themselves to political authority - and whatever that implied for individual
autonomy - had to be explained. The version of popular sovereignty reflected in the
As quoted in An Outline of Amen can History. US Information Agency. Washington:
US Government Printing Service, p. 38.
Figgis, J.N. "The Great Leviathan", in The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected
Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski, edited by P. Hirst. London: Routledge,
1989, p. 123.
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American government after the Revolutionary War constituted an attempt to turn this
"fiction" into a more literal reality.
Government that proceeds from the recognition of rights prior to the state is, inherently,
limited government. It is premised on the idea that men "sacrifice" the individual
sovereignty that they enjoy in a "state of nature" only as means to the end of safeguarding
personal "prerogatives". A state's powers, on this view, extend no further than those
necessary for it to perform its function of protecting these individual rights; it is, in other
words, what Morley referred to as a "supervisory" state. Compared to the "generic" unitary
state that has been under discussion and for the purposes of the argument that the thesis
is developing relating to the political theory implicit in the GPA, it is particularly significant
that sovereign entities of this nature: 1) proceed from recognition of a fundamental
heterogeneity of individual interests and; 2) entail a basic notion of reciprocity in the
reconciliation of competing interests. 395
 Citizens of supervisory states give up a measure
of their personal autonomy as the "price" of political association, but they also invariably
gain something as well. If they do not, their ultimate recourse, at least in the US, is
constitutionally-sanctioned revolution.
The "generic" unitary state does not, of course, exist. Many of the European states
whose historical development is generally consistent with that which has been attributed to it, for
example, now possess written constitutions that recognise individual rights that are prior to
government, or participate in supranational legal orders that effectively achieve the same thing.
The private rights that flow from the Treaty of Rome provide a prime example of this. What is
significant here, however, is the fact that the existence of such rights has not changed the basic
notions of sovereignty upon which these states and their institutions are built. Unitary states
have assumed the duties that written constitutions entail and have grown more liberal in the
process of doing so, but this has not changed the basis on which their power is exercised. There
remains, in other words, a difference between a state that is growing more liberal and one based
on popular sovereignty.
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The Role of Law in a State Based on Popular Sovereignty
The authority of "supervisory" states is circumscribed by law. In the US, more expressly,
the basic political idea is that power is controlled by being dispersed, and law governs
its allocation and exercise. As Cecelia Kenyon explained:
"The Founding Fathers were eclectic in their political thinking, and as a result, their ideas
fit together with varying degrees of harmony and emerge with varying degrees of clarity.
Their cardinal principle (however) is absolutely clear: good government requires a written
constitution to secure the liberty and welfare of the people and especially to guard against...
a 'strong Byass of human Nature to Tyranny and Despotism".3
Because of the central role of law in this political system, politics in the US effectively
revolves around the legislative process. Indeed, for this thesis' purposes, the major
difference between unitary and supervisory states can be seen in the function of their
respective law-making institutions. In states organised in the former fashion, parliament
has typically been the primary agent of democracy; "consultative" parliaments, as has
been explained, originally acted as a defacto "check" on the absolute powers of the
monarch. With devolution of hereditary rulers' executive and legislative powers to these
representative assemblies and the gradual extension of the franchise, they became "agents
Kenyon, C. "Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America' in NOMOS XX:
Constitutionalism, edited by J. Pennock and J. Chapman. New York: New York University
Press, 1979, p. 117.
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of democracy" in their own rights. 397 Ones that, among other things, retained formal
responsibility for the direction of the economic life of the nation.
Supervisory republics, on the other hand, are premised on an assumption that representative
assemblies are a kind of second-best democratic institution. Direct democracy is infeasible
in a political setting whose size exceeds that of a city-state; for this reason, in such entities,
government by law replaces that of "virtuous men". 398
 Written constitutions preside over
this process. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, in addition to fixing the structure
of government, they "dictate when the enactments of a (democratic) majority are to be
complied with... and when they can be rejected".3
Under the US constitution, there are a number of ways in which representative authority
is disciplined. Two are particularly significant for this thesis' purposes: the separation
of powers both within and between state and federal authorities, and constitutional rights,
safeguarded by the institution of judicial review. These institutions are the Founding
Fathers' remedies for two weaknesses in the "natural conditions of men", both of which
The relationship between this process and contextual developments - specifically the
industrial revolution and the corresponding movement away from traditional, agriculturally-
oriented forms of social organisation - bears re-iteration. As the introduction to the thesis
explained, the King's prerogative had to be constrained if burgeoning market mechanisms were
to work; capitalism was conditioned on a degree of predictability in sovereign-subject relations.
Under the influence of the "dangerous doctrine of natural rights", a new perspective regarding
the nature of authority emerged. This perspective found reflection in the liberal, or negative
state. It also, as is about to be explained, contributed to the development of the "supervisory"
state.
398 This expression, according to Edward Corwin, was that of James Harrington. See the
discussion in The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1955, p. 8.
op. cit., Rawls, pp. 195 - 196.
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need to be contained if "the mortal diseases under which popular governments have
eveiywhere perished" were to be avoided. Such "diseases" arise from man's susceptibility
to the "spirit of faction", or "common impulses of passion... adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community", and manifest
inequalities in the individual faculties of men.40'
The American variation on the separation of political powers is aimed primarily at
controlling the problem of faction. Commonly attributed to Montesquieu and his famous
misunderstanding of the structure of government under the British constitution, this doctrine
entails the allocation of the functions and powers of government to discrete branches of
government, typically a legislature, responsible for the making of laws, an executive
charged with enforcing them, and ajudiciary with responsibility for their interpretation.402
As manifested in the US, it was, in fact, an institutional retort to the British Government's
approach to the exercise of colonial authority; the Americans, for reasons that have been
described, had come to fear the state as a potential agent of oppression. The idea of
dividing its various powers was to create a kind of intra-governmental competition for
their use; one that would increase the probability that they would be exercised in a manner
400 Madison, J. The Federalist Papers, Number 10, as quoted by Wilfrid Rumble in "James
Madison on the Value of Bills of Rights", in NOMOSXX: Constitutionalism, op. cit., p. 141.
401 Madison, J. The Federalist, Number 10, as quoted by William Carpenter in Democracy
and Representation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925, PP
.
 19 -20.
402 In Britain, political authority is balanced between the monarch, and the Houses of Lords
and Commons; there is not, however, a distinct division of labour relating to the law-making and
implementation processes amongst these entities. See Dicey's discussion of the origins of the
doctrine of the separation of powers in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1915 (re-print of 8th edition), pp.219-229.
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that was consistent with the interests of the "sovereign people" by making it particularly
difficult for special interests to capture the legislative process.
Constitutional rights theoretically work to contain the problem of faction as well. Such
rights, as earlier sections of this thesis have explained, are reflections of a society's
fundamental social values, and subject to what Joseph Raz termed "special institutional
treatment" in that they are not governed by ordinary legislative and administrative
processes; they operate to remove their objects from the political process. 403 Their
fulfillment serves to discipline law-making in that - along with the institution ofjudicial
review that has also been discussed - they allow individuals to formally question the
consistency of a given piece of legislation with the "sovereign will" embodied in the
constitution. The availability of this avenue of appeal operates to give the legislative
process a qualified political significance. As Arthur Hadley, in contrasting the British
legislative process with that in the US, explained:
"An act of the British Parliament is authoritative. It is law, ipso facto, as soon as it is
regularly passed. It cannot be resisted except by revolution. But an act of the United States
Congress or of a state legislature is not law except as it lies within the limits allowed by
the Constitution. Whether it transgresses these limits is a matter for the courts to decide".404
The reason why constitutional rights help to contain factions is related to a particular
problem that the representative process has in gauging the popular interest. This problem,
op. cit., Raz, pp. 257.
Hadley, A.T. Undercurrents in American Politics. London: Oxford University Press,
1915, p.42. A similar kind of "conditionality" exists in countries with systems of abstract
review. Significantly, however, the role played by individuals in assuring the constitutional
consistency of a given piece of legislation is different. The nature of these differences will be
examined in Part ifi of the thesis. See below, especially pp. 273 - 275.
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endemic within any democratic system, arises from inequalities in the individual faculties
of the men such processes are set-up to represent. These diverging natural capacities mean
that on any distributional questions that arise within the system, there is a corresponding
tendency for individual interests to splinter. "Sinister interests", or "common impulses
of passion... adverse to the rights of other citizens" arise when any subset of the voting
population large enough to form a majority determines that maintenance of whatever
allocational procedures have been instutionalised is no longer consonant with its interests 405
If these "passions" are not, in turn, calmed by reason, virtue, tradition or institutions, the
results can be literally revolutionary.
Factions - and, in particular, those arising from situations such as the one described in
the proceeding paragraph - constitute what might be characterised as an abiding dilemma
of representative government. The "solution" proffered by the US Constitution recognises
this dilemma as irreconcilable; it is the role of constitutional rights to keep the conflicts
it inevitably engenders from destroying the political system in which they arise. The
individual's right to invoke constitutional safeguards against legislative decisions taken
by a majority imparts a conservative bias on the operation of the latter institution. Although
the judicial processes he evokes interfere with the representative system's ability to
accommodate change rapidly, they are the foundation on which this variation of popular
democracy is constructed.
The term "sinister interests", according to Cecilia Kenyon, was that of Samuel Willard, a
Massachusetts clergyman. See the discussion in "Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America',
op. cit., pp. 88 - 89.
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The right to property contained in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions ensuring due process for the enforcement of
law as against the individual states are of particular relevance for this thesis' analysis of
the GPA. They serve as what Jennifer Nedeisky has described as "primary limits", on
the scope of government authority in the US:
"The protection of vested (property) rights from the encroachments of democratic
legislatures was the central issue on which the courts asserted their power to protect
individual rights from democratic attack. The inviolability of property was invoked to
show that both the Constitution and natural rights required judicially enforced limits to
the power of the majority. The Court became the guarantor and mediator of the basic
tension of the system - a tension which held property rights at its center".406
Earlier sections of this chapter have suggested that the American approach to political
organisation was a product of the "economic and political foment" of its times. This
foment, as the introduction to the thesis explained, was tied to the advent of the self-
regulating market economy in Europe, and, in particular, the Industrial Revolution in
England. Capitalism was starting to replace authoritarian and traditional approaches to
the management of man's "economic problem" with those of the market; in doing so, it
was also altering the face of political authority. The evolution of these changes, however,
was not consistent across sovereign jurisdictions. The response to them that came to be
embodied in the US Constitution, in particular, diverged from that of the European states
in which there was a tradition of military-based political authority. For this reason, one
final, general feature of the "constitutional landscapes" in which the GPA is to be applied
406 Nedelsky, J. "American Constitutionalism and Private Property" in op. cit.,
Constitutionalism and Democracy, edited by Jon Elster and R. Slagstad, p. 255 and 247,
respectively.
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must be mapped; that relating to differences between what might be described as states'
scopes and scales.
Diverging Scope and Scale of Liberal States: Internal Security and the "Dangerous
Doctrine" of Individual Rights
The political economists' "minimal state" was designed to facilitate the functioning of
civil society within a state, whilst reducing the number of potential circumstances in which
conflict between sovereigns might arise. Relative to the mercantilist doctrine it succeeded,
it entailed a drastic reduction in the scope of states' official duties. Significantly, however,
it did not substantially alter the state's powers relative to the individual. The introduction
of positive law to enable the recognition and exchange of private property did not entail
a corresponding emancipation of the individual within civil society. The scale of
government, in other words, remained unchanged; political power continued to be
concentrated in the hands of the sovereign, despite the fact that opportunities to use it
had been curtailed.
The reasons why the negative state emerged in this way are tied to the defense-related
"institutional ambiguities" described in earlier sections of this thesis. The international
problem with which they have come to be associated is, in turn, basically one of diverging
paths to liberalism. The first "path", that of the unitary sovereign, has just been described;
it proceeds from a communitarian notion of the social contract. In states of this nature,
liberalisation "flows downward", from the collective to the individual. It is typically driven
by the "public interest" - as defined by the sovereign - and a commitment to greater
individual equality. Sovereign authority in political settings of this nature remains, by
comparison with that of popular sovereigns, relatively absolute; "liberalism from above"
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does not diverge materially from the "institutional itinerary" proposed by the classical
political economists. The second "approach" to liberalisation, that of popular democracies
like the US, on the other hand, proceeds, from the micro to the macro, or the individual
to the collective; its guiding values are liberty and individualism. 407
 The liberal state that
is associated with this process is effectively a foregone conclusion; any other kind of
collective entity would be difficult to reconcile with the individualist social contract on
which it is postulated.
Why are there these differences in unitary and non-unitary states' "technologies" of
liberalism? What is their relationship to questions of domestic security and stability?
More importantly, how are they of relevance in a GPA context? The remainder of this
section considers these questions, concluding that any liberal representative government
must contend with the previously described "weaknesses in the natural conditions of men",
or, that is, their tendencies to submit to the "intellectual charms" of faction, coupled with
glaring inequalities in their individual abilities. If an institutional solution to this "dilemma
of representative government" cannot be found, "sinister interests" are likely to undermine
established political institutions. The American solution to this "dilemma" differs from
that of the democratic unitary state in that the US never had to contend with an existing
distribution of property that reflected a feudal legacy of ownership. Furthermore, initially,
the country was relatively unsettled. Individual rights, in an American political setting,
Britain, as has been mentioned before, is an exception to the "generic" unitary state
being described here in that its liberalisation, like that of the US, has been driven by the values of
liberty and individualism. In order to maintain the unitary authority of the British sovereign,
however, the English "technology" of liberalisation differed from that of the popular sovereigns
in that it proceeded from a stratified theory of society. For reasons that are about to be explained,
English liberty was, at least initially, conditioned on social position. See, as well, the discussion
in George Sabine's "The Two Democratic Traditions", op. cit., pp. 454 - 460.
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did not represent a "danger" to established authority in their own right. Indeed, for the
most part, they actually served to reinforce it.
Previous sections have outlined the way in which a sovereign's security-related obligations
complicate its management of the economy, focusing on external aspects of the problem.
Individuals' rational planning with respect to the exercise of their property rights could
not, it will be recalled, take place in the face of "irrational belligerency" between or amongst
sovereigns. The internal "face" of this institutional quandary might be described as a
derivative of diverging natural capacities in the individual faculties of men. Historically,
these differences have tended to make individual rights, starting with the right to vote,
a "dangerous proposition" for unitary sovereigns. In Britain, for example, they explain
the fact that five Parliamentary Reform Acts - those of 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918 and 1928 -
were necessary before the national franchise included virtually all adult subjects. 408 They
also account for "detours" that many of these states took along an alternate political path,
that of socialism. The reason why is associated with the fact that concentrated political
authority at some point has usually implied concentrated representative authority, as well.409
For the purposes of understanding rights' relevance in the context of the GPA, in any case,
a useful first step is to re-consider the various ways in which majoritarian government
408 op. cit., Morley, p. 27.
409 On the subject of socialism and democracy, Karl Polyani, in his classic study of the
political implications of liberalism, The Great Transformation: the political and economic
origins of our time, said: "Socialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial
civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a
democratic society. It is the solution natural to the industrial workers who see no reason why
production should not be regulated directly and why markets should be more than a useful but
subordinate trait in a free society..." The Great Transformation: the political and economic
origins of our time. Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1957, p. 234.
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is constrained under the US Constitution. In this political economic context, "anti-
democratic mechanisms", consisting of the separation of political powers, the use of law
to confine these powers, and constitutional rights are all employed. Each of these, it will
be recalled, was a considered response to the inherent vulnerability of democratic republics
to the problem of faction. Furthermore, because of the so-called "natural weaknesses"
of men, the Founding Fathers saw this problem as being particularly acute in the context
of property. The safeguards for private property that came to be reflected in the American
political system reflect an implicit assumption that capitalism cannot be sustained in a
purely representative democracy.
The unitary state's diverging path to liberalism, on this view, is a product of its approach
to the distribution of political authority. Power has always been institutionally concentrated
in the unitary sovereign; rights against the state - including those of property - have been
antithetic, at least until fairly recently. As the liberal unitary state has gradually grown
more democratic during the past two hundred years, the political consequences of this
form of organisation have been, at times, forbidding, at least from an establishment
perspective. A unitary state is premised on a vision of citizen interests that assumes that
they are homogeneous. When the results of its democratic processes indicate otherwise,
suggesting, for example, that a majority of the population may not be in favour of the
continuation of the existing distribution of property, what happens?
First, it should be underscored that if inequalities in the abilities of men are assumed,
differences of political opinion amongst them are probable. When such controversies
arise in the context of distributional questions, it is not unlikely, furthermore, that they
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will be particularly impassioned. 41 ° Great strides have been made in resolving man's
"economic problem"; nevertheless, it is still the central one in most individuals' existences
today.41' This situation clearly has the potential to pose a serious threat to the established
order. Given these circumstances, how has the unitary state been able to maintain domestic
peace and security? The answer, as one might expect, has often been collective in nature.
It has also, in keeping with the unitary state's "top-down" approach to political authority,
entailed appeasement of the relatively-unpropertied majority. Employing terminology
used earlier in this thesis, the "solution" has often consisted of "positive" duties for the
negative state, or re-distributive state initiatives, designed to "smooth" the inevitable social
inequalities generated by the market. So as to maintain domestic security and stability,
in other words, the omnipotent unitary sovereign has assumed responsibility for the
correction of certain "social evils" that might befall hapless citizens.4t2
410 It is, of course, also assumed that men have not become significantly more virtuous
during the 200-plus years in which the liberal state has existed.
"' Whether this is true across sovereign jurisdictions raises interesting questions, albeit ones
that are beyond the scope of this thesis. In 1930, John Keynes wrote an article in which he
argued that the "economic problem" was not the "permanent problem of the human race".
Increasingly, he said, "...man will be faced with his real permanent problem - how to use his
freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound
interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well..." "Economic Possibilities
For Our Grandchildren", in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume IX, Essays
in Persuasion, edited by the Royal Economic Society. London: MacMillan, 1972, p. 328.
412 Positive economic policies were, of course, also introduced by non-unitary sovereigns.
According to Sidney Fine, however, these typically differed from those of unitary sovereigns in
that "... they were not conceived.., in terms of certain specific functions of government, such as
social security or the maintenance of full employment... (Rather, they reflected an assumption)
that government could promote the public interest by appropriate positive action and that its
authority should therefore be invoked whenever the circumstances indicated that such action
would further the common weal..." The state, on this view, was seen "as servant rather than as
master..." Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American
Thought 1865 - 1901. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956, p. 375.
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Previous sections of this thesis have also described how the positive policies of the liberal
state evolved earlier this century, highlighting their potential relationship to a society's
values, the manner in which they came to be institutionalised in the post-war trading system
and the influential role John Keynes played in this process. The 50 years that have passed
since the GATT came into existence have not changed the "natural conditions" and
weaknesses of men. What has changed, and changed dramatically, however, is the scope
of the market. The section that follows returns to the GPA as a mechanism for the
reconciliation of diverging domestic policies. The GPA, that is, as an institutional
methodology for resolving political problems stemming, ultimately, from the fact that
different civil societies underlie each of the markets that are amalgamated under the accord.
It illustrates how the disciplines embodied in the Agreement are structured around an
American vision regarding the appropriate relationship between property and political
authority, contending that this, finally, is the most important kind of "intervention"
associated with the accord. A concluding section, examining the political implications
of such an institutional approach follows. Focusing on the "public good" that is represented
by international order, the inherently heterogeneous nature of the interests that the latter
must accommodate, the way in which reciprocity facilitates the factoring of local values
and preferences into this cooperative proposition, as well as the fact that every obligation
that Member States have assumed under the GPA is voluntary, it resolves that the
Agreement should be viewed as the best solution available, given the fact that the nation
state remains the central focus of social order. "Constitutionalisation" of the rights arising
from the international economic order is a means to the end of safeguarding the "public
good' it represents.
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2.4	 Balancing Collectivism and Individualism: The GPA as a Reflection of the
American Vision of Property
Although the individual rights arising from the GPA are generally indirect and, furthermore,
require that Member States take positive legislative steps if they are to take precedence
over national rules with which they may be in conflict, their purpose is to judicialise the
domestic application of the accord. The political significance of this process lies in the
fact that it involves a screening of certain areas of individual activity from the unequivocal
control of national governments: The Agreement's "transparency obligations" first create
corresponding individual rights of national treatment. Operating in conjunction with the
due process-like review mechanism, these "common rules" and their corresponding rights
define a "transnational policy terrain". It is administered by the executive officials of
Member States, acting as "agents" on behalf of international order. Individual property
rights exercised within this domain are shielded from domestic political processes to the
extent that they fall within the jurisdiction of the "common rules".
In thinking about practical difficulties that may be related to GPA implementation and
normative questions surrounding the "intervention" that the Agreement entails, it is useful
to consider precisely how its regulatory logic is aligned with the political theory that is
embodied in the popular sovereign, and, more particularly, that of the US. There are three
primary areas in which the GPA's "technology of liberalisation" parallels that of the
Americans. They include its: 1) approach to rule-making and enforcement that entails
a separation of political powers, combined with recognition of the judicial branch of
government as arbitrator on questions concerning the boundaries of power; 2) use of law
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to define and discipline these powers and; 3) tacit assumption that there are individual
rights prior to government and that the powers of the latter are inherently limited.
Earlier sections of this thesis have described the political function of the institution of
the separation of powers. Political authority is divided amongst different branches of
government to stimulate intra-govemmental competition for its use. In this way,
"democratic dangers" associated with concentrated state power are eased. A legalised
political community, as will be explained in the next section, is also engendered in that
the separation of powers is realised through law. Indeed, there can be no political division
of labour such as that existing between the three branches of American government without
a definitive way of allocating the rights and duties of authority, and a neutral entity for
resolving differences of opinion regarding the distribution of authority.
The GPA structures the exercise of executive authority by obliging its Member States
to institute formal procedures to govern administrative activities that take place in the
context of public procurement. This "structuring process" establishes a division of labour
between the legislative and executive branches of participating Governments, relating,
specifically, to the administration of the "common rules" embodied in the treaty. In most
Memberjurisdictions, this separation develops along the following lines: Operating under
its foreign policy prerogative, the executive has negotiated the treaty on a Government's
behalf and signed the accord. Subsequently, the National legislature has accepted the
treaty's obligations as binding and introduced any implementing legislation that may be
required in order to realise them. The new legislation, in keeping with the parameters
of the treaty, specifies detailed, procedural duties for the executive administrators who
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are going to be charged with its implementation. These duties circumscribe administrative
discretion; in doing so, they "ring-fence" the job of the executive. If an official
subsequently fails to respect the rules, he is exceeding the executive authority that has
been delegated to him. The court-like avenues which Member States must provide for
the review of administrative compliance with the accord, in turn, create an arbitrator's
role for the judicial branches of their governments. Courts are charged with resolving
questions relating to the allocation of authority under the Agreement; they, accordingly,
possess the authority to define the boundary that the rules have created between law and
politics in this context.413
For reasons that have been described earlier in this chapter, if there were no American-style
separation of political powers under the GPA, there would be no need for its detailed
tendering procedures. From the "constitutional perspective" of any of its individual unitary
state members, parliamentary interests and those of administrative officials are generally
aligned; executive administrators have few political incentives not to act iii accordance
with Parliamentary will. Formal tendering procedures are largely superfluous, at least
from a national perspective. Indeed, because of the way in which political authority is
structured in the unitary state, "democratic dangers" to the domestic order usually come
under a different guise entirely. Earlier chapters have referred to the differing historical
roles of the legislative branch of government in unitary and popular sovereigns; the latter
The potential political significance of this role has been described by Jennifer Nedeisky
in "Confining Democratic Politics: The Anti-Federalists, Federalists and the Constitution".
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, December 1982, p. 354 - 355. The basic idea is one of
defining politics and law as "distinct spheres", and "insulating within the latter" a society's most
fundamental issues and threatened values. Designating an issue to be legal rather than political,
in this sense, defines the terms in which it will be considered, and thus replaces what Nedeisky
terms "far-reaching debate" with the "fine points of rule application".
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are structured around a premise that it constitutes the greatest potential threat to democracy,
whereas, in the former, parliaments have been the primary agents of democracy. Since
the beginnning of this century, these positions have been converging. Postwar economic,
political and legal integration, in particular, have been associated with a growing prevalence
of constitutional disciplines to formally control the exercise of representative authority.
To this day, however, there remain fundamental differences between the way in which
unitary and popular sovereigns apply such "higher order" law. Many Continental European
states, for example, practice forms of abstract judicial review that need not even involve
individuals in the invoking of constitutional norms. In keeping with the two, contrasting
democratic traditions that were introduced at the outset of this thesis, the very purpose
of these disciplines is different. In the unitary state, their objective is most commonly
to correct representative failures, and thereby maintain the vitality of the self-governing,
national political community. The American approach, on the other hand, privileges the
interests of the individual over the collective, and undertakes judicial review primarily
to safeguard the former from the latter. As Allan Brewer-CarIas has explained:
"European continental countries adopted the review of the constitutionality of laws
following a different path from that of the system in the United States. The European
phenomenon occurred less in response to a problem of legal logic than to political logic.
It was the fear of oppression by a parliamentary majority, which was decisive in the change
of the position of the continental European countries regarding their review of the
constitutionality of laws... the myth of representativeness of the general will as expressed
by those elected... (had) broken down..."4t4
The second way in which the GPA is consistent with a programme of "liberalism from
below" is related to the fact that, in "structuring the exercise of executive discretion, the
Agreement inevitably "legalises" the processes of public procurement that it governs.
414 op. cit., Brewer-CarIas, p. 115.
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The separation of political powers that the Agreement facilitates also serves the broader
purpose of defining these powers and disciplining them. This process proceeds from
Member States' assumption of the fundamental duty embodied in the GPA. Negative
in nature, it involves an obligation not to discriminate "among foreign products or services
or among foreign suppliers or service providers".4t5
 The effect of this duty is to limit
government powers exercised in the context of public procurement. For reasons that were
outlined in chapter 1.4, it is, however, more of a "political aspiration" than a legal
obligation. Treaties, like other laws, are enforceable in courts only if they impose duties
sufficiently well-specified to bejudiciable. Treaty-engendered "aspirations", on the other
hand, are for the political branches of government to assess. In this sense, the indirect
"private rights" that flow from the GPA's positive "transparency duties", coupled with
the new national court-like avenues in which they can be invoked, are a means to the end
of judicialising the rights and obligations that arise from this Agreement. Such rights
clarify the obligations stemming from Member States' negative duty of non-discrimination.
They are necessary because each state has a different conception of property, and, thus,
differing rights and privileges of ownership. The "common rules", in this sense, embody
minimum international rights of ownership and identify the parties that possess them.
In conjunction with the "challenge mechanism" through which they can be invoked, they
serve to legalise and, thus, "de-politicise" the application of this treaty.
One further important parallel exists between the institutional methodology of the GPA
and the relationship between private parties and the state under the US Constitution.
Related to the "process of legalisation" described in the proceeding paragraph, it involves
415 op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 6.
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the fact that the accord effectively recognises certain closely circumscribed individual
rights that are prior to the law, specifically those of ownership defined by the 'common
rules", as well as a right to equality before the law, or "due process" for its enforcement.
The GPA, in this sense, is consistent with a political philosophy that proceeds from an
assumption that power resides ultimately in the hands of the people, and that the authority
of government is inherently limited.
Proceeding paragraphs have described how the OPA's "common rules" define a series
of international rights and privileges of ownership. Although, as has been explained, these
rights are indirect and do not automatically take precedence over national rules with which
they may be in conflict, they operate, in conjunction with the GPA's review-like
enforcement mechanism, in a constitutional manner nonetheless. That is, as if they were
rights and privileges prior to the law, or "limiting values" conditioning the exercise of
representative authority. The purpose of the GPA, more particularly, is to ensure "fair"
administrative processes, whilst facilitating liberalisation and growth. The obligation
that Member States have assumed under Article XX of the treaty is central to this objective;
it amounts to a moral commitment to ensure that administrative decisions taken under
the Agreement will not be biased and/or taken without giving the party or parties a chance
to put their case. A "vague" constitution-like duty, it creates a corresponding individual
right to equality before the law, or due process for the enforcement of the law. This duty
is designed to discipline the national application of the law, whatever it may be. In an
international setting, the application of vague constitution-like standards is problematic
in that there is no "common conception" on which to assess Member States' compliance
with them. The "common rules" embodied in the GPA, in defining minimum international
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rights and privileges of property, reconcile this problem. If the individual rights to national
treatment that they engender are violated, a state has breached its duty to respect suppliers'
equality before the law. To the extent that a violation impinges upon the minimum rights
and privileges of property embodied in the rights to national treatment, in other words,
it is inconsistent with a supplier's right to due process for the enforcement of the law.
In this sense, then, there are two, distinct "constitutionalised rights" emanating from this
treaty: a closely-circumscribed right to property, as well as one to equality before the law,
or "due process" for its enforcement.
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Part III - Intervention and the GPA: Why Have Parties' Accepted these
Disciplines? Can the Agreement be Effective?
Earlier sections of this thesis have justified the legislative and administrative intervention
associated with the GPA on the basis of the fact that all of the duties arising from the treaty
are voluntary, closely circumscribed and, most importantly, enable Member States to
achieve self-determined ends that they could not otherwise hope to attain. This conclusion
was reinforced by the role that reciprocity has played in the exchange of market access
concessions under the Agreement, and the way in which its new enforcement mechanism -
and absence of an escape clause - ensure that the benefits it engenders are credible. How,
then, does the more political, or "constitutional intervention" embodied in the Agreement's
overall regulatory methodology affect this assessment? In particular, do the fundamental
individual rights recognised by the accord - despite their indirect status and "self-determined
hierarchical ranking" vis-à-vis domestic law - represent a more serious "assault" on the
unitary sovereign's authority? If so, why have Member States been prepared to accept
this?
The answer to the first of these questions is a qualified one: Yes, the "rights" engendered
by the GPA do tend to subvert the structure of a unitary sovereign's authority, but, in a
globalising world, this is ultimately inevitable if the latter process is to continue, and,
furthermore, "subversion" of this nature is not new.416
 In addition, the GPA's particular
"institutional methodology" strictly confines the intervention that takes place in a given
sovereign jurisdiction. Member States' discretionary control over their procurement
416 The "intervention" associated with the Treaty of Rome, as has been explained, provides
an extreme, but apt example. See footnote 275 above, p. 155.
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processes, as has been demonstrated, remains virtually complete; only the particular
administrative activities that fall under the jurisdiction of the "quasi-legal" common rules
are subject to the voluntary constraints. The reasons why these sovereign entities have
been willing to accept such discipline, in turn, are fundamentally derived from challenges
they face in fulfilling what this thesis has described as elementary duties of the negative
state, specifically maintaining national security and ensuring the integrity of citizens' civil
rights.
National defense constitutes what has been termed the "first duty" of the liberal state.
It is a sovereign obligation that exists regardless of the way in which the exercise of
authority is structured in any particular national jurisdiction. The problem with which
GPA Member State governments are contending, in this respect, has arisen from the fact
that globalisation and the extranational division of labour that is following in its wake
are making the integrity of the market as a whole a factor of growing importance in each
state's assessment of its security interests; national defense, paradoxically, is becoming
difficult to maintain independently. Equally bad, if not worse, at least from the point of
view of the beleaguered individual sovereign, positive steps that it may wish to take to
maintain domestic stability and security can now be foiled by the same external market
pressures. For example, the international integration of financial markets means that
measures that a government may introduce to stem high rates of unemployment are difficult
to sustain if they seriously undermine market perceptions with respect to local
macroeconomic fundamentals. A good example of this - albeit one that is undoubtedly
most directly related to stringent EMU guidelines for deficit reduction - is provided by
the challenge that Main Jospin's Socialist Government in France recently faced to find
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non-deficit sources funding for a youth employment scheme that is going to add roughly
350,000 young people to public payrolls over the coming 5 years.417 As Mr Jospin, himself,
put it at his Party's annual summer meeting when Communist members of his parliamentary
coalition were criticising his Government's market "pragmatism", socialists must
"emphasize the attention... (given) to the creation of wealth, not its redistribution".418
Protecting the civil rights of citizens is another fundamental duty of the liberal sovereign;
in this context, globalisation is creating a situation in which threats to these rights may
arise in a part of the market that lies outside of a sovereign's legal jurisdiction. This
situation is particularly problematic for the popular sovereign whose duties relative to
the individual citizen - and, certainly, the individual property owner - tend to be clearly
delimited. 419
 Recent unilateral measures that the US Government has taken to safeguard
the property interests of its nationals in foreign jurisdictions such as, for example, the
notorious Helms-Burton Act are a reflection of ways in which powerful sovereigns have
responded to this contextual challenge. Another illustration is provided by the response
of the European Union to the consolidation that is occurring in the US aerospace sector,
and, specifically, the recently concluded merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.
Lavin, D. "Common Ground: French Socialists Swallow a Dose of Economic Reality".
Wall Street Journal Europe, 3 September 1997, p. 3 and p. 5. Gunnar Myrdal's previously-
quoted remarks concerning the way in which political economic phenomena are inevitably
connected with other political economic phenomena in the "social flux" probably bear re-
iteration here. See above, pp. 113-114. Most importantly, if the French Government were
operating in a political economic context over which it exercised complete control, Jospin would
certainly not have been forced to contend with the same kind of political challenges when
introducing his new "make-work" scheme.
418	 ibid., p. 5.
Sub-federal entities' duties relative to the individual can also be well-specified.
Contention arguably relating to this possibility has recently arisen amongst GPA Members in the
context of a Massachusetts law that prohibits companies that do business
with Burma from obtaining government contracts.
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Before this merger could proceed, its partners effectively had to concede to certain
conditions posed by the Commission, e.g. Boeing's elimination of its 20-year "sole-supplier"
contracts with commercial carriers.420
Each of these actions would suggest that an important change in the political economic
context in which WTO Member Governments must operate is underway. The GPA can
be viewed as a response to this change. From the perspective of any one of its individual
Member States, it is an institutional vehicle for augmenting the regulatory "powers" that
they, as independent sovereign entities, possess. The political logic that the Agreement
embodies is premised on the fact that as market access questions have developed strategic
significance, a "common international interest" in the well-being of the market as a social
institution has started to emerge amongst WTO participants. This "shared concern" is
altering the dynamics of cooperation within the international economic order; strictly
competitive association between independent sovereign entities is being replaced by a
more cooperative - albeit still fundamentally competitive - variation on the concept.
Whereas, previously, the international economic order sought solely to reduce trade barriers
between distinct national markets, interdependence is bringing recognition of the fact
that the benefits of a wider division of labour can neither be achieved nor sustained without,
in addition, a measure of international coordination as regards the positive law that
facilitates the realisation of individual ends within any given national market. Just as
law of this nature was necessary to facilitate the realisation of such ends within a national
setting, in other words, so, too, is a basic framework of rules a prerequisite for the operation
4	 .	 ,	 .	 ,,	 .	 .
- de Jonquieres, 0. Storm over the Atlantic . The Financial Tunes, 22 May 1997.
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of a market whose confines are not necessarily conterminous with those of any particular
sovereign jurisdiction.
"Lessons" from EU integration, once again, offer additional insights regarding these
contextual changes. Ones that relate, more specifically, to the relatively "efficient"
regulatory methodology that is embodied in the GPA, and, thus, shed further light on why
its Member States may have been willing to accept the kind of political intervention that
it entails. Jacques Pelkmans, it will be recalled, described the process of economic
integration in Europe on the basis of a quest to find the right balance between regulatory
liberalisation and harmonisation. One of the first lessons to be gleaned relating to this
"balance" was that a programme of negative liberalisation needed to be complimented
by positive regulatory measures designed to facilitate the functioning of integrated parts
of an economy. Practically speaking, this "institutional insight" had little impact until
the Community changed its strategy of positive policy coordination from one of total "ex
ante harrnonisation" to one of minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition. The
operation of this new strategy, in turn, was facilitated by the introduction of "qualified
majority voting", a variation on one-state, one-vote representation in the Council, the
political body having the authority to take collective regulatory decisions, and - at least
in a procurement context - an enforcement mechanism designed to ensure the uniform
application of the minimally harmonised or "common rules". External market pressures,
as chapter 1.3 explained, were an important additional factor in generating the political
will that was ultimately necessary in order to realise market integration at this level.42'
'' According to Willem Molle's previously-cited text on European integration, the idea of
levels, or "stages of economic integration" was originally developed by B. Balassa in his 1961
classic, The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood: Irwin Publishers, Inc. See the
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The overall result of these incremental developments was a change in the political dynamics
of European economic cooperation. The opportunity costs of non-cooperation, in particular,
had become significant factors in the "regulatory equation" needing to be evaluated by
each of the Community's participating sovereigns. Active non-cooperation, in the form
of contingent protection, furthermore, could no longer be proffered by any one of them
on a politically costless basis.
3.1	 Efficiency and the GPA
The EU's particular pattern of institutional evolution, as Part I intimated, might be
characterised on the basis of some of Douglass North's ideas relating to the "efficiency"
of institutions and economic performance over time. Institutions, on this view, are man-
made constraints that shape human interaction, affecting the costs of production and
exchange; they facilitate social cooperation by reducing uncertainty and promoting mutual
understanding. Two kinds of institutions exist, formal and informal ones. The latter are
"culturally derived" and commonly exercise precedence over the former when the two
are at odds; they include things like local or tacit knowledge, values and other social factors
that define and limit the economic choices of individuals. 422
 Formal institutions, on the
other hand, serve the same purpose, but consist of state-enforced, coercive rules that dictate
the structure of political authority, the rights of property, and the laws of contract.
Significantly, as the scope and scale of economic transactions has increased with economic
and technological progress, the social importance of formal institutions has expanded.
This is tied to compliance-related problems; the returns on opportunism, cheating and
discussion in op. cit., pp. 12- 15.
422 op. cit., North, p. 45.
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the shirking of social obligation - or what this thesis has generally described as "free-riding"
on order - have all risen as economic relationships have grown more complex and
impersonal.423
Amongst institutions, there is a continuum of "efficiency". According to North, efficient
institutions are those that minimise the extent to which non-wealth maximising motivations
influence the choices of economic actors; they facilitate growth. Those that are formal
tend only to evolve when economic actors with the bargaining power to devise new rules
determine that such efficiency is consistent with their private interests. In this sense, what
has occurred in European context is that a premium has been placed on the development
of efficient institutions, both nationally and supranationally. As chapter 1.3 explained,
the overall result of the various incremental changes - or the balance that has been struck
between regulatory liberalisation and harmonisation - has been the emergence of a context
in which positive incentives have been created for firms to lobby their national governments
to adopt regulations that indirectly enhance the efficiency of existing, relatively efficient
Community institutions by reducing remaining regulatory discrepancies amongst its
individual sovereign participants.
A few words must be said, in conclusion, to emphasise the way in which globalisation
has affected the behaviour of firms, or what North called "organisations", as well as the
Recent developments in sectors that are particularly advanced technologically would
suggest that this may not be a trend that will continue, eg. the dwindling of the number of
suppliers in the automotive sector and the close, informal working relationships that have
developed between the former and their clients, particularly as regards the development of new
products. This raises interesting regulatory questions; ones, however, that are beyond the scope
of this thesis in that they relate more to how an Agreement like the GPA might evolve rather than
why the existing Agreement is structured as it is.
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sovereigns that regulate their activities. The express purpose of entities of the former
nature is to take advantage of the economic opportunities a society's institutions create.
In pursuing such purposes, firms play a critically important role in institutional change,
at least in sovereign states with formal democratic political institutions; institutions enable
and constrain them. The first part of this chapter concluded that globalisation has
complicated the regulatory job of the state by making it difficult for it achieve its
autonomous ends independently. It has also, in a similar way, introduced new pressures
on corporate management. Firms in globally competitive sectors are subject to an
externally-imposed discipline that comes from greater competition in all of the markets
that affect their operations. The existence of world prices for their goods or services, as
well as the acquisitive demands of private and public investors are particularly significant
in this sense. They are making tacit knowledge and the reduction of uncertainty more
important than ever for economic decision-makers. 424
 Barring government intervention,
in time, it is likely that only adaptively efficient firms will be able to survive in this
competitive environment. This situation is causing the 'organisations" in question to
become proactive advocates of efficient institutions. Such advocacy is, in turn, flowing
over borders because of the relentless pressure that these firms are under to augment their
profitability. Developed country markets are mature in many sectors; the most significant
growth opportunities for individual firms are, thus, often to be found in emerging markets.
Such pressures also affect a society's informal institutions. For example, the fact that
Japan's economy is export-based is making it increasingly impossible for that country to maintain
its cultural tradition of lifetime employment. Similarly, heretofore collegial corporate
governance in Germany is being revolutionised by increasingly activist shareholders. In a
somewhat different, but, altogether related vein, new financial instruments like derivatives are
being constantly developed to help firms in the management of risk.
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These opportunities are generating strong incentives for such entities to actively support
efficient institutional change in societies other than those from which they have emerged.
Assuming these "lessons" from EU integration are more or less applicable to the
institutional context in which the GPA has evolved, the WTO Agreement might be
described, fundamentally, as a relatively efficient response to the increasingly intense
external market pressures to which its Member States and their constituents are exposed.
Because of its "quasi-legal" character and the strictly reciprocical way in which its benefits
and burdens are distributed, Member states have retained a significant amount of discretion
over their participation in this formal institution; nevertheless, the simple fact that an
"interventionary" accord of this nature has been agreed would suggest that there is a
growing awareness of the opportunity costs associated with non-cooperative regulatory
practices. Whereas arguments for multilateral liberalisation have traditionally emphasised
the potential gains to be achieved from the reduction of trade barriers, this Agreement,
on the other hand, is a manifestation of its Members' desire to stem the costs that are now
potentially associated with regulatory independence. The fact that an exceedingly diverse
series of national institutional constraints must be accommodated in a WTO setting is
arguably related to the various ways in which this Agreement departs from efficiency.
Those features of the GPA that differ from the European public procurement regime on
which it was largely modelled - like its limited membership and reciprocity-based
discriminatory features - are particularly significant in this respect.
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3.2	 Constitutional Implications of the GPA; the Thesis' Contribution
Many of the issues that have been under consideration in this section were considered
in the introduction to this thesis in the context of a broader discussion of the constitutional
function of the international economic order. That dialogue, it will be recalled, proceeded
from an outline of the two major political purposes of constitutions, namely, the structuring
of the exercise of political authority, and the privileging of certain individual interests
relative to those of the collective; it highlighted the work of Jan Tumlir relating to way
in which the postwar trading system has functioned in the former sense, structuring the
authority exercised by its Member States in their trade policy-making processes. The
fundamental purpose of the economic order, as conceived by the "economic-constitutional
analysts", is to facilitate peaceful, international commercial relations by discouraging the
use of trade policies with market distorting effects and/or negative international
externalities. A few remarks were also offered concerning Tumlir's less-than-fully
developed ideas relating to the second constitutional function - that of rights relative to
the collective - and how the GATT would need to change in order to fulfill its constitutional
role more completely. Particular changes that he felt were appropriate included: the
introduction of common, domestic laws based on free market principles; a reinforced,
"rigid commitment" to the principles of non-discrimination: review-like domestic
institutions, and; a formal departure from the then-to-fore rigid GATT norm of
multilateralism. The introduction concluded, finally, that questions of political "cost"
had inhibited development of a broader constitutional role for the multilateral trading
system. Herein Tumlir's comments relating to the way in which the postwar order has
traditionally been viewed as a "painful constraint on economic sovereignty" were cited;
the thesis suggested that the GAiTs failure to provide effective domestic policy disciplines
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was a "particularly vivid" reflection of the institutional "cost structure" associated with
Contracting Parties' "inviolable sovereign freedoms". In addition to the inherent threats
to sovereign autonomy potentially posed by more cooperative rule-making, a further
"costly" complication in this respect stemmed from the difficulty of quantifying the
potential benefits likely to be generated by such endeavours.
The domestic policy disciplines embodied in the GPA would suggest that there is now
a need to revise some of these ideas regarding the constitutional function of the international
economic order. Something, more precisely, has happened to change the cost-related
factors that have heretofore inhibited development of a broader constitutional role for
the multilateral trading system. The GPA, in addition, corresponds in important ways
with each of the remedies that Tumlir proposed for the GAIT's constitutional infirmities.
This thesis' study of the institutional evolution of this Agreement offers insights as to what
may have changed, as well as how the trading system might assume fuller constitutional
responsibilities in future. The remainder of the thesis summarises these "lessons"; they
constitute its academic contribution.
What has changed contextually for WTO members, provided the lessons from EU
integration generally apply to the cooperation that is manifest in the GPA, is that
globalisation is enhancing the political significance of the public good that is represented
by the international economic order. This development, as the first part of this chapter
explained, is tied to the costs that are now recognised as being potentially associated with
regulatory independence. Incentives for cooperation in the provision of order, in turn,
are reinforced by the activities of individual economic agents, or what North called
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"organisations". These advocates for efficient institutions are well-organised and not
necessarily bound to any particular sovereign jurisdiction.
The potential benefits, or, more accurately, forestalled losses associated with regulatory
rapprochement across national domains of order, however, still must be balanced against
the political costs of not maintaining a more conventional regulatory stance. The
fundamental problem with multilateral domestic disciplines has always been and continues
to be the fact that states do not share common visions of the "political good", broadly
defined, and how it is to be achieved. Each of their economic systems, as earlier sections
of this thesis have explained, is theoretically premised on different value judgements
relating to how the advantages of social cooperation are to be achieved and distributed;
"common rules" and "constitutional rights", such as those embodied in the GPA. can
undermine these potentially principled positions. Rights against the state, in particular,
are usually justified as means to the end of safeguarding a society's fundamental values.
Does this then, therefore, imply that GPA Member States necessarily share similar values
with respect to either property, or fairness in the context of their relationships with its
owners?
In a word, no. Rather, at a minimum, all that these nation states necessarily have in
common is a recognition of the value of the market as a social institution, or decision
procedure; the order engendered by the GPA is, first and foremost, instrumental to the
integrity of a wider, transnational market. Part II of this thesis, however, showed how
the Agreement's "transparency procedures" effectively define minimum international "rights
of property" that, in conjunction with the "vague" due process-like obligation of Article
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XX of the GPA, operate to secure a "common conception of administrative fairness".
This conception clarifies the parameters of a second, corresponding "right" to supplier
equality before the law. Parallels between the existence of these two "rights" and the
relationship between property and the state under the US Constitution, in turn, were
identified, including, most importantly, the GPA's tacit assumption that there are rights
prior to government and that the powers of the latter are inherently limited. Is all of this,
then, not evidence of at least a shared conception of administrative fairness in the context
of public procurement?
The answer to this question is that the instrumental and indirect nature of the rights flowing
from the OPA makes it difficult to think of them relative to the kind of value debate that
is inherently reflected in any national constitution. Rights are commonly conceived as
being in opposition to the demands of the collective, at least as they are expressed through
the legislative branches of a democratic government. They are not subject to a sovereign's
ordinary legislative and administrative processes because they relate to matters a society
has determined should be "above" the law, or left within the realms of individual
sovereignty. The relationship between individual freedoms of this nature and a society's
political culture, in other words, is such that they must be protected from the vagaries
of day-to-day politics. The "constitutional rights" flowing from GPA, on the other hand,
have been described as primarily "means" to the end of safeguarding a "collective good".
Whilst they privilege the interests of individual suppliers relative to the public under certain
closely circumscribed conditions, they do this indirectly and primarily to achieve a
collective end, namely non-discriminatory liberalisation of public procurement markets
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covered by the Agreement. Is there some kind of crossing of political purposes here?
If so, how might such a discrepancy be understood?
The thesis' "gambol through the political theory" of order suggested an alternative way
of thinking about the political function of some constitutional rights. That of Joseph Raz,
it is premised on the idea that rights are neither inherently independent of collective goods,
nor essentially opposed to them. The liberal tradition, according to Raz, has always been
"ambivalent on the role and justification of fundamental rights". 425 For this reason, he
argued, it is important to remember that "Many rights were advocated and fought for in
the name of individual freedom... (but) this was done against a social background which
secured collective goods without which those individual goods would not have served
their avowed purpose". Rights thus "both depend on and serve collective goods". He
proposed, therefore, that some of them be considered as mechanisms for the protection
of public goods, via a division of power between the various branches of government.
Making a distinction between the basic political culture of a country and its more detailed
and transient regulatory arrangements, Raz argued that rights can facilitate the protection
of the former; the role that courts are allocated in overseeing them is, in this sense, a way
of assuring a society that its political culture will be preserved and that at least a minimum
measure of social continuity will be maintained. This, he concluded, does not remove
the object of a right from political strife. Rather, it is merely "designed to make it change
op. cit., Raz, p. 250. The following discussion summarises pp. 250 - 263 of this book.
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in response to different social processes from those which determine ordinary political
change" •426
If this perspective on the political function of rights is adopted, those flowing from the
GPA might be characterised as being fundamentally instrumental to Member States'
collective end of maintaining economic order. The unorthodox institutional methodology
that the Agreement employs is, in this sense, essentially an innovative way of securing
such order and allocating its costs. 427
 One that does not necessarily preclude the existence
of common values with respect to property and fairness amongst its Members, but, more
importantly, specifies minimum formal perceptions of them as a means of creating a legally
recognisable boundary between policy matters that remain under the jurisdiction of local
political processes and those that, on the other hand, are subject to the internationally-agreed
rules and enforcement procedures. The purpose of the "rights" of property and equality
before the law created by the GPA is, in this sense, to clarify the limits of "sovereign
freedom" within this limited polylateral policy context, and grant the judicial branches
of Member State governments the authority to determine whether an issue is legal, or
political.
426 ibid., p. 260. It is interesting to note, in addition, that Raz clearly specifies that his
perspective on the political function of rights does not necessarily entail the "existence of
written, entrenched bills of rights". Rather, he says, it applies "wherever there is legal tradition
which views the defence of civil rights as a special charge of the judiciary... The existence of a
formal constitution may contribute to the formation and to the political defence of those
traditions. But this depends on its use rather than its existence". See the discussion on pp. 258 -
259.
427 Another way of looking at this might be in terms of the fact that globalisation has not
resolved problems stemming from the fact that there is no international sovereign to pay for and
enforce international economic order. In this sense, the purpose of the GPA is to reconcile major
political problems - in an international public procurement policy context - caused by the lack of
such an entity.
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To bring this discussion back to Tumlir's constitutional concepts, it is useful, in conclusion,
to distinguish between the objectives of the GPA and its regulatory methodology. Whereas
GAIT trade policy disciplines supposedly served the "constitutional function" of structunng
domestic trade policy processes, the GPA might be described as a restraint on its Members'
administration of domestic laws, practices and procedures that have the potential to
undermine their fundamental negative commitment to non-discriminatory public
procurement. In this sense, just as the GATT's trade policy proscriptions correct the
"executive failures" that are implicit in discriminatory trade policies, the GPA remedies
"administrative failures" that are manifest in discriminatory tendering practices, structuring
the executive discretion that has been delegated to officials responsible for the
implementation of public procurement policies and procedures; employing Tumlir's
terminology, it serves the purpose of "rigidifying" Member States' commitment to non-
discrimination.
This relatively innocuous constitutional objective, however, does not detract from the
fact that the methodology that the GPA employs is fundamentally an American one, and,
in this sense, potentially interventionary, depending on the particular "constitutional
landscape" in which it is to be applied. Part II of this thesis showed how the Agreement's
"technology of liberalisation" paralleled that of the US, namely by separating the public
procurement-related rule-making, implementation and enforcement activities of its Member
States, using law to define and discipline the various powers, and implicitly assuming
that there are supplier "rights" prior to government. At the same time, Raz' approach to
understanding the political function of constitutional rights would also appear to be
consistent with popular sovereignty as it practised by the Americans; the "arbitrators role"
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that he envisaged for the judiciary is consistent with that of the courts in a state in which
legal sovereignty lies with the people and not their elected agents. Surely, then, this
situation presents political problems that may be somewhat more difficult to resolve in
a transnational context?
Once again, however, benefits are to be gained by those possessing the patience to take
a closer look at an apparent "consistency". The GPA's methodology is consonant with
an American approach to order, but, more importantly, it is also not inconsistent with
that of what this thesis has termed the "generic unitary sovereign". In this respect, the
nature of the damages available under the provisions of Article XX of this Agreement
is particularly significant. Its paragraph 7(c) reads:
"(Challenge procedures shall provide for) correction of the breach of the Agreement or
compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to costs for tender
preparation or protest".428
Herein, the fact that a Member State's financial liability for injury to individual supplier
interests "may be limited to (the latter's) costs for tender preparation or protest" suggests
that the purposes of review under this Agreement can be interpreted as being either to
safeguard the specific individual rights exercised or affected by participation in the letting
of a government contract, or to protect the more general interests of the collective in fair
administrative processes. The fact that the Agreement allows its participants to limit the
availability of damages to those sufficient to cover costs incurred by a potential supplier
in participating in, or challenging a given tender, more precisely, is fully congruous with
the "political logic" that usually underlies the institution of judicial review in a unitary
428 op. cit., GATT, "Agreement on Government Procurement", p. 26.
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state; it does not, that is, undermine the democratic tradition that favours the equal rights
of man as a citizen. Individuals, in this sense, are given legal standing to appeal against
administrative decisions because such appeals indirectly benefit the interests of the
collective in more just administration of the law. Even though the exercise of political
authority is effectively re-structured by the GPA, in other words, the individual "rights"
that it engenders neither imply that the power of any one of its Member State sovereigns
is inherently limited, nor preclude the continuation of processes of liberalisation "from
above".
For similar reasons, there is, in addition, no inherent ideological conflict between the
political purposes of the "constitutional rights" engendered by the GPA and the
constitutional premises of either the unitaly or popular sovereign. Raz talked about rights
relative to the division of political powers that they provoke. His theory, however, said
nothing about the particular purpose of any given right; specific constitutional rights may
protect either individual or collective interests. The role played by individuals in enforcing
a right, accordingly, has no implications as regards the nature of their relationship to
political authority. Rather, the judicial branch of government is allocated responsibility
for the protection of rights because of their relationship to a society's political culture;
politically speaking, this reflects formal recognition of the inherent fallibility of the
representative process, nothing more.
Finally, it is interesting to note how the GPA's "regulatory methodology" parallels - and
subsequently departs from - the "constitutional remedy" for the GA1'T that was proposed
by Tumlir in the early 1980s. The common domestic laws, strengthened commitment
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to non-discrimination, national review institutions, and departure from multilateralism
that he prescribed were, fundamentally, an economists interpretation of what was then-
ailing the international economic order. Despite the fact that this "institutional ordinance"
would have 1) applied exclusively to countries at similar stages of development; 2) created
only indirectly effective "rights"; and 3) given national courts the authority to conduct
the review-like procedures that were proposed, the way in which it was premised on rigid
free market principles - to be enacted through common domestic laws - suggests that
Tumlir's vision of international order, unlike that manifested in the GPA, was aligned
with that of the popular sovereign in a more politically-material sense. Although Tumlir
never went so far as to propose that GATT Contracting Parties should be held financially
liable for the effect of their discriminatory trade practices on specific individual interests,
his common domestic laws were designed as means to the end of "efficient" domestic
economic institutions; accordingly, they would have had the practical effect of freeing
the individual property owner within any given participating sovereign's national civil
society. This, for political reasons that have been explained, is something that the GPA
does not do.
Other than the fact that history has shown Tumlir's efficient "institutional remedy" to have
been politically infeasible, his proposals were, nonetheless, politically astute; most
significantly, they responded to the problem of intervention in that the "rights" to be
engendered by his new, institutionally-improved GATT were to be non self-executing,
and invocable before national courts. Furthermore, the reinforced, free market disciplines
that he advocated were only to be applied in countries with similar political systems and
at comparable stages of development. Indeed, one way of looking at today's GPA is as
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an intermediate step towards the kind of more efficient international economic institutions
that Tumlir envisaged. Politically significant differences between the constitutional vision
from which he was operating and that implicit in the GPA, however, are intelligible to
the extent that the latter departs from efficiency. In this sense, the GPA's reciprocity-based
discriminatory features are of especial importance. Alongside of the Agreement's
plurilateral and voluntary character, limited remedies and nationally-centred enforcement
procedures, they enhance the political palatability of this Agreement.
The reasons why "philosophically-oriented differences" of this nature are of practical
political importance are tied to the way in which globalisation is impinging upon the liberal
sovereign's conduct of its "positive", defense-related obligations. The market's transcension
of the nation state, as has been explained, is changing the latter's approach to the "collective
action problem" and, in the process, redefining the politics of international economic order;
to the extent that the integrity of a wider market is a strategic consideration for any given
sovereign, national security is becoming difficult to maintain independently. Leaving
a veritable "contextual seism" in its wake, this process really took off after the end of the
Cold War. To Tumlir's credit, it is a phenomenon that he did not anticipate. 429
 Its defense-
related implications for order, in any case, have two "faces", an external one and an internal
one.
In motivating his economic constitutional theory, Tumlir said that foreign policy issues
between developed countries had become economic and that economic issues demanded
429 Frieder Roessler, a long time colleague of Jan Tumlir at the GA1'T Secretariat, told the
author in conversation that Tumlir had never considered how a process of globalisation might
affect his theories.
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regulation by law.43° The ultimate political connotation of this, given the specific regulatory
methodology that he was concocting - and its relationship to that embodied in the GPA -
is an effective shielding of these issues from local political processes. The defense-related
problem that globalisation is engendering in this respect is that it is causing economic
issues to be major foreign policy issues for all countries, regardless of whether they happen
share democratic traditions, and/or relative standards of living. This, in turn, is problematic
because, as Robert Gilpin put it, the operation of the international market tends, over time,
to produce "profound shifts in the location of economic activities" and affect an
"international redistribution of economic and industrial power". The most rewarding
prospects for active economic cooperation, in this sense, may also be the least attractive
ones from a purely political point of view.
Assuming it is desirable to maintain the democratic traditions and institutions on which
the existing order is premised, it is probably premature, at best, to "de-politicise" economic
policies internationally through the multilateral introduction of efficient institutions. For
this reason, the latitude that is left to individual GPA Member States to determine the
specific, sectoral coverage of its market opening - and sustaining - disciplines is critically
important politically, as, of course, is the plurilateral nature of this accord. Alongside
of the general, defense-related "carve-outs" contained in Article XXffl of this Agreement,
these features allow participating sovereigns to maintain a maximum amount of flexibility
in determining the extent to which further liberisation - in the specific form of effective
430	 op. cit., Tumlir's "International Economic Order and Democratic
Constitutionalism", p. 80
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regulatory harmonisation - is consistent with their short-to-medium term national
interests.43'
The other security-related problem with efficient institutions in a globalising world is
that they may be introduced in a manner that is insensitive to the political role that is played
by a sovereign's existing, informal or economically "imperfect" institutions. Each nation
state, as earlier sections of this thesis have explained, has a unique approach to the
balancing of individualism and collectivism. This approach enables it to maintain domestic
order and stability, the internal aspect of a sovereign's duties of defense. The GATT's
Part II commercial policy disciplines, as has also been discussed, were premised on these
national idiosyncrasies. If the separate, nationally-centred, social equilibria that they
facilitate are under-mined, the old, abiding dilemma of representative government may
once again raise its ugly head. Efficient institutions offer a particular solution to this
dilemma, but they do not automatically reconcile problems stemming from its
implementation; ideological disjunctures between the principles on which such institutions
are premised and any given sovereign's currently prevailing assumptions with respect
to the appropriate relationship between the individual and the state may be considerable.
These disjunctures, in turn, are likely to be the products of a variety of formal and informal
institutions, some of longstanding duration.
'	 GPA Article XXIII "Exceptions to the Agreement", more specifically, include:
those for "essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war
materials.., national defense purposes... (or measures) necessary to protect public morals, order
or safety, animal or plant life or health, intellectual property, or relating to the products or
services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labour". See the text
of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, op. cit., p. 28.
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It might be said, in conclusion, that there is a built-in social governor on the pace of
institutional transformation, certainly at the level of social aggregation that has been under
consideration in this thesis. New extranational institutions must be constantly reconciled
with existing national and sub-national institutions - both formal and otherwise - if change
is to be orderly. The political danger that is potentially associated with this situation arises
from the possibility that, like a chemical solution, a given domestic system may become
saturated with externally engendered change. Whilst the economic growth that is facilitated
by efficient institutions can allow for a kind of domestic "institutional super-saturation",
further social reorganisation cannot continue apace - peacefully - once this point is
transcended. As George Sabine put it, "Ideals that have been imbedded for centuries in
a culture are not discarded with impunity".432
432	 op. cit., Sabine, p. 474.
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